Entry regulation under asymmetric information about demand

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2010

Autores

Paula Sarmento (Autor) FEP; António Brandão (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Economics research international

Vol. 2010

ISSN: n/a

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00H-ZFV

DOI: 10.1155/2010/105049

Abstract (EN): We investigate how an incumbent firm can use the regulatory policy about entry and the informational advantage to protect his market position. This question is studied through the construction of a signalling game where we assume that the regulator has less information about demand than the firms. We conclude that there is a pooling equilibrium and partially separating equilibria in which entry is deterred and, if demand is high, there will be insufficient entry. The final effect on welfare depends on the tradeoff between short-run benefits (lower price) and long-run losses (weaker competition).

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica