Gnostic disagreement norms

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2022

Authors

Faria, Domingos (Author) FLUP

Journal

Title: European Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Vol. 18 No. 1

Pages: 5-22

ISSN: 1845-8475

Publisher: University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Indexing

Crossref

ERIH Plus

DOAJ

Other information

DOI: 10.31820/ejap.18.1.2

Abstract (EN): Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific