SUSTAINING COLLUSION IN GROWING MARKETS

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2008

Autores

Helder Vasconcelos (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Vol. 17 Nº Number 4, Winter 2008

Páginas: 973-1010

ISSN: 1058-6407

Editora: John Wiley & Sons

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 9 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 11 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-003-TJ1

DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00202.x

Abstract (EN): The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable 'grim trigger strategies' available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 38