Non-competition covenants in acquisition deals

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2016

Autores

Alcino Azevedo (Autor) Outra; Paulo Jorge Pereira (Autor) FEP; Rodrigues, Artur (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Economics Letters

Vol. 143

Páginas: 61-65

ISSN: 0165-1765

Editora: Elsevier

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 2 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 2 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00K-CMH

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.025

Abstract (EN): We study the changes in the consumers' and producers' surplus associated with acquisition deals where there is a non-competition covenant that forbids the seller from re-entering the market over a given time period. We find that these acquisition deals can lead to significant negative (positive) changes in the producers' (consumers') surplus, which decrease significantly with the time period of the covenant. We also show that the effect of the time period of the covenant on the welfare change can be positive or negative. It depends largely on the market conditions, such as the profit uncertainty and growth rate. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica