Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2011

Autores

Alonso Meijide, JM (Autor) Outra; Ferreira, F (Autor) Outra; Alvarez Mozos, M (Autor) Outra; Pinto, AA (Autor) FCUP

Revista

Título: Journal of Difference Equations and Applications

Vol. 17 Nº 7

Páginas: 1095-1100

ISSN: 1023-6198

Editora: Taylor & Francis

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 5 Citações

Scopus - 8 Citações

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências exactas e naturais > Matemática

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-002-XCC

DOI: 10.1080/10236190903200677

Resumo (PT): Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Abstract (EN): Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 6