Formal verification of side-channel countermeasures using self-composition

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2013

Authors

Bacelar Almeida, JB (Author) Other; Barbosa, M (Author) FCUP; Pinto, JS (Author) Other; Vieira, B (Author) Other

Journal

Title: Science of Computer Programming

Vol. 78

Pages: 796-812

ISSN: 0167-6423

Publisher: Elsevier

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 21 Citations

Scopus - 34 Citations

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-004-ZVC

DOI: 10.1016/j.scico.2011.10.008

Abstract (EN): Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-the-shelf tools. This is due to the domain-specific characteristics of the code, involving aggressive optimizations and non-functional security requirements, namely the critical aspect of countermeasures against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we extend previous results supporting the practicality of self-composition proofs of non-interference and generalizations thereof. We tackle the formal verification of high-level security policies adopted in the implementation of the recently proposed NaCl cryptographic library. We formalize these policies and propose a formal verification approach based on self-composition, extending the range of security policies that could previously be handled using this technique. We demonstrate our results by addressing compliance with the NaCl security policies in real-world cryptographic code, highlighting the potential for automation of our techniques.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 17