PRICE DISCRIMINATION STRATEGIES OF LOW COST CARRIERS

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2009

Autores

Carlos Alves (Autor) FEP; Cristina Barbot (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Journal of Transport Economics and Policy

Vol. 43 Nº 3

Páginas: 345-363

ISSN: 0022-5258

Editora: University of Bath

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 11 Citações

Scopus - 11 Citações

EBSCO

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Outras ciências sociais

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-003-GAM

Abstract (EN): The low-cost carriers' (LCCs) pricing system is characterised by a single class of booking that starts with a minimum fare and then monotonically increases its value over time. This is a form of price discrimination although markets are not physically or temporally separate. Using game theory techniques, this paper shows that this Lo-Hi (low first and later high) strategy is optimal under certain ranges of fare. The paper also finds that the existence of different probabilities of consuming the good and of different willingness to pay makes it possible to separate markets in time and to profitably price discriminate.

Idioma: Português

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica