Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2007

Autores

Paula Sarmento (Autor) FEP; António Brandão (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Telecommunications Policy

Vol. 31 Nº 5

Páginas: 236-250

ISSN: 0308-5961

Editora: Elsevier

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 16 Citações

Scopus - 21 Citações

Classificação Científica

CORDIS: Ciências Sociais > Economia

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-004-9Z9

DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2007.03.003

Abstract (EN): In this paper, two instruments of access price regulation, cost-based and retail-minus, are compared with the full deregulation hypothesis. For this purpose, a model that considers an upstream monopolist firm that sells a vital input to an independent firm and to a subsidiary firm in the downstream market is developed. The main conclusion of the paper is that retail-minus regulation avoids foreclosure and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus. Moreover, retail-minus regulation allows a higher consumer surplus than deregulation of access price as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-minus instrument.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 15