Resumo (PT):
Abstract (EN):
Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One
Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and
things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker
(2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim
that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a
weaker version of the One Object View that is not couched in terms of Numerical
Identity and, consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case
is based on a sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that
appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the
very same things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly)
under the mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of
sensory intuition are appearances; presented under the (possible) mode of intellectual
intuition are things in themselves. This way of construing appearances and things
in themselves preserves the core insight of the One Object View. At the same time,
as it does not entail any isomorphism between appearances and things in themselves,
it does not clash against Noumenal Ignorance.
Idioma:
Inglês
Tipo (Avaliação Docente):
Científica
Nº de páginas:
17