Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

• Type: Article in International Conference Proceedings Book
• Date: 2007

Authors

F. A. Ferreira (Author) Other; A. A. Pinto (Author) FCUP; H. A. Moreira (Author) Other

Conference proceedings International

Title: Proceedings in Applied Mathemetics and Mechanics (PAMM)

Pages: 1060301-1060302

Conference in Applied Mathemetics and Mechanics

Weinheim, Germany

Scientific classification

FOS: Natural sciences > Mathematics

Other information

Resumo (PT): We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Abstract (EN): We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific