

Universidade do Porto
Faculdade de Psicologia e de Ciências da Educação

**PRIMACY OF MORALITY AND THE HALO EFFECT IN JUDGMENTS OF
IMMORAL AND INCOMPETENT DEVIANTS: THE IMPACT OF GROUP
MEMBERSHIP AND INTERGROUP COMPARISON**

Jennifer Dawn Lech

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Eu, Jennifer Dawn Lech, portador do passaporte 141671380 declaro, para os devidos efeitos, que o meu trabalho, intitulado *Primacy of Morality and The Halo Effect in Judgments of Immoral and Incompetent Deviants: The Impact of Group Membership and Intergroup Comparison* executado na Unidade Curricular de Dissertação de Mestrado, orientado pelo Professor Doutor Rui Serôdio, é um trabalho original e inédito, fruto das minhas pesquisas e investigações.

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(Jennifer Dawn Lech)

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Abstract

As members of an interactive society, humans are continuously presented with opinions, suggestions, and innovative ideas. They are subject to constant pressure, different motivations, and endless influence by others. How can people negotiate their way around this complex social world? The present study aims to clarify and provide support for previous research on the impact of group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social identity. It specifically focuses on the effect that a morally deviant ingroup member and an insecure intergroup context have on the judgments from other ingroup individuals.

The theories of social identity (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), self-categorization (e.g. Turner, 1982), and the model of subjective group dynamics (e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998), as well as the two basic dimensions of social judgments, morality and competence (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968), are central to the theoretical framework of this investigation.

Through manipulation of *Group Membership (Ingroup / Outgroup)*, *Type of Deviance (Immoral / Incompetent)* and *Intergroup Comparison (Secure / Insecure)* in a factorial design, we established the roles of these variables. Our hypotheses that there would be an effect of primacy of morality over competence in the *Immoral* condition and a pattern consistent with a halo effect in the judgments of an *Immoral Ingroup Member* in an *Insecure Intergroup Context* were generally supported by the results.

Resumo

Como membros de uma sociedade interativa, os seres humanos são continuamente apresentados com opiniões, sugestões e ideias inovadoras. Eles estão sujeitos a uma pressão constante, motivações diferentes, e a influência interminável por outros. Como é que as pessoas podem negociar o seu caminho em torno deste complexo mundo social? O presente estudo visa esclarecer e fornecer apoio para as pesquisas anteriores sobre o impacto da pertença a um grupo, do comportamento desviante e da ameaça à identidade social. Foca-se especificamente no efeito que um membro endogrupal moralmente desviante, num contexto intergrupar inseguro, tem nos julgamos que recebe de outros indivíduos do grupo.

As teorias da identidade social (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a auto-categorização (e.g. Turner, 1982), e o modelo da dinâmica de grupos subjetiva (e.g. Marques, Paez & Abrams, 1998), bem como as duas dimensões básicas dos julgamentos sociais, moralidade e competência (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968), são fundamentais para o enquadramento teórico desta investigação.

Através da manipulação da *Pertença Grupal (Endogrupo / Exogrupo)*, *Tipo de Desvio (Imoral / Incompetente)* e *Comparação Entre os Grupos (Segura / Insegura)*, num plano fatorial, estabelecemos os papéis destas variáveis. As nossas hipóteses de que se verificaria um efeito de primazia da moralidade sobre a competência na condição *Imoral* e um padrão consistente com um efeito de halo nos julgamentos de um membro *Imoral* do *Endogrupo* num *Contexto Intergrupar Inseguro* foram globalmente suportadas pelos resultados.

Resumen

Como miembros de una sociedad interactiva, los humanos se ven confrontados constantemente con opiniones, sugerencias e ideas innovadoras. Sujetos a presiones constantes, diferentes motivaciones y la perpetua influencia de los otros. ¿Cómo pueden las personas negociar su camino al redor de este complejo mundo social? El presente estudio quiere esclarecer y fornecer apoyo a las pesquisas anteriores acerca del impacto de la pretensa a un grupo, del comportamiento desviante y de la amenaza a la identidad social. Se foca en especial en el efecto que un miembro del endogrupo moralmente desviante, en un contexto intergrupar inseguro, tiene en los juzgamientos de los otros miembros del grupo.

Las teorías de la identidad social (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), la auto-categorización (e.g. Turner, 1982), y el modelo de la dinámica de grupos subjetiva (e.g. Marques, Paez & Abrams, 1998), así como las dos dimensiones básicas de los juzgamientos sociales, moralidad y competencia (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968), son fundamentales para el encuadramiento teórico de esta investigación.

A través de la manipulación de la *Pretensa Grupal (Endogrupo / Exogrupo)*, *Tipo de Desvío (Inmoral / Incompetente)* y *Comparación Entre los Grupos (Segura / Insegura)*, en un plan factorial, establecemos los papeles de estas variables. Nuestras hipótesis de que se verificaría un efecto de primacía de la moralidad sobre la competencia en la condición *Inmoral* y un padrón consistente con un efecto de halo en los juzgamientos de un miembro *Inmoral* del *Endogrupo* en un *Contexto Intergrupar Inseguro* fueron globalmente suportadas por los resultados.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The complexity of human interaction is reflected in the impact that the existence of others has on the way humans feel, believe, and act. From genocide in Nazi Germany, to political paradigms and voting decisions, to simple expressed opinions in conversations with a long-time friend, the expansive influence of social relationships is extraordinary. This overwhelming influence on different aspects of human life has been contemplated by researchers for many years. The present study aims to develop the concept by focusing on the role of social identity theory, self-categorization theory, and the model of subjective group dynamics, while specifically analyzing the unique association between the two fundamental dimensions of social perception, which are morality and competence. We intend to prove that within the realm of social judgment, group membership, type of deviance, and presence or absence of threat within intergroup comparison can play a momentous role.

Specifically, this study was developed in order to provide support to help answer questions of social influence, such as: When considering socially or intellectually deviant individuals, that is, immoral or incompetent, are those who are socially deviant more harshly judged, regardless of ingroup or outgroup status? Does immoral behavior provoke a stronger negative emotional reaction than incompetence? What role does threat to intergroup comparison play in the judgment of a deviant group member? How harshly are immorally deviant ingroup members evaluated when there is a threat to positive ingroup representation? The concepts of group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social identity are central in the present research.

The paper begins with a summary of the central concepts of social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner, 1982), and the model of subjective group dynamics (e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) in order to establish

the background knowledge on basic social phenomenon. Next, the two basic dimensions of social judgments, morality and competence (e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968), are described, including explanations of the relationship between the two dimensions (e.g. Judd et al., 2005) and the primacy of morality (e.g. Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Wojciszke & Dowhyluk, 2003).

Following the theoretical framework, we present the 3-level factorial design of this study and the research methodology. The results are then presented; including all statistical analyses run using the software SPSS. Finally, we present a discussion of results and our conclusions regarding the study and possible further research.

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory is centered on the idea of the individual within the group. Social identity is the individual's definition of self, based on membership to a group and the emotional and value significance given to that group membership (Tajfel, 1972). While humans are individual beings with personal characteristics (ie: "I like chocolate", "I get along with my brother"), as members of society, they also define themselves through group membership ("I am a woman", "I am a supporter of team X"). The purpose of social identity theory is to explain the how individuals establish and understand their role in society. It describes the situations in which individuals view themselves as a singular person or as a member of a group, and elaborates on the effect of this identity definition on group behavior and individual perceptions (Abrams & Hogg, 1990).

Social identity theory was established through the study of the conditions that lead to favoring the ingroup (the group to which the individual is a member) and opposing or disapproving the outgroup (the group to which the individual is not a member), known as minimal group studies (Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1975, 1978). Since these initial studies, the theory has developed and been extended to many different aspects of group behavior, including stereotyping, intergroup conflict, and leadership (Levine and Hogg, 2010).

Cognitive Processes

One of the basic features of social identity theory is that there are three psychological processes involved in the way people socially define or classify themselves: social categorization, social comparison, and social identification (Tajfel, 1979). Social categorization is based on the tendency that people view themselves or others only as members of groups, rather than as individuals. When social categorization is the central

means of perceiving a person, he may lose some of his unique characteristics because he is seen solely as a member of a certain group.

Social comparison refers to the process by which a group is perceived as having a particular value, especially in relation to the value of other groups. Through social comparison, some groups and their members are considered as more socially valuable by their characteristics. For example, social comparison may lead to the consideration that professors are more valuable than construction workers. However, in comparison with a different social group, such as doctors, professors may be considered to be of lower social value.

Social identification considers the idea that people tend to view social situations with regards to how they view themselves and their social relation to others, rather than as subjective outsiders. In other words, an individual's outlook on the world, his place and the place of others is based on the position that he occupies in society. A construction worker's awareness of his social standing in relation to professors, according to social comparison, will affect the way he views himself and how he interacts with professors and other construction workers.

An individual's social identity is formed based on these three processes, as they allow the person to understand his level of belonging within social groups combined with emotional meaning and value placed on that membership. Although personal identity is based on an individual's awareness of his personal attributes and unique qualities, social identity reflects whom an individual is, based on his group membership (Levine and Hogg, 2010).

Behavior Motivation and Status Improvement

One central feature of social identity theory is the concept of behavior motivation. The idea is that behavior can be either motivated by the individual, which is considered interpersonal behavior, or by the group membership of the individual, considered intergroup behavior. Group membership motivated behavior is often a response to people's desire for a positive portrayal of their group. This need for their group to be positively regarded by other groups and individuals can lead to a focus on the positive attributes (traits, attitudes and behaviors) of their group or to an emphasis on the less desirable characteristics of an outgroup (Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

When an individual believes that his group may be negatively regarded, the solution to this dilemma depends on his social belief system, which ranges from an individual mobility belief system to a social change belief system. The individual mobility belief system, or notion that an individual can move freely between social groups, allows for a person to change their social status by simply moving to another social group. On the other hand, the social change belief system is the conviction that the movement of the group's social standing is the only way to change its status (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).

Self-Categorization Theory

Turner's role in the study of social identity theory led him to the development of self-categorization theory (Turner, 1982). The theory's development first came about as an explanation of the distinction between social identity and personal identity. Self-categorization is closely related to social identity theory, but the details of the theories differ in that self-categorization places more emphasis on cognition and self-definition based on the group, while social identity theory focuses on motivation and intergroup

dimensions. Specifically, self-categorization theory explains the cognitive process of categorization within groups, which leads to identification with that specific group, and the different behaviors that result from group membership (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).

Prototypes and Categorization

One of the central aspects of self-categorization theory is the representation that individuals have about specific features of a group, which can be considered the prototype of that group. Prototypes include the general characteristics used to describe the similarities within a group and the differences between groups. Prototypes allow for entitativity (Campbell, 1958), or the consideration that a group is a pure and distinct entity, as they push for clear and specific representations of the group. The consideration of prototypes to define groups leads to the categorization of individuals, which often results in the binary categorization of our selves within the ingroup and the other within the outgroup. Prototypes are dependent on context, since they can change when the reference of comparison to an outgroup changes (Turner, 1987).

Due to the use of prototypes to categorize others, individuals tend to become depersonalized, and regarded as a generic member of the group. This depersonalization of outgroup members leads to the formation of group stereotypes, as group members lose their personal traits and are considered to hold only the prototypical characteristics of the group. Categorization can also occur with the ingroup or with the self. Categorizing the self can lead to self-stereotyping, or the consideration that we are defined by the traits of the ingroup. The categorization of ingroup members, combined with the idea of prototypical group behavior, leads to the definition of group norms. Acceptable group behavior is therefore reflective of established norms, and can be considered normative behavior (Turner, 1982, 1987).

Affect Regarding the Ingroup and Ethnocentrism

The cognitive impacts of self-categorization can influence people's affect. The feelings they have for ingroup members are based more on their fit into the group prototype than their individual characteristics. According to this concept, the more a member fits the prototype, the more liked he will be by group members. Another important aspect of this idea is that ingroup members should, therefore, be more liked than outgroup members because the ingroup prototype is considered more attractive and outgroup members are unprototypical (Turner, 1987; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).

The idea that people view the ingroup prototype as better than outgroup prototypes is related to ethnocentrism, or the consideration that the ingroup is wholly superior to any outgroup (Turner, 1987). Since people want their ethnocentric beliefs to be true, there is a constant pressure on group status and need for self-enhancement of the group to moderate collective self-esteem. Theories have emerged that incorporate self-categorization theory with social identity theory to explain how people behave as a result of this motivation for self and group enhancement. Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007) explains that people do not like uncertainty about their place in the social world and about their expected actions (and those of others), so they try to reduce these feelings of uncertainty. The ability for individuals to define themselves and know how they and others are supposed to act, based on social identity, allows for a reduction in uncertainty. Another theory that incorporates both social identity theory and self-categorization theory as aspects to explain behavioral motivation is the optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991). The theory states that people are motivated to be both unique individuals and generic members of groups, and to solve this dilemma they must find an optimal amount of distinctiveness.

Normative and Deviant Behavior

Self-categorization theory helps to shed light on the cognitive processes related to depersonalization, group prototypes, stereotypes and normative behavior. Due to the consequence of ethnocentrism, individuals want all members of their group to be the best group representative possible. As such, members should epitomize the prototype, and therefore display normative behavior. Consequently, individuals who do not fit the mold and have deviant behavior will not be treated the same or viewed equally as those who are nearly perfect prototypes. This type of response is exactly what the model of subjective group dynamics explains, below. Although deviant behavior may be important because it helps to define the rules and boundaries of certain behaviors, those who are deviant will experience the social ingroup and outgroup differently than those who are normative members (Levine and Hogg, 2010).

Subjective Group Dynamics

The model of subjective group dynamics is related to both social identity theory and self-categorization theory. Social identity theory supports the idea that people have a desire for their ingroup to be considered socially favorable, and therefore they will perceive anyone who brings an unfavorable quality to their ingroup as negative. Self-categorization theory is associated, in that individuals make judgments about favorable qualities based on the prototype of the ingroup. Accordingly, non-prototypical members are considered as unfavorable, and consequently, are a negative aspect of the ingroup. These non-prototypical individuals are considered to be deviant group members.

Intergroup and Intragroup Differentiation

The model of subjective group dynamics essentially states that individuals may differentiate among ingroup members if they are provoked to differentiate between groups (their ingroup and an outgroup). Further, individuals who are more concerned with intergroup differentiation will be more likely to differentiate among group members when a deviant is present (Marques et al., 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). Even though the model relates social identity theory and self-categorization theory, it actually describes circumstances in which people do not behave as would be expected. The former theories suggest that individuals always perceive the ingroup, and members of the ingroup, in a more positive light than outgroup members, but that is evidently not the case.

The Black Sheep Effect

The feature of subjective group dynamics known as the black sheep effect can elaborate on this situation. The black sheep effect (Marques et al., 1988) demonstrates an intriguing response of individuals when a fellow ingroup member is considered deviant, as they will evaluate the deviant more negatively than members of an outgroup who exhibit the same behavior. In other words, they punish or dislike a member of their own ingroup more than an outgroup member, when the two have the same traits or behaviors. This reaction can be explained by the model of subjective group dynamics, which emphasizes that when prescriptive ingroup norms are violated, other ingroup members will have a harsh and negative judgment of the behavior. Additionally, the more salient the intergroup differences, and the more important the norm is considered in the group, the more group members will focus on the deviant behavior and view it as a violation (Marques et al., 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). There are different follow-up reactions for dealing with deviants within the group, which may include pressure to conform to the group norms

or acceptance of the individuals because of other positive qualities he adds to the group (Levine & Hogg, 2010).

The Fundamental Dimensions of Social Perception

Morality and Competence

In their research on personality impressions, Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan (1968) encountered an intriguing pattern in the way personality traits are grouped along two dimensions of social perception. They found that in participants' descriptions of people they knew, the organization of 64 personality traits fell along a two-dimensional structure with poles of positivity and negativity. They coined the dimensions as *social good-bad* and *intellectual good-bad*. Today, these two dimensions go by many names, including other-profitability and self-profitability (Peeters, 1992), agency and communion (Abele, 2003), warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and morality and competence (Wojciszke, 1994). Although the terms differ, it is generally agreed upon that these dimensions are the fundamental components underlying judgments of the self, others, and groups (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd et al., 2005). In the case of the current study, the terms morality and competence will be utilized.

Since the initial proposal of the existence of two fundamental components of social judgment, there has been substantial effort by researchers to determine the details of morality and competence, the characteristics of their unique relationship, and their specific impact within the realm of social perception. Wojciszke (1994, 2005b) defined the two dimensions through the goals of behaviors. For example, the moral dimension is associated with the intention of the goal, and whether it is morally right or wrong, and the competence dimension refers to the ability of the individual to reach that goal. Within this goal-oriented

interpretation, there are four classifications of action, depending on the negativity or positivity of the actor's morality and competence pertaining to goal attainment. The four types of action are virtuous success, virtuous failure, sinful success, and sinful failure (Wojciszke, 1994).

As an extension to the idea of goal orientation, research by Wojciszke, Abele and Barylá (2009) explained the evaluations that others have of individuals who perform actions within the four classifications. Those who are virtuously successful are liked and respected, those who virtuously fail are liked and disrespected, those who are sinfully successful are disliked and respected, and those who sinfully fail are disliked and disrespected. This work clearly demonstrated the range of judgments that occur in response to actions with differing levels of morality and competence.

Relationship Between Morality and Competence: Halo Effect

The vast quantity of literature on morality and competence is a clear indicator of their significance in social perception. However, there is a notable divide in the opinions of the way in which these two conceptual opposites relate to one another. The two predominant views explain the relationship as having either a halo effect or a compensation effect. The halo effect in social judgment is an overestimation of the extent to which positive attributes along different dimensions go together (Thorndike, 1920). Support for a halo, or valence, effect comes from investigators who found evidence of a relationship between dimensions that leads to an influence on perceptions in the same direction. Since nearly all traits have a positive and a negative pole, shared valences on that spectrum will influence respective judgments. In other words, an effect of valence suggests that when an individual is considered positive in one aspect, that positivity will impact other aspects, which will then be regarded as more positive.

In the original research that established the existence of the fundamental dimensions of social perception, Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan (1968) encountered a significant positive correlation between morality and competence, in that individuals who are perceived as warm are also seen as competent. This research established that in the judgments of morality and competence of individuals, dimensions of similar valence correspond.

The impact of trait valence between dimensions has been shown in studies on global impression formation and information integration (Anderson, 1965; Srull & Wyer, 1989). In his classic work on impression formation, Asch (1946) not only exhibited the effect of valence of traits in general judgments, but he showed that the valence of morality can play a special role. When describing targets with a series of positive competence traits and one morality trait (*intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm/cold, determined, practical, cautious*) the positive or negative valence of the single morality trait significantly impacted the global impression that participants had of the target. In a similar fashion, Zanna and Hamilton (1972) demonstrated that the valence of the competence dimension, when listed as the sole competence aspect among positive morality traits, has a comparable effect on central impression.

Relationship Between Morality and Competence: Compensation Effect

Advocates of the compensation effect argue that when one of the fundamental aspects of social judgment is viewed positively, the other will be viewed negatively, so as to compensate each other. For example, Judd et al. (2005) asked participants to rate fictional target individuals or groups after they were provided with a description of behaviors that were either competent or incompetent, but neutral in morality. They found that competent targets were considered colder than incompetent targets, and in the same

fashion in a later study, that moral targets were rated as more incompetent, demonstrating the opposing, or compensating, relationship between the dimensions.

Additional confirmation of the compensation effect has been found in studies on groups that have mixed-stereotypes, such as the research by Yzerbyt, Provost, and Corneille (2005), which looked at the perceptions that Belgian and French people have of themselves and each other. Both groups rated the Belgians as less competent than warm and the French as more competent than warm, which shows a clear reverse in the judgments on the two dimensions. A study by Cuddy, Norton, and Fiske (2005) also demonstrated support of the compensation effect in a their research on the stereotype of the elderly, in which elderly people are viewed as warm but incompetent. Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2004) showed similar evidence in a study on the stereotype of female professionals, in which working mothers were considered warmer but less competent than other professional women who were childless.

Although there may be significant evidence in support of the compensation effect, it should be noted that a comparison context is necessary for this effect to be present. In fact, in the previously mentioned work by Judd and colleagues (2005) in which a compensation effect was found, a halo effect was actually demonstrated when there was a lack of comparison context. In three of the four experiments by Judd et al., a comparison between individuals or groups was demanded, which in turn elicited a compensation effect in perception. However, in the fourth experiment (Judd et al., 2005, Experiment 4), when participants were not provided with a comparison context and judged only one group, a halo effect emerged with the positive valence of morality and competence.

The Primacy of Morality

The extensive research on the dimensions of morality and competence within social perception has shed light on their unique relationship. However, within this phenomenon of the fundamental dimensions, morality has been shown to play a special role. At the most basic level, morality is more salient. When completing lexical decision tasks, participants are faster to recognize morality traits than competence traits (Ybarra, Chan & Park, 2001). Additionally, it has been shown that people make more reliable morality judgments than competence judgments, even with very short amounts of exposure (Willis & Todorov, 2006).

This dominance of the morality dimension is likely due to the importance that is given to morality within the sphere of human interaction. In a cross-cultural study, Ybarra and colleagues (2008) found that a large percentage of universal behavior and thought is related with managing the social aspects of group existence and interaction, more so than competence-related aspects. In addition, they discovered that there was more similarity across cultures in the aspects of behavior and judgments pertaining to morality than to competence.

This global agreement on the significance of morality can explain why morality is an especially influential dimension in social judgment when it is coupled with the norms established by society. That is, the moral dimension of social perception is a reflection of the extent to which an individual's goals conform with or defy social norms, whereas the competence dimension corresponds to an individual's success in attaining said goals (Wojciszke, 2005a). Therefore, the morality dimension has more impact on social factors and the competence dimension is more an indication of individual ability. Work by Wojciszke (1994) supported this dynamic and demonstrated that observers regard the behaviors of others in terms of morality rather than competence, while actors interpret their

own behaviors more in terms of competence than morality. Further investigating on responses to the acts of others posits that people have a stronger emotional reaction to the morality in behaviors of others than to their competence (Wojciszke & Dowhlyuk, 2003).

Additionally, the valence of morality prompts divergent emotional reactions, as the immoral behavior of others is perceived as inherently negative, whereas moral behavior is more ambiguous. When an immoral act is committed, it leads to a negative emotional reaction, regardless of whether or not the observer likes the actor. However, when a moral act is carried out, the subsequent emotional reaction is positive only when the performer of the act is liked, and is ambiguous when the performer is not liked (Wojciszke & Szymków, 2003).

When it comes to making evaluations, morality has clear primacy. Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) found that morality corresponds more to positive evaluations of the ingroup, as well as personal identification with and pride in the ingroup. Further, in extensive studies on ethnocentrism across cultures, morality was regarded as the most important characteristic to ingroup favoritism (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Levine & Campbell, 1972). Substantial research (De Bruin, & Van Lange, 1999; Martijn, et al., 1992; Vonk, 1996) has demonstrated that the formation of global evaluations is more contingent on impressions of morality than information relative to competence. Wojciszke, Bazinska, and Jaworski (1998) also found that morality traits are central in forming global impressions of others, including when the others are fictitious, while competence traits were only instrumental as a weak modifier. The same study also supported previous evidence (Peeters, 1992) that the moral sense of an act can significantly alter the evaluation of competence, but not the other way around, which corroborates the halo effect and gives greater power to morality.

CHAPTER III: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Overview

The hypotheses for this study are concerned with effects related to moral deviance, ingroup membership and a threat to social identity. Specifically, we hypothesized that in the dimension consistent with the target's behavior, results would demonstrate an effect of primacy of morality. That is, regardless of the target's membership, participants in the *Immoral* condition should attribute less positive (morality characteristics) and more negative characteristics (immorality characteristics) to the target, than in the attribution of competence/incompetence characteristics by participants in the *Incompetent* condition. In other words, the immoral target is judged more harshly. Additionally, we predicted that this effect would be stronger in the *Ingroup* condition.

Our second central hypothesis was that we would encounter a pattern consistent with a halo effect when it comes to evaluating the target on the alternate dimension: judging an *Immoral* on his competence or incompetence, or an *Incompetent* in his morality or immorality. We predicted that participants would attribute less competence and more incompetence to the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Intergroup Comparison*, than targets in any other condition. We anticipated that we would find these effects in the measures of *Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target* as well as *General Evaluation of the Target's Morality, Competence and Overall Impression*.

Further, a secondary hypothesis in the dependent measure of *Emotional Reaction to Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison* was that the strongest negative emotional reaction would be found in the condition in which participants are presented with an *Immoral* target and within an *Insecure Intergroup Comparison* setting.

Regarding the experimental factor *Membership*, the *Outgroup* chosen was Spanish. The dependent measures of *Portuguese Identity* and *Differentiation from Spanish* were utilized in order to confirm participants' affiliation with the utilized *Ingroup* (Portuguese)

and separation from the *Outgroup* (Spanish). The decision to use Spanish as the *Outgroup* variable was reached after debate about a nationality that was similar to Portuguese, but that was generally not desired as an alternative. Although the *Outgroup* that was utilized in the experiment was Spanish, questions about Italian identity were inserted following the questions to determine *Differentiation from Spanish* in order to try to avoid suspicion about the true purpose of the study.

With respect to the factor *Deviance*, it should be noted that we only presented circumstances in which the target displayed deviant behavior. Normative behavior was not utilized because the objective of this study focused on the difference between the negative valence of the two dimensions of social perception, or the judgments of immorality versus incompetence.

Concerning the factor *Intergroup Comparison*, we devised a *Secure* and an *Insecure* condition. A *Secure Intergroup Comparison* was meant to make the participants feel that the ingroup was behaving as would be expected in their judgments of a deviant (a stronger negative evaluation), while an *Insecure Comparison* was meant to elicit feelings of threat to the status of the ingroup by making it seem unclear whether or not the ingroup was making judgments that would be expected.

Method

Participants

Participants were 92 (12 male, 80 female) Portuguese students from the University of Porto who were between the ages of 18 and 37 ($M = 19.93$, $SD = 3.15$). The participants were enrolled in various statistics courses at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Science. They were solicited for participation during their class time and were not compensated for their participation in the experiment.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions, based on the following factorial design: 2 (*Group Membership: Ingroup vs. Outgroup*) x 2 (*Type of Deviance: Immoral vs. Incompetent*) x 2 (*Intergroup Comparison: Secure vs. Insecure*). The number of participants per condition varied from 11 to 12, $\chi^2 (1, N = 92) < 1$. Materials for this study included one questionnaire, in booklet format, with a cover page and six interior pages (three full-sized pages, folded in half) of manipulation and surveys.

Participants were presented with the questionnaire that initially explained that the experiment in which they were about to participate was part of a larger international study that was taking place in several universities. This explanation was given in order to avoid suspicion about the forthcoming questions pertaining to ingroup and outgroup opinions.

Once participants received some general instruction, and prior to any manipulation, they were asked to answer a series of questions tapping the value they ascribe to *Personal and Social Levels of Self-Categorization* (Personal and Social Identity Scale – 16 items) and another set of questions that measured their *Portuguese Identity* and feelings of *Differentiation from Spanish*.

After completing the *Personal and Social Level of Self-Categorization* survey and the *Portuguese Identity/Differentiation from Spanish* survey, participants were presented with the experimental manipulation on an alternate page of the questionnaire, so as to not be seen prior to that point. The manipulation included a fictitious explanation that clarified that within the international investigation, the teams from different countries analyzed the reactions that people have towards different behaviors and the consequences of those reactions. It then presented one of the situations that had supposedly been discussed among previous participants, which described that a group of former classmates met after many years and spoke about their respective lives. It said that in general, the people were happy

and successful. Then, the manipulation of the factor *Type of Deviance* was introduced. The description said that after more conversation, they discovered that one of the people in the group had either: embezzled money from the company at which he was a manager (*Immoral* condition); or got his company into a difficult financial situation after not completing a job on time (*Incompetent* condition).

Manipulation of *Type of Deviance*:

“Num jantar de antigos colegas de escola que não se encontravam há vários anos, as pessoas foram conversando umas com as outras sobre as suas vidas privadas. Puderam constatar que, na generalidade, são pessoas felizes e realizadas. No entanto, através de algumas conversas, acabam por descobrir que uma dessas pessoas colocou numa situação difícil uma das empresas em que trabalhou como gestor, por ter desviado ilicitamente quantias de dinheiro importantes [...por não fazer cumprir os prazos de produção contratados].”

Below the story was a graph that was part of the next experimental manipulation of *Intergroup Comparison*. The graph appeared identical in both conditions, with two slightly overlapping bell-shaped curves of the evaluations of previous Portuguese and Spanish participants. However, there was a small header above the graph that changed. In the *Secure* condition, the text said that Portuguese people had a statistically more negative evaluation of the target they just read about, while in the *Insecure* condition, it said that it was unclear which of the two groups of participants had a more negative evaluation of the target. Additionally, a small “*ns* (non-sig.)” or “ $p < .001$ (sig.)” was placed over the graph, depending on the condition (cf. Appendix 1). In the *Insecure* condition, the manipulation was meant to provoke feelings of threat to the social identity of Portuguese people, as they

should want the other members of their group to have a more harsh evaluation of someone who is performing a deviant behavior.

Following the story and graph, there was a small survey of six measures of *Emotional Reaction to Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison*. It included factors of surprise, disappointment, satisfaction, mood, worry, and anxiety, all of which were to be rated on a 9-point scale.

On the next page, so as to not yet be seen, the questionnaire explained that the story the participant just read actually came from a recent newspaper article. In order to generate the third, and final, experimental manipulation of *Membership*, the article was said to have come from either the Portuguese newspaper *Jornal de Notícias* or the Spanish newspaper *El País*. This way, participants would judge the deviant target as either being a member of their ingroup or from an outgroup.

After this clarification, participants evaluated the target person across a series of measures: participants were asked to ascribe morality and competence characteristics to the target. Finally, participants provided their sex and age, and were thanked for their participation.

Dependent Measures

Value ascribed to personal and social levels of self-categorization. Participants were asked the extent to which they agreed with a series of sentences that focused either on the value of social identity or personal identity, adapted from the Personal and Social Identity Scale (e.g. Gomes and Serôdio, in preparation). The scale is composed of 16 items, 8 related to social identity and 8 to personal identity, all of which were to be rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”.

Table 1. Principal Components Analysis on the Items of *Value Ascribed to Personal and Social Levels of Self-Categorization* (with Varimax rotation)¹

	<i>Component</i>		<i>Com.</i>
	Social Identity	Personal Identity	
Os grupos sociais de que faço parte têm reflexo naquilo que eu sou.	.84		.71
Encontramos nos grupos de que fazemos parte aquilo que nos define como pessoas.	.83		.70
Definimo-nos como pessoas pelos grupos a que pertencemos.	.75		.57
Definimo-nos como pessoas pelos padrões dos grupos a que pertencemos.	.68		.49
Habitualmente, aquilo que acontece com um grupo a que pertença tem influência na minha vida.	.62		.41
Os grupos sociais a que eu pertenço contribuem para definir a pessoa que eu sou.	.61		.37
O que partilhamos com as pessoas dos grupos a que pertencemos é a essência daquilo que somos.	.60		.37
A “essência” de cada pessoa está dentro de si.		.85	.73
Definimo-nos como pessoas ao sermos “nós próprios”.		.80	.65
Aquilo que nos define como pessoas deve ser encontrado dentro de nós.		.68	.51
Para ter uma opinião pessoal sobre as coisas que me importam, mais vale pensar por mim mesmo(a).		.64	.42
Ao definirmo-nos como pessoas devemos procurar ser “únicos”.		.60	.36
Para definir quem somos temos de ser independentes dos outros.		.52	.29
Total Variance Explained (%) = 50.48	27.83	22.65	

¹ KMO = .77; Bartlett’s test of Sphericity, χ^2 (78, $N = 92$) = 458.25, $p < .001$; discarded items: “As pessoas que dependem apenas de si próprias progridem mais facilmente na vida”; “Tenho fortes laços com os grupos sociais a que pertenço.”; “Depender apenas de mim é importante para ter mais controlo sobre o que me acontece.”.

Despite the somewhat limited number of participants, we ran a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) on the 16 items.² Using a Varimax rotation, and a forced solution of 2 components, the solutions accounted for 50.48% of the total variance. Three items were eliminated from the initial solution due to low communalities. The final solution with the two components is reported in Table 1. One of the components loaded all of the remaining 7 items that measure the value ascribed to Social Identity, and the other loaded the 6 items regarding the value of Personal Identity.

We computed one measure corresponding to the mean of 7 items measuring the value attributed to *Social Identity*, Crobach's $\alpha = .84$, and another one for the value attributed to *Personal Identity*, on the remaining 6 items, $\alpha = .78$.³

Portuguese identity. Participants had to indicate their agreement with 6 sentences that measured the extent to which they identify with being Portuguese: (1) Para mim é muito importante ser português. (2) Tenho orgulho em dizer que sou português. (3) Tenho uma ligação forte com o meu país. (4) Prefiro ser português do que ser de outra nacionalidade qualquer. (5) É importante para mim sentir-me português. (6) Tenho orgulho das tradições e da história de Portugal. All items were rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. We created a measure of *Portuguese Identity* on the basis of the mean of these 6 items, $\alpha = .86$.⁴

Differentiation from Spanish. Participants also responded to 3 questions measuring the extent to which they differentiate Portuguese people from Spanish people: (1) Os portugueses e espanhóis são semelhantes em muitos aspetos. (2) Em geral, os

² Participants/variable ratio = 5.75.

³ Mean r s, respectively, .42 and .37.

⁴ Mean $r = .51$.

espanhóis têm mais razões para ter orgulho nas suas tradições e história. (3) Preferia ser espanhol do que português. (-4 = “completely disagree”, +4 = “completely agree”).⁵

Emotional reaction to type of deviance and intergroup comparison.

Immediately after the manipulation of *Type of Deviance* and *Intergroup Comparison*, participants answered a series of 6 questions measuring their emotional reaction to the alleged results: -4 = Very satisfied, Very good mood, Not at all worried, Not at all anxious; +4 = Very unsatisfied, Very bad mood, Very worried, Very anxious. We computed a measure of *Emotional Reaction to Deviance and Intergroup Comparison* corresponding to the mean of 4 of these measures, $\alpha = .78$.⁶ In this new measure, the more negative the value, the more negative the emotional reaction.

Attribution of competence and morality characteristics to the target.

Participants had to rate a series of 24 characteristics on a 9-point scale, regarding the extent to which they define the target: the scale ranged from “does not characterize at all” on one end, to “neither characterizes nor does not characterize” in the middle, to “characterizes a lot” on the other end.

These items were obtained in a previous study which determined the characteristics that Portuguese people use to define a person that is “Moral”, “Immoral”, “Competent” or “Incompetent” (Barbosa, 2012). We created a measure of *Morality*, $\alpha = .86$, corresponding to the mean of the following 6 items: (1) Tem respeito pelos outros, (2) Segue as normas da sociedade, (3) É honesta, (4) Tem princípios, (5) Tem ética, (6) É íntegra/digna. The measure of *Immorality*, $\alpha = .89$, corresponds to the mean of the following 6 items: (1) Não tem princípios, (2) É má pessoa, (3) Não respeita os outros, (4) Não segue as normas da

⁵ The same 3 items were included pertaining to Italians. The purpose of this was to avoid suspicion about the mention of Spanish people.

⁶ Mean $r = .46$; The items “surprised” and “disappointed” were eliminated due to their low correlations to the remaining 4 items: Item-total correlation, $r = .15$; $R^2 = .11$; and Item-total correlation, $r = .29$; $R^2 = .18$, respectively.

sociedade, (5) É desonesta, (6) Não tem ética. The measure of Competence, $\alpha = .85$, corresponds to the mean of the following items: (1) É pontual, (2) É organizada, (3) Executa tarefas devidamente, (4) Sabe trabalhar em equipa, (5) Cumpre tarefas, (6) É responsável, (7) É eficiente. Finally the measure of Incompetence, less reliable than the others, $\alpha = .65$, had a mean of the following 3 items: (1) É irresponsável, (2) É ineficaz, (3) Não cumpre objetivos.⁷

General evaluation of the target's morality, competence and overall impression. Participants rated the target on two general measures of Morality and Competence on a 9-point scale. The measure of Morality ranged from “extremely immoral” (= -4) to “extremely moral” (= +4). The measure of Competence ranged from “extremely incompetent” (= -4) to “extremely competent” (= +4).

Finally, participants answered a question in which they stated their Overall Impression of the target on a scale ranging from “extremely negative (= -4)” to “extremely positive (= +4)”.

Results

To test our set of predictions, we used contrast analyses rather than omnibus ANOVAs. This is because we had highly focused predictions, which in most cases meant the comparison of one experimental condition with all other conditions. Following Rosenthal, Rosnow and Rubin (2000), we utilized this statistical procedure due to its greater statistical power compared to omnibus procedures.

⁷ The mean correlations of each measure are the following: $r = .51$, $r = .57$, $r = .46$ and $r = .27$.

Value Ascribed to Personal and Social Levels of Self-Categorization

Although these dependent measures were collected prior to any manipulation, we checked for their equivalence across conditions. The repeated measures ANOVA of *Value Ascribed to Personal vs. Social Self-Categorization*, revealed no significant effects, highest $F(7, 84) = 1.47, ns$.

The contrast with the mid-point of the scale shows that participants positively value both levels of identity: *Personal Identity*, $M = 1.27, SD = 1.07, t(91) = 11.46, p < .001$; *Social Identity*, $M = 1.08, SD = 1.15, t(91) = 9.05, p < .001$.

Portuguese Identity

The ANOVA analysis shows that *Portuguese Identity* is also equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) = 1.82, ns$. The overall mean shows that participants identify positively with being Portuguese, $M = 1.53, SD = 1.16, t(91) = 12.67, p < .001$.

Differentiation from Spanish

The results from the ANOVAs regarding the three measures focused on *Differentiation from Spanish* were consistent with those of *Portuguese Identity*. Firstly, participants consider that the Portuguese are neither similar or different from the Spanish, $M = -0.11, SD = 1.93, t(91) < 1$ (this is equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) < 1$).⁸ Secondly, participants strongly disagree that the Spanish have more reasons to be “proud of their traditions and history”, $M = -1.74, SD = 1.63, t(91) = 10.24, p < .001$ (this is equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) < 1$).⁹ And, finally, participants even more strongly

⁸ A different pattern emerged in the case of Italians: although close to “0”, $M = -0.42, SD = 1.33, t(91) = 2.22, p = .029$, participants slightly disagreed that Portuguese are similar to Italians (this is equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) < 1$).

⁹ The same pattern emerges in the case of Italians: $M = -1.58, SD = 1.85, t(91) = 8.18, p < .001$, (this is equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) < 1$).

disagree that they would “prefer being Spanish to being Portuguese”, $M = -2.49$, $SD = 1.69$, $t(91) = 14.10$, $p < .001$ (this is equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) < 1$).¹⁰

Emotional Reaction to Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison

Our first prediction tests the effect of intergroup setting created by our experimental design on participants’ emotional reaction. As described earlier, our tenet was that the condition that would elicit a stronger negative emotional reaction is that in which they are faced with a potentially unfavorable intergroup comparison and with an immoral deviant. The pattern of the means in the four conditions is as follows: Immoral Deviant/Secure Intergroup Comparison, $M = 0.36$, $SD = 1.51$; Immoral Deviant/Insecure Intergroup Comparison, $M = 0.30$, $SD = 1.29$; Incompetent Deviant/Secure Intergroup Comparison, $M = 0.63$, $SD = 1.33$; Incompetent Deviant/Insecure Intergroup Comparison, $M = 0.37$, $SD = 1.05$. To test this prediction we performed a contrast analysis using the following contrast values: -3 on the Immoral Deviant/Insecure Intergroup Comparison condition, and +1 on the remaining three conditions. Our prediction was not confirmed: $t(88) < 1$. Actually, participants’ emotional reaction, although mild, is significantly positive as revealed by the comparison of the overall mean with the scale mid-point (0), $M = 0.42$, $SD = 1.29$, $t(91) = 3.09$, $p = .003$.

Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target

Participants had to attribute positive and negative characteristics to the target concerning his morality and competence, or in the latter case, his immorality and incompetence. These characteristics were attributed on dimensions that were both “consistent” and “inconsistent” with the target’s behavior. For instance, participants judged

¹⁰ The same pattern emerges in the case of Italians: $M = -2.23$, $SD = 1.77$, $t(91) = 12.05$, $p < .001$, (this is equivalent across conditions, $F(7, 84) = 1.56$, *ns*).

an *Immoral* target in terms of his morality and immorality, but also in terms of his competence and incompetence. While the first two aspects are both consistent with the dimension of the target's behavior, the latter two are inconsistent. Conversely, *Incompetent* targets were judged on their competence and incompetence, as well as morality and immorality.

As previously stated, we predicted an effect of primacy of morality in the dimension consistent with the target's behavior: that is, participants should attribute less positive and more negative characteristics (in the morality dimension) to the *Immoral* target, than to the *Incompetent* on the competence dimension; but even more so in the case of the *Ingroup* targets. To test these predictions, we ran two contrast analyses, with one on the attribution of positive aspects and the other regarding negative aspects. In Table 2, we present the pattern of attributions of morality and immorality to the *Immoral* target and competence and incompetence to the *Incompetent* target – the “consistent” dimensions.

In the first analysis, regarding the attribution of Positive characteristics (either morality or competence, according to conditions), we entered the following contrast values: Ingroup / Immoral / Secure = -1; Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure = -1; Ingroup / Incompetent / Secure = 1; Ingroup / Incompetent / Insecure = 1; Outgroup / Immoral / Secure = -1; Outgroup / Immoral / Insecure = -1; Outgroup / Incompetent / Secure = 1; Outgroup / Incompetent / Insecure = 1. Results were consistent with our first prediction, $t(84) = -2.90, p = .005$. As expected, participants attributed less morality to the *Immoral* targets (respectively -2.34, -2.49, -1.54, -2.37) than competence to the *Incompetent* targets (respectively -1.32, -1.64, -1.18, -1.39).¹¹ Additionally, we expected that these attributions

¹¹ In an omnibus ANOVA, this corresponds to the main effect of *Type of Deviance*, $F(1, 84) = 8.41, p = .005$ (highest remaining effect, $F = 1.87, ns$)

of positive characteristics were stronger for *Ingroup* targets. However, results of this contrast analysis was not consistent with our prediction, $t(84) = 1.18, ns$.¹²

Table 2. Attribution of Characteristics on the Dimension Consistent with the Target's Behavior

Dimension	Ingroup Target				Outgroup Target			
	Immoral		Incompetent		Immoral		Incompetent	
	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure
Positive (Morality or Competence)	-2.34 (1.28)	-2.49 (1.03)	-1.32 (1.60)	-1.64 (1.41)	-1.54 (1.24)	-2.37 (1.12)	-1.18 (1.37)	-1.39 (1.48)
Negative (Immorality or Incompetence)	2.02 (0.95)	2.08 (1.09)	0.04 (1.89)	0.92 (1.06)	1.15 (0.86)	1.71 (0.88)	0.33 (1.65)	0.54 (1.25)

Regarding the attribution of negative characteristics, we ran the equivalent contrast analyses, but with reversed values for each condition: this means, +1, +1, -1, -1, +1, +1, -1, -1, for the test of the effect of primacy of morality. Results were consistent with our prediction: participants attributed more immorality to the *Immoral* targets (2.02, 2.08, 1.15, 1.71) than incompetence to the *Incompetent* targets (0.04, 0.92, 0.33, 0.54), $t(84) = 4.92, p < .001$. Additionally, in the attribution of such characteristics to *Ingroup* or *Outgroup* targets, we found a result consistent with our prediction, but only marginally significant, $t(84) = 1.67, p = .098$ (contrast values, +1, +1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0). This result shows that, as we predicted, participants' attributions of negative characteristics were stronger for *Ingroup* targets (2.02, 2.08) than for *Outgroup* targets (1.15, 1.71).¹³

¹² In this analysis, the contrast values were as follows: -1, -1, 0, 0, +1, +1, 0, 0, in the same order.

¹³ In an omnibus ANOVA, the only significant effect was the corresponding main effect of *Type of Deviance*, $F(1, 84) = 24.20, p < .001$ (highest remaining effect, $F(1, 84) = 2.71, ns$).

Our prediction in the case of the attribution of characteristics on the alternate dimension was that we would find a pattern consistent with a halo effect for the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Intergroup Comparison* context. To test this hypothesis, we ran a contrast analysis, entering the value +7 for the *Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure* condition, and -1 to all other conditions, with regards to the attribution of negative dimensions (that is, attributions of immorality and incompetence). The positivity/negativity of contrast values were reversed for the attribution of positive dimensions (that is, morality and competence). The means corresponding to these analyses are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Attribution of Characteristics on the Dimension Alternate from the Target's Behavior

Dimension	Ingroup Target				Outgroup Target			
	Immoral		Incompetent		Immoral		Incompetent	
	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure
Positive (Morality or Competence)	-0.74 (1.05)	-1.01 (1.32)	-0.63 (1.24)	-0.94 (1.02)	-0.17 (1.01)	-1.17 (1.28)	-0.04 (0.86)	-1.24 (1.08)
Negative (Immorality or Incompetence)	0.38 (0.61)	0.94 (1.31)	-0.12 (1.55)	0.38 (0.78)	0.24 (0.82)	0.47 (0.81)	-0.50 (1.07)	0.30 (1.02)

Results from the first contrast analysis were consistent with our prediction: participants attributed more incompetence to the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Comparison* (0.94) than in all other conditions, $t(84) = 2.35, p = .021$. Additionally, this is the only mean that is significantly different from 0, $t(10) = 2.38, p = .039$ (highest

remaining difference, $t(11) = 2.14$, *ns*). This means that participants do in fact judge the *Immoral* target as being incompetent.¹⁴

For the attribution of positive dimensions, the contrast analysis results were not consistent with our prediction (see the means in the upper part of Table 3, contrast of -1.01 with all others), $t(84) < 1$.¹⁵

General Evaluation of the Target's Morality, Competence and Overall Impression

In the case of the *General Evaluation of the Target's Morality and Competence*, we predicted that we would again find an effect of morality primacy in the dimensions consistent with the target's deviance, which would also be stronger for ingroup targets. To examine this hypothesis, we ran a contrast analysis with the value -1 in the *Immoral* conditions, and +1 in the *Incompetent* conditions. Results were partially consistent with our prediction of a primacy of morality effect, $t(84) = -1.85$, $p = .068$. As shown in Table 4, although only marginally significant, as predicted, participants evaluate the *Immoral* targets (either *Ingroup* or *Outgroup* members) as less moral (-1.67, -1.82, -2.09, -1.67) than the *Incompetent* as competent (-1.27, -1.08, -1.33, -1.73). Our additional prediction that this effect would be even stronger in the *Ingroup* was not supported by the corresponding contrast analysis, $t(84) < 1$ (contrast values, +1, +1, 0, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0).¹⁶

We also hypothesized, as above, that in the alternate dimension we would find a pattern consistent with a halo effect for the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure*

¹⁴ Nonetheless, we checked for the difference between this condition and the corresponding *Outgroup* condition (0.47), using a contrast analysis attributing the values +1 and -1, respectively, and 0 for the remaining. The difference was not significant, $t(84) = 1.09$, *ns*.

¹⁵ The contrasts are the same as with the negative characteristics, but with the opposite sign: -7 for the *Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure*, and +1 for all others. We again ran an omnibus ANOVA and as the pattern of contrasts in Table 3 shows, we found only an effect of *Intergroup Comparison*, $F(1, 84) = 8.95$, $p = .004$ (remaining $F < 3.01$, *ns*). This result indicates that participants attribute less positive dimensions (both Morality and Competence) to the target in the *Insecure* condition, $M = -1.09$, $SD = 1.15$, than in the *Secure* condition, $M = -0.39$, $SD = 1.05$.

