The power of voting and corruption cycles

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2022

Autores

Accinelli, E. (Autor) Outra; Martins, F. (Autor) FCUP; Pinto, Alberto Adrego (Autor) FCUP; Afsar, A. (Autor) Outra; Oliveira, B.M.P.M. (Autor) FCNAUP

Revista

Título: Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Páginas: 1-24

ISSN: 0022-250X

Editora: Taylor & Francis

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 5 Citações

Scopus - 3 Citações

Classificação Científica

CORDIS: Ciências da Saúde

FOS: Ciências médicas e da saúde

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00S-QAW

DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2020.1818077

Abstract (EN): We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 24