Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2009

Autores

João Correia-da-Silva (Autor) FEP; Carlos Hervés-Beloso (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Economic Theory

Vol. 39

Páginas: 67-92

ISSN: 0938-2259

Editora: Springer Nature

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 23 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 27 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

CORDIS: Ciências Sociais > Economia

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-003-M0T

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0316-6

Abstract (EN): In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow-Debreu that is used to study trade ex ante with private state verification. Under the assumption that agents are prudent, equilibrium is characterized by the fact that agents consume bundles with the same utility in states that they do not distinguish. This is a weaker condition than the restriction of equal consumption imposed by Radner (Econometrica 36(1), 31-58, 1968), therefore, some no trade situations are avoided and the efficiency of trade increases.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 26