| Summary: |
Hallucinations are a lingering concern for philosophers and psychologists alike.
On the one hand, from a philosopher's viewpoint they represent the paramount
case of epistemic disquietude. On the other hand, clinicians and experimental
psychologists studying mental disorders often encounter them too. In recent
years, however, interest in the problem of hallucinations has become more
intense than ever. In philosophy, the recent revival of naïve realism under the
label of "disjunctivism" has revitalized the philosophical debate surrounding
hallucinations (see [7], [16], [23]). Similarly, the empirical investigation of
hallucinations has been an important trend in psychology - in a broad sense - in
recent decades [1]. This is largely due to the impressive development of neuroimaging
techniques which have permitted to gather a much deeper insight into
the neurobiological underpinnings of such mental phenomena. Unfortunately,
philosophers and psychologists concerned with hallucinatory phenomena have
rarely shown interest in each other's work (a rare exception is LarALia10). On
the one hand, reference to empirical findings is scarce within the disjunctivism
discussion. On the other hand, psychologists give less attention to the
conceptual work brought about by philosophers in order to clarify the nature of
different kinds of mental events. Accordingly, lack of cross-fertilization between
the two areas is the main motivation of this project. Therefore, the general
proposal we put forward consists in promoting a multidisciplinary approach to
the problem of hallucination as the most appropriate strategy. This key idea will
be articulated along three main axes:
A) Conceptual puzzles for psychologists: The different theoretical frameworks
and methodological approaches adopted in investigating hallucinatory
phenomena have made it difficult to provide not only a widely accepted
classification (see [6] for auditory hallucinations), but even a non-conte  |
Summary
Hallucinations are a lingering concern for philosophers and psychologists alike.
On the one hand, from a philosopher's viewpoint they represent the paramount
case of epistemic disquietude. On the other hand, clinicians and experimental
psychologists studying mental disorders often encounter them too. In recent
years, however, interest in the problem of hallucinations has become more
intense than ever. In philosophy, the recent revival of naïve realism under the
label of "disjunctivism" has revitalized the philosophical debate surrounding
hallucinations (see [7], [16], [23]). Similarly, the empirical investigation of
hallucinations has been an important trend in psychology - in a broad sense - in
recent decades [1]. This is largely due to the impressive development of neuroimaging
techniques which have permitted to gather a much deeper insight into
the neurobiological underpinnings of such mental phenomena. Unfortunately,
philosophers and psychologists concerned with hallucinatory phenomena have
rarely shown interest in each other's work (a rare exception is LarALia10). On
the one hand, reference to empirical findings is scarce within the disjunctivism
discussion. On the other hand, psychologists give less attention to the
conceptual work brought about by philosophers in order to clarify the nature of
different kinds of mental events. Accordingly, lack of cross-fertilization between
the two areas is the main motivation of this project. Therefore, the general
proposal we put forward consists in promoting a multidisciplinary approach to
the problem of hallucination as the most appropriate strategy. This key idea will
be articulated along three main axes:
A) Conceptual puzzles for psychologists: The different theoretical frameworks
and methodological approaches adopted in investigating hallucinatory
phenomena have made it difficult to provide not only a widely accepted
classification (see [6] for auditory hallucinations), but even a non-contentious
definition of them (see [25], [19], [1], [5]). Furthermore, psychological literature
often fails to specify criteria which enable to clearly distinguish hallucinations
from other sensory events such as misperceptions, illusions, imagery
phenomena and even dreams.
B) Empirical puzzles for philosophers: Common to the many versions of
disjunctivism that can be found in related literature is the idea that there is a
fundamental discontinuity between perceptions and hallucinations: there is no
"common factor" which is shared by these two classes of mental phenomena.
However, cognitive and neurobiological models typically treat perceptions and
hallucinations as being realized in the same functional and anatomical systems.
This claim, at least prima facie, contrasts with the discontinuity assumption
which is most central to disjunctivism. This tension opens up several questions.
How can the view suggested by cognitive and neurobiological models be
articulated so as to challenge disjunctivism? And how can disjunctivists defend
their core thesis taking into account the functional and anatomical convergence
suggested by the neurobiological findings?
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C) The real puzzle: The phenomenology (phenomeal character) of hallucinatory
experience still remains obscure. Particularly puzzling is its "percept-like
charachter" [24], its misleading "sense of reality" [3]. Sometimes this character
is described as "Leibhaftigkeit" [18], or "vividness". In the case of veridical
perception, vividness is taken to indicate the fact that we are being presented
with the objects in our surroundings. For instance, the vividn |