Inclusion, Exclusion, and Marginalization of Group Deviants

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Summary

Basic concepts and important processes about groups' reactions to deviance, such as group affiliation, social norms, deviance, and its consequences for groups and behavior of their members, have largely been conceptualized by social psychological and sociological theoretical frameworks: the small group framework, the social identification framework, and the collective solidarity framework. Subjective group dynamics theory articulates between these frameworks on the understanding of antecedents and consequences of group reaction to deviance. Punishment or derogation of deviant ingroup members stems from an interplay between an intergroup descriptive focus and an intragroup prescriptive focus that are adopted by group members when faced by ingroup deviance in intergroup contexts. Ingroup deviants contribute negatively to individuals' social identity, and they are punished or derogated, which may materialize in terms of negative evaluations and/or marginalization and social exclusion. However, normative individuals' reactions to ingroup deviants are protective of the group's identity and its norms, not because the group is purged from its deviants but rather because in derogating and punishing them, normative members strengthen their ingroup identification, their commitment to the norms the deviants have violated, and, ultimately, reinforce group cohesiveness and the solidarity among ingroup members. Derogation and punishment of ingroup deviants would therefore function as an ultimate device to ensure normative members' social inclusion.

Keywords: collective solidarity, descriptive and prescriptive focus, group prototypes, ingroup deviance, social norms, social identification, subjective group dynamics

Subjects: Social Psychology

Introduction

Groups deprecate, marginalize, and exclude their members or, on the contrary, protect, reward, or promote them based on their convergence with other members' normative expectations. Some important aspects of two seminal approaches to group processes in social psychology and one in sociology are underlined as an attempt to reach a theoretical account of the antecedents and functions of people's reaction to deviance in groups. These are the *small-group approach* (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968); the social *identification approach*, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987); and the *collective solidarity approach*, based on the Durkheimian analysis of the social functions of deviance (Durkheim, 1933). Subjective group dynamics theory articulates some important postulates and predictions of those three approaches (e.g., Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998; Pinto et al., 2010).

Interpersonal Affiliation and Social Influence in Interactive Groups

The experimental social psychology of small groups traditionally conceives of the group as an organized social unit, structured through the objective interdependence and common destiny of its members (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Shaw, 1976). Affiliation to a small face-to-face group would allow individuals to construe a social reality aimed to explain important aspects of their lives that would otherwise generate uncertainty. Affiliation would also allow individuals to fulfill collective and personal goals that they could not attain in isolation. Finally, affiliation would fulfill individuals' motivation to be liked and validated by others. For these reasons, individuals would be strongly motivated to preserve consensus within the group. The larger is that consensus the stronger should be the subjective validity of members' beliefs and their adherence to the behaviors required to achieve group goals, and the stronger should be their reciprocal approval and mutual positive orientation (Boyanowsky & Allen, 1973; Janis, 1982; Sherif, 1936). Ingroup members who deviate from the group's majority beliefs or whose actions are inadequate to achieve group goals should generate uncertainty and frustration for other members and should suffer verbal reproach, belittlement, marginalization, or ostracism from other members (Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Earle, 1986; Latané & Nida, 1981; Levine & Thompson, 1996).

Informational and Normative Influence

Group members would be the objects and actors of informal and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Informal influence refers to the private acceptance as valid evidence of the beliefs that other members transmit through informal communications. Normative influence corresponds to the public acceptance of beliefs or enforcement of these beliefs on other members, based on a motivation to obtain social approval from other members (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Levine & Thompson, 1996).

Social Identification, Intergroup Differentiation, and Referent Informational Influence in Cognitive Groups

The social identification approach postulates that individuals construe their social world by perceptually accentuating the differences between members of opposite categories and the similarities between members of the same category (Doise et al., 1978; Tajfel, 1969). When this occurs, individuals assimilate themselves to the ingroup so that their identity becomes represented by the distinctive characteristics of the ingroup category (cf. Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This corresponds to a depersonalization or *self-stereotyping* process (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1982, 1984). As a result, people develop a positive orientation toward the ingroup, which becomes equivalent to the positive orientation they feel about the self (i.e., *ingroup favoritism*; Tajfel, 1978). Interestingly, in the small group approach, group affiliation stems from individuals' similar

beliefs and goals, but in the social identification approach, it is the subjective affiliation to a group that generates perceived similarity, interdependence, and a common fate among ingroup members (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner & Bourhis, 1996).

Self-categorization theory (SCT) formalizes the above intergroup differentiation process by means of the *meta-contrast* principle (Hogg & McGarty, 1990). SCT proposes that once an intercategorical opposition becomes salient, people weight the average perceived intracategory similarities by the average perceived intercategory differences and represent each category in terms of the set of attributes that more clearly differentiate it from the opposite category (i.e., they construe *group prototypes*; Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). People are then in position to ascertain their similarity to the ingroup prototype and difference from the outgroup prototype.

Due to their basic motivation to hold a clear-cut, distinctive, social identity, people will expect ingroup and outgroup members to regulate their behavior by the specifications of their respective prototypes. Group prototypes would thus be the benchmarks for normative ingroup and outgroup members' behavior, which, if that were the case, would present a *normative fit* (Turner et al., 1987). Concomitantly, people should also apply to the specifications of the ingroup prototype as guidelines for their own behavior. Therefore, in the small group approach, members' normative behavior stems from an informational or a normative influence that other members exert upon them, but in the social identification approach, referent informational influence (i.e., the representation of the ingroup together with the motivation to hold a distinctive social identity) guides members' behavior (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1991).

Deviance and the Functional Antagonism Between Levels of Categorization

The social identification framework presents a straightforward account of the cognitive processes underlying people's compliance with their group's normative systems. However, that account raises potential problems for a conception of marginalization and exclusion of group members as a *within-group* phenomenon. SCT proposes the existence of a *functional antagonism* between superordinate and subordinate levels of categorization (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). Indeed, defining deviance as group members' failure to match the specifications of their group's prototypes (i.e., as a lack of normative fit) begs whether deviance could be conceived as a divergence occurring *within* a group. Such deviance would have two possible consequences: (a) Group members who displayed features or behavior similar to those expected from members of the other group should be recategorized as members of this group, and (b) the similarities and differences that allowed for the initial meta-contrast would no longer apply and should be replaced by a new intercategory dimension that more effectively establishes intragroup similarities and intergroup differences (Oakes et al., 1991, 1994).[1] Taken at face value, the functional antagonism principle would make the concept of *intragroup* deviance a theoretical incongruity. This issue is discussed below.

Marginalization and Positive Deviance

There is a widely shared view, according to which deviance disrupts cohesiveness and promotes conflict in groups (cf. Clinard & Meier, 2004; Gibbs, 1977; Harris & Hill, 1982). However, this is not always necessarily true, or at least groups may sometimes show some leniency toward atypical members.

With their motivational model of group responses to deviance, Hogg and colleagues (Hogg, 2005; Hogg et al., 2005; Hogg & Reid, 2006) assume that ingroup members' typicality, including the typicality of the self, is an important condition for people's maintenance of a distinctive and positive social identity (Hogg et al., 1993). As a result, atypical ingroup members are less liked than typical members and should be relegated to the fringe of the group (cf. also Glambek et al., 2020). However, as they point out, deviance may be more or less negative, facilitating atypical members' recovery of the status they had before their demotion, depending on five conditions.

First, atypical members who show regret and take responsibility for their behavior, or whose behavior was group centered, have better prospects of rehabilitation than those who show no regret, take no responsibility, or behave self-servingly. Second, atypical members whose behavior is perceived as self-centered are more negatively evaluated. This idea is consistent with the fact that ingroup loyalty should be a highly praised value in all kinds of groups (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). Third, atypical members who have been marginalized may respond to the feeling of an identity loss associated with their demotion by reinforcing their identification to the group and acting in consequence (Fielding et al., 2006; cf. Hogg, 2021; cf. also Levine & Moreland, 1994). Fourth, atypical members may diverge from their group's prototype either away from or closer to the outgroup prototype. Although in both cases, atypicality decreases intragroup similarity, divergence away from the outgroup will harm intergroup distinctiveness less than divergence toward the outgroup (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 2002; Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000). Finally, atypical behavior may be useful to the group, as in the case of outperforming group members, for example. Although such members blur intragroup differences, they may still contribute to the positive differentiation of the ingroup, and this should be appreciated. This should occur especially when their behavior was group centered rather than self-centered, when they recognize the group's role in their achievements (Hogg et al., 2005), and by highly identified normative members (Schmitt et al., 2000).

Group deviants may thus act with an intention to protect or to improve their group. In line with this idea, Packer and colleagues have shown that group members may engage in deviant behavior not because they feel estranged from their group but because they highly identify with and struggle to improve the group (Packer, 2008; Packer & Chasteen, 2010; Packer & Miners, 2014). In one of their studies, Packer and Chasteen (2010, Experiment 1) asked participants to list two groups with which they strongly identified and two groups with which they weakly identified. Participants were asked to recall the frequency with which they had disagreed with each group in the past and to indicate the motives for disagreement. Consistent with the hypothesis, participants reported more frequent disagreement with groups with which they strongly

identified than with other groups. In addition, the motives for disagreements with the former groups were related to collective goals, whereas disagreement with the latter groups was based on participants' personal goals.

In another study, these authors (Packer & Chasteen, 2010, Experiment 2b) measured students' identification with their university and informed them that ingroup students in general held a lax attitude about "plagiarism." Participants were induced to consider either how that attitude affected the university's image or how it affected their personal image. A control group received no induction. Participants who strongly identified with their university were more willing to remain members of their university and diverged more from other students' lax lenient attitude when they were induced to think about how that attitude affected the university's image compared with their personal image. In turn, participants with low identification with their university were less willing to remain in the university and diverged less from the general attitude, regardless of whether they were thinking about the consequences for the university's image or their own image (cf. also Blader et al., 2017).

Deviance and Social Control in Large Communities

The previous discussion focused on the antecedents of the punishment (rejection, marginalization, or exclusion) of deviant individuals as conceived by studies on small, interactive groups, in which social cohesion and its flip side, deviance, are attributed to interpersonal similarity and attraction, and on large social categories. The following summary of sociologist Émile Durkheim's seminal ideas will complement those two previous approaches and address the basis of our subjective group dynamics theory about the antecedents and functions of reactions to deviants in groups. In his work, Durkheim (1898/1933) ascribed deviance a fundamental role for the preservation and increased cohesion of social groups. He proposed that groups need to implement rituals, which in more complex groups are set up by institutions, such as religion, education, or criminal justice, aimed at increasing their members' awareness of the values and norms that constitute what he designated the group's *collective mind* (cf. also Durkheim, 1958/1917). In this vein, no group could exist without deviance, because without it, there would be no reason to implement rituals that sustain rule-abiding members' adherence to the norms and values that form the collective mind. Deviance gives normative individuals the opportunity to participate in rituals whose function is to increase their awareness of, and commitment to, the norms and the values that the deviants have infringed (Inverarity, 1980).

Decreased Tolerance Thresholds and Social Cohesion

If deviance is, indeed, a functional device for the maintenance of group cohesiveness, then groups should encourage it within the limits of anomie, especially when they face threats to their existence and need to protect the moral values that sustain their collective mind (Durkheim, 1898/1933; Erikson, 1966). In this case, groups would decrease their threshold of tolerance, not to reduce their deviance but, on the contrary, to create additional definitions of deviance and hence increase the opportunities for normative members to engage in punishment rituals.

Groups' decreased tolerance for divergence when they are under pressure is well known in research on small groups (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Marques & Paez, 1994). For example, Lauderdale et al. (1984; see also Lauderdale, 1976) found that participants in face-to-face groups evaluated a deviant member more negatively and were more willing to exclude that deviant when the group's preservation was threatened than when there was no such threat. Ditrich et al. (2021, Experiments 1–3) showed that members' discrepancies with the normative expectations of their groups elicited anxiety-related emotions and anger in participants and that these reactions originated punitive reactions against the deviants.

Similar phenomena emerge from historical data. For example, Rokeach et al. (1960) correlated the intensity of the threat faced by the Catholic Church, the severity of punishment prescribed to deviance from religious precepts, and the level of authoritative legitimacy for that punishment between the 4th and 16th centuries. These authors observed that the stronger the threat posed by the deviance, the harsher the punishment advocated for deviants, and the higher was the level of the authority invoked for that punishment. Other historical events such as the Stalinist Great Purges, the McCarthyistic "loyalty and security program" persecutions, or the Catholic witch-hunting craze in Central Europe, which arose in association with, respectively, the Nazi expansion in Europe, the onset of the Cold War, or the rise of Protestantism (cf. Ben-Yehuda, 1980; Connor, 1972; Conquest, 1990; Gibson, 1988; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Sullivan et al., 1979), also suggest that groups' enhanced oversight and decreased tolerance over internal dissent may be a direct function of impending internal or external threats. Interestingly, the deviants seem to be persecuted exactly because they were considered ingroup members rather than being recategorized in the outgroup. Regarding this phenomenon, the 16th- and 17th-century Spanish and Portuguese inquisitions' public executions did not target Jewish citizens, who had been expelled, but rather the conversos, who, often forcibly, had converted to Catholicism (cf. Reston, 2006).

