Vaccine supply: Effects of regulation and competition

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2011

Autores

Danzon, PM (Autor) Outra; Nuno Sousa Pereira (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: International Journal of the Economics of Business

Vol. 18

Páginas: 239-271

ISSN: 1357-1516

Editora: Taylor & Francis

Indexação

Scopus - 12 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-007-ZJW

DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2011.584429

Abstract (EN): In US vaccine markets, competing producers with high fixed, sunk costs face relatively concentrated demand. The resulting price and quality competition leads to the exit of all but one or very few producers per vaccine. Our empirical analysis of exits from US vaccine markets supports the hypothesis that high fixed costs and both price and quality competition contribute to vaccine exits. We find no evidence that government purchasing has significant effects, possibly because government purchase tends to increase volume but lower price, with offsetting effects. Evidence from the flu vaccine market confirms that government purchasing is not a necessary condition for exits and the existence of few suppliers per vaccine in the US. © 2011 International Journal of the Economics of Business.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica