Risk tolerance and social awareness: adapting deterrence sanctions to agent populations

• Type: Article in International Conference Proceedings Book
• Date: 2009

Authors

Henrique Lopes Cardoso (Author) FEUP; Eugénio Oliveira (Author) FEUP

Conference proceedings International

Title: Progress in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the 14th Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence, EPIA2009

Pages: 560-571

14th EPIA - Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence - EPIA 2009

Universidade de Aveiro, Portugal, 12 a 15 de Outubro de 2009

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 0 Citations

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 1 Citation

INSPEC

Scientific classification

FOS: Natural sciences > Computer and information sciences

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-003-RWB

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04686-5_46

Abstract (EN): Normative environments for multi-agent systems provide means to monitor and enforce agents' compliance to their commitments. However, when the normative space is imperfect, contracts to which norms apply may be Unbalanced, and agents may exploit potential flaws to their own advantage. In this paper we analyze how a normative framework endowed with a simple adaptive deterrence sanctioning model responds to different agent populations. Agents are characterized by their risk tolerance and by their social attitude. We show that risk-averse or socially concerned populations cause lesser deterrence sanctions to be imposed by the normative system.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 12