The problem with J. Searle’s idea that ‘all seeing is seeing-as’ (or what Wittgenstein did not mean with the Duck-Rabbit)

• Tipo: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
• Data: 2019

Autores

Miguens, Sofia (Autor) FLUP

Ata de Conferência Internacional

Título: The philosophy of perception: proceedings of the 40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium

Páginas: 135-146

40th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2017

Classificação Científica

CORDIS: Humanidades > Filosofia

Outras Informações

DOI: 10.1515/9783110657920-008

Abstract (EN): In Seeing Things As They Are - A Theory of Perception (Searle 2015) John Searle claims that all seeing is seeing-as. The thesis in fact encapsulates his intentionalism about perceptual experience. In what follows I suggest that Searle’s intentionalism embodies what Wittgenstein thought should not be said about seeing-as (Wittgenstein 2009). Based on recent interpretations of Wittgenstein on seeing-as (Schulte 2016, Baz 2016, Travis 2016). I try to spell out the nature and the implications of the head-on clash between Searle’s and Wittgenstein’s positions regarding seeing-as. I finish by discussing whether an alternative to intentionalism as a view of perception does indeed emerge from Wittgenstein’s remarks on seeing-as.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica