AIRPORT AND AIRLINE COMPETITION: INCENTIVES FOR VERTICAL COLLUSION

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2009

Authors

Cristina Barbot (Author) FEP

Journal

Title: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

Vol. 43 No. 10

Pages: 952-965

ISSN: 0191-2615

Publisher: Elsevier

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 35 Citations

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 45 Citations

Econlit

Scientific classification

FOS: Social sciences > Other social sciences

CORDIS: Social sciences

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-003-E8N

DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001

Abstract (EN): This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions, also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines.

Language: Portuguese

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific