Can partial horizontal ownership lessen competition more than a monopoly?

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2019

Autores

Brito, D (Autor) Outra; Ribeiro, R (Autor) Outra; Helder Vasconcelos (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Economics Letters

Vol. 176

Páginas: 90-95

ISSN: 0165-1765

Editora: Elsevier

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 20 Citações

Scopus - 18 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00Q-4S1

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.039

Abstract (EN): In this paper we investigate the anti-competitive effects of partial horizontal ownership in a setting where: (i) two cost-asymmetric firms compete a la Cournot; (ii) managers deal with eventual conflicting interests of the different shareholders by maximizing a weighted sum of the two firms' operating profits; and (iii) weights result from the corporate control structure of the firm they run. Within this theoretical structure, we find that if the manager of the more efficient firm weights the operating profit of the (inefficient) rival more than its own profit, then partial ownership will lessen competition more than a monopoly when both firms produce.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 6