A repeated strategy for dumping

• Type: Article in International Conference Proceedings Book
• Date: 2016

Authors

Martins, J (Author) Other; Banik, N (Author) Other; Alberto A. Pinto (Author) FCUP

Conference proceedings International

Title: Springer Proceedings in Mathematics and Statistics

Pages: 145-153

Indexing

Scopus - 1 Citation

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00M-6Z7

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-52927-0_11

Abstract (EN): In this work, we study the phenomena of dumping in a duopoly market through an infinitely repeated game. We consider two firms of different countries competing in the same country. When both firms are cooperating, if the foreign firm deviates from cooperation this can be interpreted as dumping and a period of punishment can be imposed to the foreign firm. After this, firms can play continuously the deviation-punishment game or compete à la Cournot. Previously, we observe that the repeated strategy of deviation-punishment is not adopted in the case of symmetric demand equations. Here, we observe that this strategy of repeated dumping can appear as the best repeated strategy when the demand equations are non-symmetric. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific