AIRPORT AND AIRLINE COMPETITION: INCENTIVES FOR VERTICAL COLLUSION

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2009

Autores

Cristina Barbot (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

Vol. 43 Nº 10

Páginas: 952-965

ISSN: 0191-2615

Editora: Elsevier

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 35 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 45 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Outras ciências sociais

CORDIS: Ciências Sociais

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-003-E8N

DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001

Abstract (EN): This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions, also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines.

Idioma: Português

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica