Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

• Tipo: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
• Data: 2007

Autores

F. A. Ferreira (Autor) Outra; A. A. Pinto (Autor) FCUP; H. A. Moreira (Autor) Outra

Ata de Conferência Internacional

Título: Proceedings in Applied Mathemetics and Mechanics (PAMM)

Páginas: 1060301-1060302

Conference in Applied Mathemetics and Mechanics

Weinheim, Germany

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências exactas e naturais > Matemática

Outras Informações

Resumo (PT): We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Abstract (EN): We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica