EMISSION PERMITS TRADING AND DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC MARKET INTERACTION

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2013

Autores

De Feo, G (Autor) Outra; Joana Resende (Autor) FEP; Sanin, ME (Autor) Outra

Revista

Título: Manchester School

Vol. 81 Nº 5

Páginas: 780-802

ISSN: 1463-6786

Editora: Wiley-Blackwell

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 10 Citações

Scopus - 11 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-006-7Z4

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02310.x

Abstract (EN): This paper studies inefficiencies arising in oligopolies subject to environmental regulation based on tradable emission permits. We propose a duopoly model of upstream-downstream strategic competition: in the permits market a leader sets the price, whereas in the output market Cournot competition occurs. We find that strategic interaction in the output market gives rise to an additional distortion in the permits market where both firms adopt rival's cost-rising' strategies to gain a competitive advantage in the output market. As a result, the price of permits is always higher than firms' marginal abatement costs.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 23