Perceptual presence: an attentional account

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2019

Autores

Riccardi, Mattia (Autor) FLUP

Revista

Título: Synthese

Vol. 196 Nº 7

Páginas: 1-30

ISSN: 0039-7857

Editora: Springer Nature

Indexação

Scopus

ERIH Plus

Google Scholar

Humanities International Complete (EBSCO)

Worldcat OCLC

EBSCO

ProQuest

Current Contents

Humanities Source Ultimate (EBSCO)

Classificação Científica

CORDIS: Humanidades > Filosofia

Outras Informações

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1588-4

Abstract (EN): It is a distinctive mark of normal conscious perception that perceived objects are experienced as actually present in one’s surroundings. The aim of this paper is to offer a phenomenologically accurate and empirically plausible account of the cognitive underpinning of this feature of conscious perception, which I shall call perceptual presence. The paper begins with a preliminary characterization of. I then consider and criticize the seminal account of proposed by Mohan Matthen. In the remainder of the paper I put forward and defend my own attentional account. I first outline a simple version of the view by focusing on vision and then extend it to audition. After discussing the case of depersonalization, I consider some objections. The last objection, in particular, will motivate a refinement of the attentional account for the visual case. The paper ends with some remarks mainly about the specificity of the visual case vis-à-vis the auditory one.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica