Consumer-surplus-enhancing collusion and trade

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2012

Autores

George Deltas (Autor) Outra; Alberto Salvo (Autor) Outra; Helder Vasconcelos (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: RAND Journal of Economics

Vol. 43 Nº 2

Páginas: 315-328

ISSN: 0741-6261

Editora: Wiley-Blackwell

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 10 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 11 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

Projetos Associados

PTDC/EGE-ECO/099784/2008 - Modelos em "Antitrust Economics"

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-002-9CR

DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00167.x

Abstract (EN): That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated-product duopoly operates in two geographically separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel, relative to duopolistic competition, raises the price of the imported good and lowers the price of the home good. This raises welfare for most consumers and increases aggregate consumer surplus. A similar possibility result applies to autarky. Our analysis applies beyond the spatial setting.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 14