



SIN, INCARNATION AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE IN PEDRO LUIS (1538-1602)

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ABSTRACT: Pedro Luis (1538-1602) was a Valencian Jesuit that succeeded Molina as the professor of the chair of *Prima* at the University of Évora. Although he was extremely influential, his works remain unpublished and were ignored after his death. The preparation of the publication of *De incarnatione*, his commentary on the *Tertia pars* of *Summa theologiae*, brought him many difficulties and was a source of institutional problems, both within his order and with the Portuguese Inquisition. The unrest of his fellows around the publication of this treatise shows that it may contain novelties and controversial theses. With this paper, I aim at providing a first survey of Pedro Luis's two redactions of a commentary on *Tertia pars*. I will highlight especially the importance of the divine knowledge of the future contingents for his discussion on the relationship between sin and Incarnation.

KEYWORDS: Pedro Luis; Incarnation; Christology; Molinism; middle knowledge.

RESUMO: Pedro Luis (1538-1602) foi um teólogo jesuíta valenciano que sucedeu Molina como professor de teologia na cadeira de *Prima* na Universidade de Évora. Apesar de ter sido extremamente influente, as suas obras permanecem inéditas e foram ignoradas após a sua morte. A preparação da publicação de *De incarnatione*, o seu comentário à *Tertia pars* da *Summa theologiae*, trouxe-lhe muitos dissabores e foi uma fonte de problemas institucionais, quer dentro da sua ordem, quer com a Inquisição Portuguesa. A agitação dos seus pares em torno da publicação deste tratado mostra que este pode conter novidades e teses controversas. Com o presente trabalho, procuro providenciar uma primeira sondagem das duas redações do comentário de Pedro Luis à *Tertia pars*, evidenciando especialmente a importância do conhecimento divino dos futuros contingentes para a sua discussão sobre a relação entre o pecado e a Incarnação.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Pedro Luis; Incarnação; Cristologia; Molinismo; ciência média.

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1. Introduction

According to Beltran de Heredia (1968, pp. 30-47), who studied and edited documentation about the Dominican side of the *De auxiliis* controversy and its background, one of the first triggers of the controversy took place on the 20th of January of 1582, in an academic act that involved Prudencio de Montemayor (the evaluated) and Francisco Zumel (the evaluator), but also Domingo Bañez, Luis de León, and others, at the University of Salamanca. Prudencio de Montemayor was asked a question concerning the merit of Christ. From the several reports that were made to the Spanish Inquisition about this academic act (BELTRAN DE HEREDIA, 1968, pp. 26-42 and 101-112), we can see that the problem of the relation between divine grace and free will derived from a controversial point Prudencio de Montemayor made: the fact that Christ accepted that he was going to die was not meritorious in itself, since there was no free will on His part. It is the motive and the intention of his will to accept his death that is meritorious. Domingo Bañez wasn't satisfied with this answer. He argued that the imposed precept of Christ's death determines not only the death itself but also the motives, the intention of Christ's will to die, and other circumstances. Prudencio claimed that if that were the case, there would be no merit at all since there would be no trace of freedom in Christ². Then, the discussion moved from Christology to the more general question of providence, i.e., whether it determines every single good deed and in what sense. The dissent between the participants became more and more visible, accusations of offence arose, and an Inquisitorial process was opened.

This episode drew my attention to the possible relationship between some Christological issues and the doctrine of *scientia media*. Moreover, while trying to find more clues about this hypothesis, the only study I found about Molina's commentary on the first questions of the third part of the *Summa*, concerning Christology, was José Mendeiros's book on the necessity of Incarnation in Molina. The manuscript that contains Molina's commentary is in a dreadful condition: Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, cod. 2823, dated 1582 (6 years before the

² Here is the testimony of a priest, Juan de Santa Cruz, who was there in person, to the inquisitor: "En 20 de enero de 1582 – dice él – en la universidad de Salamanca, presidiendo a un acto de teología el padre maestro fray Francisco Zumel y sustentándole un hermano de la Compañía, en el primer argumento que se le puso concedió el dicho sustentante que si Christus accepavit praeceptum moriendi impositum a patre, necessitabatur ad impletionem illius adeo ut nihil libertatis haberet in substantia operis moriendi, y por el conseqüente que en la substancia de la obra no mereció, sino que el merecimiento de aquella obra le venía por los motivos u por la mayor o menor intensión que Christo libremente quería tener. Y arguyendo el el padre maestro fray Domingo Bañes, y poniendo caso que el precepto impuesto a Cristo determinase así la substancia como la intensión, motivos y otras circunstancias, le respondió que en este caso no había rastro de merecimiento, porque en todo quitaba la libertad. Y el padre maestro fray Luis de León venía en esto y concedía así él como el sustentante que en la obediencia de Cristo no hubo merecimiento, sino en el modo de ella." (BELTRAN DE HEREDIA, 1968, pp. 37-38)

publication of *Concordia*). José Mendeiros points to the fact that Molina, in question 1, article 3 (*Utrum si homo non peccasset Deus fuisset incarnatus*, whether God would have become incarnate if man had not sinned) writes several passages that are coincident with some of his writings in the *Concordia*³. Moreover, within the fourth part of the *Concordia* itself, he dedicates a last section of Dispute LIII to Christ's impeccability and freedom (MOLINA, 1953, p. IV, d. LIII, memb. IV, §§ 18-24, pp. 401-405).

While these findings pointed to the connection between Christology and the *scientia media* doctrine, at the same time, my study on the figure of Pedro Luis also made it pertinent to focus my research on such a connection. In fact, Pedro Luis, Molina's successor in Évora, had his own institutional issues while trying to publish his *De incarnatione*. Those issues are probably the reason why he remained unpublished and forgotten after he died in 1602. In fact, he spent the last years of his life, sick with tuberculosis (*hectica*), already away from his academic obligations, trying to publish his commentary on the *Tertia pars* of the *Summa*. This commentary was submitted to two different commissions, one in Évora (1596-1599) and another in Rome (1600). There are several letters about this issue, both by the ones who tried to protect him and his opponents within the Portuguese province. In the end, the publication was authorised with minor changes. Luis went on a journey to Madrid (he had found a printer there after the results of the first commission), and everything seemed to favour him, but he died soon after this journey and remained forgotten until Friedrich Stegmüller, Klaus Reinhardt and Miguel Batllori called attention to him again in the 20th century (STEGMÜLLER, 1959; REINHARDT, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1971; BATLLORI, 1967).

I thought it to be interesting to use the list of controversial topics gathered by Francisco Pereira – the Portuguese Jesuit who wrote to the Superior General Claudio Aquaviva asking him to constitute a new commission in Rome to evaluate Pedro Luis' works – as a gateway to explore the hundreds of pages of the two redactions he left us of his *De incarnatione*. Here is the list:

- the satisfaction and the merits of Christ
- contrition
- predestination
- grace
- divine relations

³ However, Mendeiros's interpretation is, to say the least, incoherent: "Permanece fiel a São Tomás e defende a ciência natural de Deus (ciência média) que explanara na *Concordia*." (MENDEIROS, 1944, p. 37).

- being too far from Thomas and too close to the Nominales
- making distorted interpretations of the authorities⁴.

I already tried to explore the third, fourth and sixth points of the list in other works, not *De incarnatione*. I already did some preliminary studies on his doctrine of divine foreknowledge of the future contingents in the context of his two commentaries on question 14 of *Prima pars* of the *Summa* (LUIS, [1591-2], q. 14, art. 13, ff. 257r-285v, especially disp. 66 and 67, ff. 272v-285v). In the present text, I aim to explore the same issue in the two versions of his *De incarnatione*.

