Dual process theory and the challenges of functional individuation

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2024

Authors

Grayot, James D. (Author) FLUP; Beck, Lukas (Author) Other; Heijmeskamp, Thijs (Author) Other

Journal

Title: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

ISSN: 1568-7759

Publisher: Springer Nature

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Other information

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10000-3

Abstract (EN): Despite on-going debates in philosophy and cognitive science, dual process theory (DPT) remains a popular framework for theorizing about human cognition. Its central hypothesis is that cognitive processing can be subsumed under two generic types. In this paper, we argue that the putative success and popularity of this framework remains overstated and gives rise to certain misunderstandings. If DPT has predictive and/or explanatory power, it is through offering descriptions of cognitive phenomena via functional analysis. But functional descriptions require an individuation strategy. To date, there has been no systematic exploration of how Type 1 and Type 2 are functionally individuated. Following recent debates in philosophy of cognitive science, we consider three individuation strategies (i.e., abstraction, reification, fictionalization) and assess the legitimacy of each in relation to DPT. This leads us to the verdict that the most viable route for justifying DPT is to construe Type 1 and Type 2 processes as reifications. We conclude that, construed as reifications, the common rationales offered by proponents of DPT for demarcating Type 1 and Type 2 processes do not escape criticism and require further theoretical justification.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

Notes: Accepted 31 May 2024; Published 25 June 2024

No. of pages: 23