Subjective Group Dynamics

Subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT) was inspired by the above-summarized small group, social identification, and collective solidarity approaches (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998). SGDT proposes, in accordance with the social identification framework, that self-categorization generates perceived self–ingroup interdependence. The consequences of this state of subjective interdependence should bear a resemblance to processes observed in face-to-face groups, by which members sustain social reality and group locomotion (cf. Hogg, 1992). In line with self-categorization theory, SGDT proposes that people are motivated to sustain a distinctive social identity and expect ingroup and outgroup members to hold their groups' prototypical features. People should also be motivated to establish a positive value for their identity. In many cases, people fulfill both motivations by engaging in intergroup biases and discriminatory behavior (Tajfel, 1978). But they should also expect individual ingroup members to support the values that legitimize such positive social identity (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998). The set of cognitive mechanisms involved in this process is designated as "subjective group dynamics."

The Black Sheep Effect

SGDT was inspired by research on the so-called *black sheep effect* (Marques, 1986; Marques et al., 1988)—that is, the tendency to favor the whole ingroup and socially desirable ingroup members over the whole outgroup and socially desirable outgroup members (ingroup bias) while derogating socially undesirable ingroup members as compared to their outgroup counterparts (cf. Marques & Paez, 1994, for a review). This phenomenon has been understood as an elaborated form of ingroup favoritism (Marques, 1990; Marques et al., 1988). Socially desirable ingroup members contribute to a positive social identity and, as a result, are liked by other ingroup members. Conversely, socially undesirable ingroup members' behavior is susceptible of harming the ingroup's image, and as result, these members are disliked even more than outgroup members, whose behavior is irrelevant to the ingroup's image. This seems to be associated with the fact that information processing about deviant members is more systematic when the deviants are ingroup members (Reese et al., 2013).

Descriptive Intergroup Focus and Prescriptive Intragroup Focus

SGDT proposes that in establishing a metacontrast that defines ingroup and outgroup prototypes, individuals adopt a descriptive focalization. They concentrate their attention on the features that differentiate between ingroup and outgroup and that make members of each these groups resemble one another. Once intergroup differences are established, people may concentrate on group members' contribution for a positive social identity, especially if undesirable characteristics or behavior becomes salient. In this case, people will adopt a prescriptive focalization simultaneously with a descriptive focalization on theirs and other people's group memberships (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001; Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998).

The distinction between a descriptive and a prescriptive focus is consistent with the literature on the nature and functions of social norms. Some authors consider that norms are heuristics arising from the observation of modal or differential regularities across people, groups, and situations. Beliefs, group prototypes, or social roles would arise from such regularities (Axelrod, 1986; Campbell, 1964; Gibbs, 1965, 1977). Other authors consider that norms are arbitrary, conventional standards that correspond to moral principles and that shape social behavior (Bierstedt, 1963; Bonacich, 1972; Hawkins & Tiedeman, 1975; Homans, 1961; Morris, 1956; Nichols, 2002; Opp, 2001; cf. Clinard & Meier, 2004).

The adoption of a descriptive or a prescriptive focus may fulfill different functions. To exemplify, a descriptive focus would allow perceivers to include an array of individuals wearing color gradations ranging from dark to light blue or from light to dark red in two opposite, internally undifferentiated, categories (e.g., "Blues" vs. "Reds"). Perceivers would not have direct access to any members' value (although they might be biased in favor of the value that they assign to the ingroup). However, they should be able to denote someone wearing an auburn or a khaki shirt, respectively, as "Red*ish*" or "Blue*ish*." Finally, it would inform perceivers about the colors they should wear if they identified with one of these categories. On its side, a prescriptive focus allows perceivers to assign a value to any spectator who set the adversary team's banner on fire. In this case, perceivers would not have direct access to this spectator's membership (although they

might wish them to be outgroup members), but they would be able to determine whether the person's behavior was consistent with a moral and group-unspecific norm of fair play, citizenship, virtuousness, and so on. Whereas the descriptive focus would not be relevant to assign a value to people (other than that they share with their category), the prescriptive focus would allow assigning them such a value, but it would not inform about their identity. However, if the descriptive and prescriptive foci functioned together, as should occur in most if not all social situations, the positive or negative impact of those spectators' behavior on the perceivers' identity should be significantly stronger if they were ingroup than outgroup members.

Empirical Evidence for Subjective Group Dynamics

Descriptive and Prescriptive Foci as Complementary Processes in Judgments of Groups and Their Members

Marques and colleagues (Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998) examined this idea in a series of studies. In one of these studies (Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998, Study 3), they informed participants that people can be classified into two opposite cognitive types ("X" and "Y"), and they were exploring decision-making patterns of the members of each type in court trials. Participants examined an ambiguous murder case (cf. Marques, Abrams, et al., 1998, for details) and wrote a short essay about it, which would, purportedly, allow determining to which cognitive type they belonged. A second task was to rank the six people involved in the case according to their responsibility for the murder. One week later, participants learned that they belonged to one of the two cognitive styles. They were handled a booklet reminding them of their responsibility ranking in the first session, together with copies of rankings supposedly made by five other target members of the participants' type (ingroup condition) or of the opposite cognitive type (outgroup condition). These rankings served to manipulate targets' normative or deviant status. Four targets were normative of their respective group. In the ingroup condition, their rankings were the same as the participants' rankings, and in the outgroup condition, they showed the reverse order. The remaining target deviated from their group. In the ingroup condition, this target's ranking was similar but not identical to that made by the normative outgroup targets, whereas in the outgroup condition, the deviant target's ranking was similar but not identical to the ingroup's majority ranking. It was stressed that the targets had been selected based on their high scores for their cognitive types before they had made their rankings. A final manipulation concerned the induction (high salience condition) or not (low salience condition) of a prescriptive focalization. In one condition, participants received no information besides the targets' ratings. In the other condition, they were informed that previous research indicated that members of each cognitive type should rank the characters in a specific order (which was always the order chosen by the majority). In brief, there was a clear-cut difference between ingroup and outgroup majority responses, and participants' responses were the same as those given by the ingroup majority and opposite to those given by the outgroup majority. In addition, one member of each group deviated toward the opposite group. Finally, whereas some participants were induced to adopt a prescriptive focus in judging the targets, other participants received no such induction.

This somewhat complicated procedure yielded, nevertheless, quite clear results. Regardless of experimental conditions, participants evaluated their ingroup type more favorably than the outgroup type. When no prescriptive focalization was induced(low salience condition), participants always favored ingroup over outgroup (normative or deviant) targets. In contrast, when prescriptive focalization was highly salient, ingroup normative targets were the most favorably judged of all targets, and the closer the remaining ingroup and outgroup targets' responses to the ingroup norm, the more favorably those targets were judged. This result supports the idea that people evaluate group members based on an interplay between a descriptive and a prescriptive focus on people's judgments of groups and their members (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Evaluations of normative and deviant members as a function of group and salience of prescriptive norms (Experiment 3).

Source: Reprinted from Marques, Abrams, et al. (1998, p. 983).

One relevant question for an analysis of the interplay between descriptive and prescriptive foci concerns the impact of normative and deviant members' representativeness or typicality on their judgments. Deviants from a prescriptive norm hinder their group's positive image, and other

members' perceived interdependence with these deviants for the value ascribed to social identity should be a direct function of the deviants' ingroup representativeness. Therefore, deviant typical ingroup members should be more derogated than equally deviant, but less atypical, ingroup or outgroup members. Concomitantly, normative typical ingroup members should be more positively evaluated than equally normative, but less atypical, ingroup or outgroup members.

Pinto et al. (2010, Experiments 2–3) examined the above idea. Inspired by Levine and colleagues' (Moreland & Levine, 1994) group socialization model, the authors asked university students to read a survey report showing opinions of the students issuing either from their faculty or from another faculty about the implementation of international cooperation between their university and other universities. In a first session, participants indicated for how long they attended their faculty, how included they felt, and their opinion about the participation of the students in decisions regarding the university. In the second session, participants read the responses given by two anonymous target ingroup or outgroup faculty students. One target (normative target) agreed with a piloted normative opinion ("students should take a stand and fight for a better educational system"), and the other (deviant target) agreed with a piloted deviant opinion ("students are not mature enough to know what is good for them"). The targets' status was manipulated. In one condition, both targets reported that they had attended their faculty for only 6 months and wished to remain (new member condition). In another condition, they reported that they had attended for 4 years and were very happy and very motivated to stay (full member condition). In a third condition, the targets stated that they had attended the faculty for 4 years but were unhappy and wanted to move to another faculty (marginal member condition).

Results showed that participants evaluated the normative and deviant ingroup full members (i.e., highly representative ingroup members) respectively more favorably and more unfavorably than all the other members, irrespective of their group membership and representativeness (cf. Pinto et al., 2010, for further details). In brief, the more descriptively representative of the ingroup targets were, the more prescriptively differentiated their evaluations were (see Figure 2).



Figure 2. Evaluations of normative and deviant members as a function of group and status.

Source: Reprinted from Pinto et al. (2010, p. 114).

Perceived Threat and Derogation of Ingroup Deviants

The above studies allow one to put SGDT in perspective when considering some assumptions of the social identification framework. The following studies establish an empirical relationship between that theory and the collective solidarity framework—specifically, the idea that groups reinforce their prescriptive vigilance over deviants in normatively insecure intragroup contexts when the norms that legitimize the positive differentiation of the ingroup are undermined.

Marques, Abrams, and Serodio (2001, Experiment 1) had university students scrutinize the responses purportedly given by representative students to a "survey on student hazing" (a popular practice that was increasingly challenged by university authorities). According to the conditions, these students were described as representative of the participants' faculty (ingroup condition) or of a rival faculty (outgroup condition). The survey responses had supposedly been given on a 7-point Thurstone-like opinion scale ranging from strong agreement ("hazing should be mandatory") to strong disagreement with hazing ("hazing should be terminated"). Participants were further divided into two conditions. In the norm-validating condition, the distribution of responses was skewed toward the continuation of hazing practices. In the norm-undermining condition, the skewness was in favor of their termination. After observing the response distributions, participants indicated the opinion with which they agreed the most and the first opinion that they considered unacceptable. The results show that survey respondents' group membership did not affect participants' responses and that the most agreed-on opinion ("hazing should be supported") did not vary across conditions. However, on average, participants in the norm-validating condition still found it acceptable that other students adhered to the counternormative opinion stating that hazing is "undesirable" (corresponding to the last but one

antihazing scale position). In turn, participants in the norm-undermining condition considered, on average, that the first unacceptable opinion was in the midpoint of the scale ("neither against nor in favor"). Clearly, the perception that the group's norm was being undermined decreased participants' tolerance of nonnormative positions.

Participants were then asked to rate the ingroup or outgroup students who espoused their most agreed-on opinion (normative targets) and those who espoused their first unacceptable position (deviant targets). Notice that, although normative targets espoused the same position across conditions, deviant targets' position was objectively closer to the norm in the norm-undermining (neutral) than in the norm-validating (undesirable practice) condition. Despite being objectively closer to the normative opinion in the norm-undermining than in the norm-validating condition, deviant ingroup members were more negatively judged in the latter than in the former condition. Outgroup normative and deviant target students received mild evaluations across conditions (cf. also Marques, Abrams & Serodio, 2001, Experiments 2–3).

In a second set of studies adopting a procedure similar to that used by Pinto et al. (2010; cf. above), Pinto, Marques, Levine, et al. (2016, Experiment 2) informed participants about two other students of their faculty (ingroup condition) or another faculty (outgroup condition): One held the normative opinion widely shared by students sustaining their participation in the definition of university policies, and the other target held the opposite, deviant opinion. Participants were subdivided in four other conditions, depending on the targets' statuses. In one condition, both targets were full members. In another condition, both targets were marginal members. In a third condition, the normative target was a full member, and the deviant target was a marginal member. Finally, in the last condition, the normative target was a marginal member, and the deviant target was a full member. These four conditions were designed to vary the balance between support, and challenge to, the widely shared normative opinion of the student population. Indeed, in the first condition, because both targets have the full-member status, the strong threat posed by the deviant target would be counteracted by the normative target's support. In the second condition, both members have a marginal status, so their opinions should both have little relevance. In the third condition, the weak threat associated with the deviant member's marginal status could be easily counteracted by the normative target's full-member status. The fourth condition should be the most hazardous one, because the deviant target's full-member status should represent a strong threat, and the normative member's marginal status should turn the normative opinion too weak to resist the threat to the norm posed by the deviant full member. Participants derogated the deviant ingroup full member and upgraded the normative ingroup full member when they were presented together, as compared to all other conditions. In this condition, participants also reported the strongest agreement with the normative position. In turn, the deviant ingroup full member was most favorably judged when presented together with the normative ingroup marginal member, and participants reported the strongest agreement with the deviant opinion in this condition compared with all the other conditions (see Figure 3; cf. also Leite et al., 2016).



Figure 3. Opinion change as a function of targets' group, deviant target's role, and normative target's role (Experiment 2).

Source: Reprinted from Pinto, Marques, Levine, et al. (2016, p. 584).

Derogation of Ingroup Deviants and the Reinforcement of Social Identity

Based on the collective solidarity approach, SGDT proposes that punishment of deviant ingroup members reinforces ingroup identification, increases perceived ingroup consensus, and strengthens the perceived commitment of members with the group's social control system. To examine this idea, Pinto, Marques, and Paez (2016, Experiment 1) asked participants to read a description of an embezzlement case in their ingroup or in an outgroup country whose offender was a national of these countries. Participants were informed that the case would either be on trial soon (effective social control condition) or that the legal deadline had been exceeded, so the fraudster was automatically acquitted (ineffective social control condition). Results indicated that

participants perceived ingroup members to be less committed to the ingroup and its moral norms, trusted the ingroup's ability to detect and punish deviance the least, and reported the lowest level of ingroup identification in the condition in which the ingroup's social control was ineffective compared with all other conditions. The opposite occurred in the condition in which the ingroup's social control had been effective. Importantly, mediation analyses showed that, in this condition, the more participants believed in ingroup members' commitment to moral norms and the more they trusted the group's ability to control deviance, the higher was their ingroup identification. This was not observed in the remaining conditions.

In a second study, Pinto, Marques and Paez (2016, Experiment 2) utilized a similar procedure, with two major exceptions. First, participants were informed that reports of embezzlement crimes were highly frequent in the ingroup or outgroup country. Second, they were asked a series of questions tapping their perceptions of the positive or negative emotional climate existing in the ingroup. As predicted, participants reported the highest and lowest hope and optimism about the future, the strongest and weakest commitment of group members with moral norms, and the highest and lowest level of ingroup identification, respectively, in the effective and ineffective ingroup reaction conditions, as compared with the outgroup conditions. Moreover, in the effective ingroup reaction condition, positive ingroup emotional climate and ingroup members' perceived commitment to moral values meaningfully mediated the association between social control effectiveness and ingroup identification.

In a final study (Experiment 3), participants reported their perceived efficacy of the national ingroup social control system to fight corruption. As in the preceding experiments, participants then reported their perceptions of ingroup members' commitment to moral values, their hope and optimism about the ingroup, and their ingroup identification. Finally, participants reported their trust in the group's social control system and the emotions felt when they thought about it. The results showed that participants' belief in the ingroup's ability to detect and punish deviance predicted their ingroup identification, and this was mediated by positive ingroup emotions, trust in the group's social control system, and consequent hope and optimism about the ingroup.

Conclusion

This article summarizes important aspects of the small group approach, the social identification approach, and the collective solidarity approach, which are relevant to understand the social psychological processes involved in social inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion. Three notes are worth considering.

First, this article explicitly dwelt more on marginalization and exclusion, subsumed under the general label of "derogation" or "punishment," than on social inclusion. However, social inclusion is also present as it concerns those normative individuals who marginalize or exclude others from their group. Indeed, rule-abiding, normative individuals, whether in their capacity as members of interactive groups, members of social categories, or members of the community at large, often express derogatory opinions, direct their hostility, or attempt to purge their groups from people whose behavior they consider off-course, disloyal, immoral, or, more generally,

socially undesirable. In so doing, those normative individuals are operating their own social inclusion in those groups, and this should be one main, perhaps the major, function of deviance in groups, the self-social inclusion of those who react against it.