2. Pedro Luis' two redactions of *De incarnatione*

Pedro Luis wrote two different redactions of *De incarnatione*, as said before. One was written between October 1587 and July 1589 and is extant in five manuscripts⁵. A second version is extant in only one manuscript, written between 1593 and 1595⁶. It is longer than the first one and may have been the one he would publish. Concerning divine knowledge, the second redaction contains a more extensive reflection than the first.

Starting with the first redaction, Luis adds an appendix to disputation 9, *Utrum si homo non peccasset Deus fuisset incarnatus* [Whether God would have become incarnate if man had not sinned]⁷, where he struggles with two topics. The first concerns the relationship between the original sin and the number of predestined and reprobates. He questions what would have happened if Adam had not sinned. The second, which is the one that is of interest here, concerns

⁴ Here are the relevant parts of the letter: “Por ocasión de lo que de presente trata el P. Pedro Luis que es de irse a Madrid a imprimir sus obras, me pareció debía avisar a V.P. de lo que en este particular ocurre. Y es lo primero, que antes de se le dar licencia para la impresión, tenga V.P. la satisfacción que conviene de la obra, porque ay mucha razón de temer de ella por el trabajo que siempre ha auido con opiniones deste Padre, y aun agora se examinan en este collegio muchas, que se le han notado; mucho ha en las materias de satisfacione et meritis Christi, de contritione, de praedestinatione, de auxiliis divinae gratiae, de relationibus divinis, y no pocas dellas son de harto mala qualidad, y que si fueran defiridas al tribunal de la Inquisición, pudiera recibir daño el crédito de la Compañía (...). / (...) sería harto de considerar, si convenía a bien de la Compañía imprimirse por el estilo, modo de philosophar, género de doctrina poco acostada a s. Thomás y demasiado a Nominales, torcimiento en allegar y enterpretar doctores, concilios, etc. No prejudique lo que digo a su crédito, sólo sirva para se tener el miramiento que conviene.” (REINHARDT, 1966, doc. 43, p. 54). There are also other bigger lists, with dozens of theses, gathered by other fellow theologians in Évora, such as Ruy Martins and Brás Viegas (cf. REINHARDT, 1966, doc. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 41).

⁵ Here are they: ms. Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, cod. 2816 (dated 1590, but with the same content); ms. Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, cod. 2848; ms. Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, cod. 2876; ms. Braga, Biblioteca Pública de Braga, cod. 184; ms. Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, Gg. I.20, IV. I consulted the three manuscripts extant in Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal. They are easy to read, well-decorated, with short titles in the margins, and ready to send to a publisher. The part I'm analysing here was surely written before the publication of Molina's *Concordia* (1588).

⁶ Ms. Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, cod. 6226.

⁷ Here are the *folia* within the three Lisbon manuscripts: cod. 2816, ff. 67r-70r; cod. 2848, pp. 118-123; cod. 2876, ff. 65r-67v. I'm going to quote cod. 2816 from now on, but the text in the other two manuscripts is not significantly different.

the relationship between predestination and divine foreknowledge since Thomas Aquinas affirmed that predestination supposes foreknowledge of the future⁸. Pedro Luis struggles with Caietanus's attempt to justify this affirmation by distinguishing between three orders of things: the order of nature, the order of grace, and the order of hypostatic union (CAIETANUS, 1903, III, q. 1, art. 3, pp. 15-16). Sin belongs to the order of nature, and according to Caietanus, God must predict everything that belongs to the inferior order before predicting everything that belongs to the superior one. This would mean that he had to know all sins, through *scientia visionis* or intuitive knowledge, before establishing the order of grace and the order of hypostatic union (where Incarnation belongs). Luis doesn't accept this solution since there are sins that are posterior to the superior orders; and also things that belong to the order of grace that are prior to sin, on the one hand, and posterior to the hypostatic union, on the other hand (LUIS, 1590 [between 1587 and 1589], q. 1, art. 3, disp. 9, app., f. 68r).

This is where he introduces an attempt to order God's knowledge and will: divine knowledge is twofold – *notitia simplicis intelligentiae* and *notitia visionis*. The first one is the knowledge of everything that does not concern things as existent, or everything that he does not know through a categorical and affirmative act which makes known that something exists in a definite period of time. *Notitia visionis* is, in contrast, the one that concerns things as existent in a definite period of time⁹. In between them, there is the divine will, which commands effectively that something contingent will exist, and so, predestination is in between *notitia simplicis intelligentiae* and *notitia visionis*¹⁰. His conclusion concerning divine knowledge of the future contingents is that God knows them as possible through *notitia simplicis intelligentiae*, and He knows them as existent through *notitia visionis*¹¹. So, in this context, he

⁸ “Ad quantum dicendum quod praedestinatio praesupponit praescientiam futurorum.” (AQUINO, 1903, III, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3, p. 14).

⁹ “Scientia simplicis intelligentiae est qua Deus cognoscit omnia quae necessario praedicantur de unaqueque re et omnia contingentia quae de ea possunt praedicari et ea contingentia quae de facto praedicarentur et conuenirentur si res poneretur in talibus aut talibus circumstantiis (...). Uel ut uno uerbo dicam est scientia quae non attingit rem ut existentem de facto, id est quae non cognoscit per actum categoricum et simpliciter affirmatiuum quod illa res pro aliquo nostro tempore existat de facto. Sed si cognoscit et attingit existentiam cognoscit eam sub conditione atque adeo conceptu hypothetico seu conditionato. Nempe si hoc aut illud ponetur in actu tunc res illa existet. Hoc genere notitiae cognoscitur finis antequam sit uolitus efficaciter. Scientia uisionis est quae per actum categoricum et simpliciter affirmatiuum cognoscit aliquid, ut de facto existens per aliqua differentia nostri temporis, et hoc genere notitiae cognouit Deus ab aeterno ea quae de facto futura erant.” (LUIS, 1590 [between 1587 and 1589], q. 1, art. 3, disp. 9, app., f. 68v).

¹⁰ “Porro inter scientiam simplicis intelligentiae et scientiam uisionis mediat uoluntas diuina quae efficaciter uult ut aliquid contingens existat, qualis est praedestinatio.” (LUIS, 1590 [between 1587 and 1589], q. 1, art. 3, disp. 9, app., f. 68v).

¹¹ “Nam postquam per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae cognouit Deus omnia possibile et quid euenturum sit si res creentur in talibus circumstantiis, et quid possit commode fieri quando illud euenerit, tunc per suam liberam uoluntatem eligit id quod ipsi placet ut fiat et per media quae ipsi placent. Post istum uero actum uoluntatis

didn't yet integrate a third kind of knowledge or a subdivision of *notitia simplicis intelligentiae*, despite referring a hypothetical or conditionate concept of a thing if it existed in such or such circumstances.

In the second redaction (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595, q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, ff. 102r-116v), Luis doesn't change his opinion but complexifies it. He dedicates two large sections of Disputation 12 to this topic. There is an internal remission to his commentary on the first part of the *Summa*, especially Disputation 3 (LUIS, [1591 or 1592], q. 1, disp. 3, ff. 8v-12r), where he sets a general theory of abstractive and intuitive knowledge while trying to answer methodological questions concerning the science of theology, and Disputation 27 (LUIS, [1591 or 1592], q. 10, art. 1, disp. 27, ff. 130r-138v), where he discusses the several levels of knowledge in God (inside the wider question of the presence of past, present and future in eternity), then applied to the knowledge of the future contingents in disputations 66 and 67 (LUIS, [1591 or 1592], q. 14, art. 13, disp. 66-67, ff. 272v-285v).

