Cost inefficiency and Optimal Market Structure in Spatial Cournot Discrimination, FEP Working Paper, n. 462. 2012

• Tipo: Trabalho Académico
• Data: 2012

Autores

Ricardo Biscaia (Autor) FEP; Paula Sarmento (Autor) FEP

Indexação

EBSCO

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

CORDIS: Ciências Sociais > Economia

Outras Informações

Abstract (EN): This paper analyzes the location patterns of firms in Cournot spatial discrimination set- ting. The innovation step is that firms are allowed to have di¤erent marginal costs of the production. When analyzing the two-stage location-quantity game, we conclude that firms choose the central agglomeration outcome whatever the marginal cost di¤erence between them. When maximizing social welfare, the social planner chooses the central location for both firms as well if the marginal cost di¤erences are not too big. When allowed to decide if the ine¢ cient firm should be in the market or not, the social planner removes the ine¢ cient firm from the market if its cost is too high.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Notas: Disponível em http://wps.fep.up.pt/wps/wp462.pdf