¹⁶ We ran an omnibus ANOVA and found only the same partial main effect of *Type of Deviance*, $F(1, 84) = 3.41$, $p = .068$.

Intergroup Comparison context. To test this prediction, we performed a contrast analysis, giving the value +7 to the *Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure* condition, and -1 to all other conditions. The results were consistent with our hypothesis, as participants had a stronger negative judgment of the target in the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Context* (-1.27) than in all other conditions, $t(84) = -2.01, p = .048$. Further, this mean is the only that is significantly different from 0, $t(10) = 2.71, p = .022$ (highest remaining difference, $t_{11} = -2.17, ns$): participants again judge the *Immoral* target as incompetent.¹⁷

Table 4. Evaluation of Target's Morality, Competence and Overall Impression

	Ingroup Target				Outgroup Target			
	Immoral		Incompetent		Immoral		Incompetent	
	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure	Secure	Insecure
Consistent Dimension	-1.67 (1.15)	-1.82 (1.40)	-1.27 (1.42)	-1.08 (1.00)	-2.09 (0.94)	-1.67 (1.07)	-1.33 (0.98)	-1.73 (1.42)
Alternate Dimension	-0.58 (1.38)	-1.27 (1.56)	-0.73 (1.19)	-0.50 (0.80)	0.00 (1.18)	-0.42 (1.62)	-0.33 (0.65)	-0.73 (1.27)
Overall Impression	-1.75 (1.29)	-2.55 (1.04)	-1.27 (1.27)	-1.17 (1.11)	-1.55 (1.21)	-1.83 (1.03)	-1.17 (0.83)	-1.27 (1.27)

When it came to Overall Impression, we predicted a general evaluation that would be consistent with all previous results, that is, participants should evaluate the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Intergroup Comparison* condition more negatively than in all other conditions. To test this final hypothesis, we performed a contrast analysis, entering the value -7 to the *Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure* condition, and +1 to all other conditions. Results were consistent with our hypothesis, as the general impression that

¹⁷ Regardless, we used a contrast analysis to check the difference between this condition and condition with the closest mean (0.73), entering the values +1 and -1, respectively, and 0 for the remaining. The difference was not significant, $t(84) = -1.19, ns$.

participants had of the target was more negative for the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Comparison* (-2.55) than in all other conditions, $t(84) = 3.05, p = .003$.¹⁸

Discussion

In general, the results of this study confirm our predictions and are consistent with previous research on group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social identity. Within the framework of a 2 (*Group Membership: Ingroup vs. Outgroup*) x 2 (*Type of Deviance: Immoral vs. Incompetent*) x 2 (*Intergroup Comparison: Secure vs. Insecure*) study, we found support for our key predictions regarding the primacy of morality in the *Immoral* condition and a halo effect for the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in an *Insecure Intergroup Comparison*.

First, we will discuss the results related to the initial dependent measure that followed experimental manipulation, which was the *Emotional Reaction to Type of Deviance and Intergroup Comparison*. We predicted that when participants are presented with a target that is immorally deviant and in a potentially unfavorable intergroup comparison, they would have a stronger negative emotional reaction than in all other conditions. This prediction was not confirmed by our results. This could possibly be explained by a lack of strength in the manipulation. Since the measurement was taken after the manipulation of both *Deviance* and *Intergroup Comparison*, it is possible that the combined manipulations actually moderated participants' emotional reactions. If only one variable had been manipulated, and then emotional reaction were measured, perhaps the reaction would have been stronger or more fitting with our prediction, as it would be more focused.

¹⁸ To compare the difference between this condition and the two conditions with comparable higher means (-1.83 and -1.75), we ran a contrast analysis with the values -2 for the *Ingroup / Immoral / Insecure* condition, 1 for the two in question, and 0 for the remaining. The difference was not significant, $t(84) < 1$. The omnibus ANOVA revealed only a main effect of *Type of Deviance*, $F(1, 84) = 8.64, p = .004$ (highest remaining effect, $F = 1.30, ns$).

Regarding our primary hypotheses, the results from the dependent measures of *Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target* and *General Evaluation of the Target's Morality, Competence and Overall Impression* must be consulted. The results pertaining to both dependent measures support our hypothesis that there would be an effect of primacy of morality in the *Immoral* condition. Participants considered that the *Immoral* target was more immoral than the *Incompetent* target was incompetent. These results are consistent with previous studies that have shown the importance of morality in evaluations of others (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; De Bruin, & Van Lange, 1999; Martijn, et al., 1992; Vonk, 1996).

However, the prediction that this effect of primacy of morality would be stronger in the *Ingroup* condition was not fully supported. Although partial support was found in the case of attribution of negative characteristics (that is, those corresponding with immorality), results were not supportive in the case of attribution of positive characteristics (morality) or in the general evaluation of the target's morality. These results can be explained by previous research on differing emotional reactions as a result of the valence of morality (Wojciszke & Szymków, 2003), which has shown that immoral behavior is perceived as inherently negative, while moral behavior is perceived more ambiguously. This means that immorality is more salient when considering a deviant's behavior, as it is more easily associated with the actions. Therefore, when individuals make judgments on a target's morality, it is easier to attribute negative characteristics (those related to immoral behavior), since they are not only more clearly defined, but they correspond with the deviant behavior.

Concerning our other central hypothesis that attribution of characteristics on the alternate dimension would result in a pattern consistent with a halo effect for *Immoral Ingroup Members* in the *Insecure Intergroup Comparison*, the results were generally

supportive. Significant results were encountered in the attribution of negative characteristics and in the general evaluation of target's morality and competence, but not in the case of attribution of positive characteristics. This means that when attributing negative characteristics and making an overall evaluation, participants judge the *Immoral* target as also being incompetent, but only when the intergroup comparison is insecure. These results corroborate previous research related to a halo effect of morality (Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968; Asch, 1946; Judd et al., 2005; Peeters, 1992) and deviance provoking intergroup differentiation (Marques et al., 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

Our final hypothesis, pertaining to the overall impression of the target, was that participants would have a stronger negative evaluation of the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Intergroup Comparison* than of the targets in all other conditions. The results of our study supported this hypothesis because participants' overall impression of the *Immoral Ingroup Member* in the *Insecure Comparison* context was more negative than their impression of targets in the other conditions. Our results confirm previous research on the importance of morality in general evaluations (De Bruin, & Van Lange, 1999; Martijn, et al., 1992; Vonk, 1996; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998) and the impact of deviance on impressions of ingroup members (Marques et al., 1988; Marques et al., 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to provide further knowledge to the field of social psychology and verify previous research, particularly pertaining to the ideas of group membership, deviant behavior and threat to social identity. By focusing our investigation on immoral and incompetent behavior, ingroup and outgroup membership and secure and insecure intergroup comparison contexts, we were able to show the significant impact of a morally deviant ingroup member and an insecure intergroup comparison on the emotional reactions, perceptions and evaluations from other ingroup individuals. These results are important for the progress of research in these specific areas and also in other related subjects in social psychology, such as group behavior, stereotyping, intergroup conflict, leadership, conformity, and behavior motivation.

Although we encountered significant results for the majority of our hypotheses, there are some aspects of this study that could be improved upon in further research for more consistency and substantial significance in results. First, we suggest an increase in the number of participants, as this was a slight limitation in the current study. For example, the amount of participants did not allow us to check the correlations between the value people ascribe to *Social Identity / Personal Identity* and *Portuguese Identity* across conditions. Additionally, we believe that a larger sample size would lead to stronger results throughout the study, especially concerning possible interactions in the data, as we observed that there were many results that were marginally significant or showed the possibility for significance.

Another alteration that we would advise is the use of stronger manipulations of intergroup comparison. As the measurement of *Emotional Reaction* came after two different manipulations (*Type of Deviance* and *Intergroup Comparison*), we actually could not surmise which variable was having an effect on participants' emotional reactions. In

future research, we propose that measurements be taken after the manipulation of each variable. Alternatively, the elimination of one level of analysis could also facilitate the possibility of encountering greater significance in results. Since this study was made up of a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, it is possible that the use of three separate manipulations was too much, leading to less focus on either manipulation, and therefore, minimal reaction.

Further advice includes extreme caution with the scale of *Attribution of Competence and Morality Characteristics to the Target* and exclusion of the measurement of negative traits on a scale from “does not characterize at all” to “characterizes a lot” as this can lead to confusion for the participants. Instead, the scale should be modified so that it is easier to make attributions on negative traits.

Also, we suggest the use of either only one experimenter or, if necessary, several experimenters who have all been extensively trained to exhibit the same behavior while conducting the experiment. For the case of this study, it was not possible for the main experimenter to take part in the distribution of questionnaires, as her obvious feature of being foreign, and therefore automatically considered the member of an outgroup, could have led to unwanted effects in the investigation. Therefore, if other experimenters are utilized, is it essential that their differences in mannerisms are accounted for and minimized, in order to avoid experimenter effects. Finally, care in the choice of participants should be taken, and if students are utilized, it is important to survey different types of students from different courses, so as to diversify the sample.

If all of the proposed suggestions are considered and accounted for in further studies, we are certain that the extent of the significance of this study will only improve. We look forward to seeing how the current research impacts the academic and research community, as well as possible further research that may develop following the establishment of the results of this investigation.

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Appendix 1: The Questionnaire – Survey and Experimental Manipulations

O presente inquérito faz parte de uma investigação internacional. Este estudo faz parte de uma investigação mais abrangente que envolve outras universidades.

A participação é anónima e os dados confidenciais, sendo acedidos apenas pela equipa de investigação. Neste inquérito não há respostas certas ou erradas, o importante é a sua opinião pessoal.

A resposta deve ocupar-lhe cerca de 5-10 minutos do seu tempo. Poderá ter acesso aos resultados do estudo através dos contactos no rodapé.

A sua participação é essencial para a concretização do estudo.

Pedimos-lhe que indique o seu grau de acordo com cada uma das afirmações que se seguem. A escala de resposta tem 9 pontos e varia entre “Discordo totalmente” e “Concordo totalmente”. Ou seja, quanto mais concordar com a afirmação, mais à direita deve colocar a sua resposta; quanto mais discordar, mais à esquerda a deve colocar.

	Discordo totalmente									Concordo totalmente
As pessoas que dependem apenas de si próprias progredem mais facilmente na vida.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Os grupos sociais a que eu pertença contribuem para definir a pessoa que eu sou.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Aquilo que nos define como pessoas deve ser encontrado dentro de nós.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Habitualmente, aquilo que acontece com um grupo a que pertença tem influência na minha vida.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
O que partilhamos com as pessoas dos grupos a que pertencemos é a essência daquilo que somos.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tenho fortes laços com os grupos sociais a que pertença.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ao definirmo-nos como pessoas devemos procurar ser “únicos”.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definimo-nos como pessoas pelos padrões dos grupos a que pertencemos.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Depender apenas de mim é importante para ter mais controlo sobre o que me acontece.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A “essência” de cada pessoa está dentro de si.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Os grupos sociais de que faço parte têm reflexo naquilo que eu sou.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definimo-nos como pessoas pelos grupos a que pertencemos.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Encontramos nos grupos de que fazemos parte aquilo que nos define como pessoas.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Para ter uma opinião pessoal sobre as coisas que me importam, mais vale pensar por mim mesmo(a).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definimo-nos como pessoas ao sermos “nós próprios”.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Para definir quem somos temos de ser independentes dos outros.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Neste estudo participam pessoas de vários países, nomeadamente portugueses, espanhóis e italianos. A todos estas pessoas colocámos questões semelhantes às que encontra a seguir.

Indique o seu grau de acordo com cada uma das afirmações seguintes.


	Discordo totalmente			Nem discordo, nem concordo				Concordo totalmente	
Para mim é muito importante ser português.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tenho orgulho em dizer que sou português.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tenho uma ligação forte com o meu país.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prefiro ser português do que ser de outra nacionalidade qualquer.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É importante para mim sentir-me português.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tenho orgulho das tradições e da história de Portugal.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Os portugueses e espanhóis são semelhantes em muitos aspetos.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Em geral, os espanhóis têm mais razões para ter orgulho nas suas tradições e história.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prefiria ser espanhol do que português.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Os portugueses e italianos são semelhantes em muitos aspetos.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Em geral, os italianos têm mais razões para ter orgulho nas suas tradições e história.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prefiria ser italiano do que português.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Nesta investigação internacional, as equipas dos países envolvidos têm analisado as reações das pessoas a diferentes tipos de comportamentos, e também as consequências de tais reações nas pessoas envolvidas. Uma das tarefas que é proposta aos participantes dos vários países, é que discutam e façam uma avaliação de diferentes situações e das pessoas nelas envolvidas. Apresentamos abaixo uma das situações que foi discutida e avaliada no primeiro estudo.

TASK. 4 - Target C

“Num jantar de antigos colegas de escola que não se encontravam há vários anos, as pessoas foram conversando umas com as outras sobre as suas vidas privadas. Puderam constatar que, na generalidade, são pessoas felizes e realizadas. No entanto, através de algumas conversas, acabam por descobrir que uma dessas pessoas colocou numa situação difícil uma das empresas em que trabalhou como gestor, por ter desviado ilicitamente quantias de dinheiro importantes.” [...por não fazer cumprir os prazos de produção contratados]

Como pode verificar no gráfico abaixo, tanto os participantes portugueses como os espanhóis avaliaram negativamente a pessoa envolvida nesta situação. Contudo, verifica-se também que, estatisticamente, os portugueses fazem uma avaliação claramente mais negativa. [...não é claro nestes resultados qual dos dois grupos de participantes faz uma avaliação mais negativa]



Em relação aos resultados que lhe acabamos de apresentar você ficou:

Nada surpreendido(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muito surpreendido(a)
Nada desiludido(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muito desiludido(a)
Muito satisfeito(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muito insatisfeito(a)
Muito bem disposto(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muito mal disposto(a)
Nada preocupado(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muito preocupado(a)
Nada ansioso(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Muito ansioso(a)

De facto, a situação que lhe apresentámos antes foi adaptada de uma situação real que foi publicada num artigo recente do jornal diário Jornal de Notícias. [...do jornal diário El País]

Queremos agora que nos dê também a sua opinião acerca desta pessoa portuguesa. Para tal, apresentamos-lhe abaixo um conjunto de características que também foram utilizadas nos estudos anteriores.

Por favor, indique em que medida acha que cada uma das características abaixo poderá caracterizar a pessoa envolvida naquela situação relatada no Jornal de Notícias. [...no El País]

	Não caracteriza nada	Caracteriza pouco	Caracteriza nem muito, nem pouco	Caracteriza muito
Tem respeito pelos outros	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Não tem princípios	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É pontual	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É má pessoa	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É organizada	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Executa tarefas devidamente	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Segue as normas da sociedade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É preguiçosa	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sabe trabalhar em equipa	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Não respeita os outros	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É irresponsável	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É honesta	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É ineficaz	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Não caracteriza nada	Caracteriza pouco	Caracteriza nem muito, nem pouco	Caracteriza	Caracteriza muito
Tem princípios	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cumpre tarefas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Não segue as normas da sociedade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tem ética	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É responsável	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É íntegra/digna	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Não se esforça	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É desonesta	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Não tem ética	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Não cumpre objetivos	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
É eficiente	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Na sua opinião, em geral, a pessoa envolvida na situação relatada no artigo do Jornal de Notícias é: [...do jornal El País é:]

Extremamente imoral	Imoral	Nem moral, nem imoral	Moral	Extremamente moral
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Extremamente incompetente	Incompetente	Nem competente, nem incompetente	Competente	Extremamente competente
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Em termos gerais, com que impressão fica acerca da pessoa envolvida naquela situação?

Extremamente negativa	Negativa	Nem negativa, nem positiva	Positiva	Extremamente positiva
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Sexo: Masculino Feminino Idade: _____

Obrigado pela sua participação.