NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2017

Autores

Zubelli, JP (Autor) Outra; Alberto A. Pinto (Autor) FCUP; Martins, F (Autor) Outra

Revista

Título: Journal of Dynamics and Games

Vol. 4

Páginas: 149-173

Editora: American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 1 Citação

Scopus - 1 Citação

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00M-W7Y

DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2017009

Abstract (EN): We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quantities. We compare the competitive (Nash) tariffs with the cooperative (social) tariffs and we classify the game type according to the coincidence or not of these equilibria as a social equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma or a lose-win dilemma.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 25