Entry deterrence and entry accommodation strategies of a multiproduct firm regulated with dynamic price cap

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2007

Autores

Paula Sarmento (Autor) FEP; António Brandão (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: International Advances in Economic Research

Vol. 13 Nº 1

Páginas: 19-34

ISSN: 1083-0898

Editora: Springer Nature

Indexação

Scopus - 2 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-007-H5J

DOI: 10.1007/s11294-006-9058-7

Abstract (EN): In this paper we study the way a multiproduct firm, regulated through a dynamic price cap, can develop a price strategy that uses the regulatory policy to deter entry. We consider a firm that initially operates as a monopolist in two markets but faces potential entry in one of the markets. We conclude that the regulated firm can have the incentive to block the entry. This strategy leads to the reduction of the price in both markets. However, the final effect of the entry deterrence strategy on total consumer surplus is not always positive. © International Atlantic Economic Society 2006.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica