Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2014

Autores

Paula Sarmento (Autor) FEP; Mariana Cunha (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

Vol. 14 Nº 1

Páginas: 1-38

ISSN: 1566-1679

Editora: Springer Nature

Indexação

Scopus - 2 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

CORDIS: Ciências Sociais > Economia > Microeconomia

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-008-95B

DOI: 10.1007/s10842-012-0150-9

Abstract (EN): This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on the static and dynamic stability of downstream incomplete collusion. It is shown that a vertical merger between an upstream firm and a downstream cartel or fringe firm promotes downstream collusion, under certain conditions on the market size. However, for low downstream market concentration, a vertical merger with a cartel firm hinders collusion. Moreover, a welfare analysis shows that consumer surplus increases with the vertical merger because the merger partially eliminates the double marginalization problem.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica