The effectiveness of monetary incentives of independent directors in retail and in institutional mutual funds
Ania Zalewska – University of Leicester
“Using a hand–collected data for boards from over 10,000 U.S. mutual funds in the 2002–2020 period, we document (studying fund liquidations) that the directors’ remuneration received from fund families aligns directors with fund families’ preferences in retail funds, whereas shares held by directors do not align them with shareholders’ preferences. The opposite effects are found for institutional funds. Our results indicate that when shareholders’ monitoring is weak (retail funds), directors’ share–ownership is ineffective in representing shareholders’ interests, and the size of directors’ remuneration signals poor governance. In contrast, directors’ remuneration signals pay–for–performance in institutional funds.”
Any questions please contact cefup.sec@fep.up.pt.
“Cef.up is financed by Portuguese public funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, I.P., in the framework of the project with reference UIDB/04105/2020”