EXTERNALITY EFFECTS IN THE FORMATION OF SOCIETIES

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2015

Authors

Renato Soeiro (Author) FCUP; Abdelrahim Mousa (Author) FCUP; Alberto Pinto (Author) FCUP

Journal

Title: Journal of Dynamics and Games

Vol. 2 No. 3&4

Pages: 303-320

Publisher: American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 1 Citation

Scopus - 1 Citation

Scientific classification

FOS: Natural sciences > Mathematics

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00K-A40

DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2015007

Abstract (EN): We study a finite decision model where the utility function is an additive combination of a personal valuation component and an interaction component. Individuals are characterized according to these two components (their valuation type and externality type), and also according to their crowding type (how they influence others). We study how positive externalities lead to typo symmetries euillbrIn, while negative externalities allow the existence of equillibria that are not type-symmetric. In particular, we show that positive elides lead to euilibria having a unique partition into a minimum number of societies (simi individuals using the same strategy, see 1271); and negat ve externalities I to equilibria with multiple societal partitions, some with the maximum number of societies

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 18