The second aspect that is worth noticing is that the above reactions may appear to be triggered by the affective, emotional impact that deviants may have on normative individuals. But they also largely depend on a more complex array of social psychological processes. One such process is people's internalization of the social order and ability to hold a cognitive representation of the processes that sustain that social order (Chalik & Rhodes, 2018). As Campbell (1964, p. 397) states, at first, people are

> motivated to behave consistently with the expectations of any immediate circle of contacts toward which he feels a positive orientation [the goal of any coherent social value system being] to teach its members to punish themselves internally if their behavior violates its norms; self-control and self-punishment are primary goals of the socialization process.
>
> (cf. also Misch & Dunham, 2021)

This can be later extrapolated for judging others (Abrams et al., 2003). As Vygotsky (1997) put it, "The very mechanism that underlies the higher mental functions is a copy of the social. All higher mental functions are the essence of internalized relations of a social order" (p. 106). The reactions that are socially transmitted to individuals about the threat associated with deviance would progressively transition from an interpsychological to an intrapsychological social experience, a subjective group dynamics. So, the maintenance of social order via the definition of certain people as deviant and their subsequent punishment would not simply derive from people's internalization of social norms but also of the internalization of the very mechanisms that support that social order.

However, these subjective dynamics depend, at least partially, on their context, so the mechanisms that it entails may change depending on the recognition of the salient deviants, on the appraisal of the situation in which they emerge, and on their implications for the self. In his *Directorium Inquisitorum* (*Handbook of the Inquisitor*), Dominican friar Nicholas Eymerich wrote (our translation),

> Thomas Aquinas further states (2.2., q. 10, a. 8): There are unbelievers who have never received the gift of the Faith, such as the Gentiles and the Jews. These are not to be forced in any way to become believers; it is up to them to decide. But they must be removed from the Church. But there is another kind of unbelievers: those who have already received the gift of faith, who have taken advantage of it (such as heretics and apostates). These, the Church must physically pursue them and force them to preserve the gift they had received.
>
> (Eymerich, ca. 1376, 1573/2001, p. 109)

The idea that ingroup deviants should be punished, while outgroup members, who adhere to alternative norms, should just be kept at distance, clearly echoes evidence obtained by research on subjective group dynamics theory. This idea, which was alive in the 14th century, still lived in the 20th century, when, shortly after the U.K.–Argentina war of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, during the great 1984 English miners' strike, U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned,

> We had to fight an enemy from outside in the Falklands. We must always be aware of the enemy within, which is more difficult to fight and more dangerous . . . There is not a week, a day, or an hour when tyranny could not attack this country if the people were to lose their supreme self-confidence, their intransigence, and their spirit of defiance.
>
> (Wheen, 2004, p. 24)

Calling for differentiation between ingroup and outgroup (which is referred to as a descriptive focus) and coercing ingroup dissidents (which is referred to as a prescriptive focus) thus appear to be different, yet complementary, actions in reproducing social control mechanisms and reinforcing group identity. People's tacit adherence to this kind of process and the resulting punishment of deviants is one warranty of social cohesiveness, a positive social identity, subjective well-being, and confidence in the future (Pinto, Marques, & Paez, 2016).

The third and final aspect to be stressed is that there is a huge literature on marginalization, exclusion, and inclusion. Such literature would be too extensive to be entirely reviewed in this article. Other related perspectives, such as those proposed by Jetten and colleagues (e.g., Jetten & Hornsey, 2014) or by Williams and colleagues (e.g., Williams & Nida, 2017), should provide complementary relevant insights about this topic.

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Notes

1. Let us imagine a political debate between left-wing and right-wing parties' representatives about big fortune income taxes in which the norm-fitting opinions would likely be anti-cuts for left-wing and pro-cuts for right-wing representatives. If, during that debate, some left-wing members approved and some right-wing members disapproved of tax cuts, SCT would predict that the initial anti– versus pro–tax cut opposition would be ignored in favor of other issues more consistent with the difference between the parties. Another prediction could be that the pro– versus anti–tax cut opposition would remain salient, but the initial left-right wing opposition would be replaced by a more meaningful intercategory opposition. But it would be more difficult to conceive of, for instance, right-wing or left-wing party members who deviated from their group's normative opinion.

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