Risk tolerance and social awareness: adapting deterrence sanctions to agent populations

• Tipo: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
• Data: 2009

Autores

Henrique Lopes Cardoso (Autor) FEUP; Eugénio Oliveira (Autor) FEUP

Ata de Conferência Internacional

Título: Progress in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the 14th Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence, EPIA2009

Páginas: 560-571

14th EPIA - Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence - EPIA 2009

Universidade de Aveiro, Portugal, 12 a 15 de Outubro de 2009

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 0 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 1 Citação

INSPEC

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências exactas e naturais > Ciências da computação e da informação

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-003-RWB

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04686-5_46

Abstract (EN): Normative environments for multi-agent systems provide means to monitor and enforce agents' compliance to their commitments. However, when the normative space is imperfect, contracts to which norms apply may be Unbalanced, and agents may exploit potential flaws to their own advantage. In this paper we analyze how a normative framework endowed with a simple adaptive deterrence sanctioning model responds to different agent populations. Agents are characterized by their risk tolerance and by their social attitude. We show that risk-averse or socially concerned populations cause lesser deterrence sanctions to be imposed by the normative system.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 12