Endogenous Mergers and Collusion in Asymmetric Market Structures

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2012

Autores

Mattias Ganslandt (Autor) Outra; Lars Persson (Autor) Outra; Helder Vasconcelos (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Economica

Vol. 79 Nº 316

Páginas: 766-791

ISSN: 0013-0427

Editora: Wiley-Blackwell

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 17 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 17 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

Projetos Associados

PTDC/EGE-ECO/099784/2008 - Modelos em "Antitrust Economics"

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-002-53Q

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00937.x

Abstract (EN): Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization, we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they balance the small firms' incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders' indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger model, we also show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion. Current antisymmetry merger policy can thus be counterproductive.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 26