Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2017

Autores

Carvalho, M (Autor) Outra; Lodi, A (Autor) Outra; Joao Pedro Pedroso (Autor) FCUP; Viana, A (Autor) Outra

Revista

A Revista está pendente de validação pelos Serviços Administrativos.

Título: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING

Vol. 161

Páginas: 389-417

ISSN: 0025-5610

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 20 Citações

Scopus - 22 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00K-E9S

DOI: 10.1007/s10107-016-1013-7

Abstract (EN): Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national, regional or hospital frameworks, to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted. For the case of hospital programs, it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other, sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals. This claim led to the study of multi-hospital exchange markets. We propose a novel direction in this setting by modeling the exchange market as an integer programming game. The analysis of the strategic behavior of the entities participating in the kidney exchange game allowed us to prove that the most rational game outcome maximizes the social welfare and that it can be computed in polynomial time.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 29