Price-Setting Dynamical Duopoly with Incomplete Information

• Tipo: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
• Data: 2011

Autores

Fernanda A. Ferreira (Autor) Outra; Flávio Ferreira (Autor) Outra; Alberto A. Pinto (Autor) FCUP

Ata de Conferência Internacional

Título: Nonlinear Science and Complexity

Páginas: 397-403

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 3 Citações

Scopus - 5 Citações

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências exactas e naturais > Matemática

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00A-9PZ

DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-9884-9_46

Resumo (PT): We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms’ expected profits with the ex-post firms’ profits.

Abstract (EN): We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F-1) that chooses first the price p(1) of its good; the other firm (F-2) observes p(1) and then chooses the price p(2) of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival's production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms' expected profits with the ex-post firms' profits.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 7