Disputation 12 has five sections. After posing the question of whether God would have become incarnate if man had not sinned, the first section presents a long set of arguments for a positive answer, taken predominantly from Scotus but also from Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventure, and others. That set of arguments is followed by an also long set of scriptural passages that may support the affirmative answer. Then he starts the second section by saying that three premises are required for his answer. The first premise concerns the knowledge of God; the second asserts that God can intend an end directly or indirectly; and the third is the premise that, although everything in God is simultaneous, there is natural priority and posteriority between diverse ordinate things. After posing these premises, he holds the negative answer as more probable and more in accordance with scripture, but he doesn't offer a decisive verdict. Section 3 deepens the problem of the ontological order, so to say, of the several levels of knowledge and volition in God, applying this order to the original sin and Incarnation. Thus, he will try to answer what he calls the *dubium grauissimum*: why did God want to conserve an order of things where he had to permit the existence of sin? Finally, he dedicates sections 4 and 5 to oppose the first section's arguments and reinterpreting the scriptural passages presented there.

contemplatur per scientiam uisionis ut absolute futurum illud quod elegit." (LUIS, 1590 [between 1587 and 1589], q. 1, art. 3, disp. 9, app. f. 69r).

Here is how Pedro Luis divides divine knowledge in section 2. As in the first redaction, divine knowledge is twofold: *scientia visionis* or intuitive knowledge (*notitia intuitiva*), and *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* or abstractive knowledge (*notitia abstractiva*). Then he divides abstractive knowledge into two species: *scientia absoluta* and *scientia conditionata*. He defines them as follows, starting with *scientia visionis*:

Scientia visionis est illa qua Deus in sua essentia cognoscit rem aliquam non per causas, aut aliunde, sed in se ipsa, ut existentem per aliqua temporis differentia praesentis, praeteriti uel futuri, seu qua cognoscit eam ut praesentem per aliqua temporis notitia. (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, f. 104r)

Through this kind of knowledge, God knows things in themselves as existing in time. They are present to him in eternity, accompanied by the knowledge that they exist in a definite period of time. In his commentary on the first part of the *Summa*, question 10, Luis dedicated Disputation 27 to the meaning of the presence of temporal things in eternity. He argues against the idea that the future is already present in itself (subjectively) in eternity before it becomes present. But this is another question I won't treat here. It requires a thorough examination of his critique against Boethius's argument of eternity, which I intend to do in the future. By now, it suffices to say that it is a knowledge of things as they exist, as existent.

The next definition he presents is *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*:

Scientia simplicis intelligentiae est quae praescindit ab existentia, et praesentia quae tales sunt, id est, quaelibet alia notitia quae non est visionis, seu intuitiva. [He then divides it in two through the division between categorical and conditional propositions:] *Notitia simplicis intelligentiae absoluta est cuius obiectum est propositio categorica, aut saltem in eam resoluitur, qua scilicet cognoscit essentias, proprietates et accidentia possibilis, ut quod haec res habeat hanc essentiam, has proprietates, possit habere haec aut illa accidentia. Notitia simplicis intelligentiae conditionalis est cuius obiectum est propositio conditionalis, qua scilicet Deus cognoscit quod si res aliqua producat in istis aut illis circumstantiis habebit de facto haec aut illa accidentia, ut quod si Adamus creatur cum istis circumstantiis non peccabit, si cum aliis peccabit.* (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, f. 104r)

As we can observe, there is no *scientia media* here explicitly. In the commentary to the first part of the *Summa*, disputation 67, Luis equates the terminologies by saying that "some authors" (*aliqui*) name *scientia conditionata* as *media* since, in a certain sense, it is in between *simplicis intelligentiae* and *visionis* because it is a science that, although it waives the real presence of things in eternity, requires the condition that God would decide to make reality in such or such a way¹². However, for Pedro Luis, it is still a part of *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*

¹² "Scientia conditionata est qua Deus cognoscit praedicata contingentia quae de facto conuenirent subiecto si in talibus uel talibus circumstantiis poneretur, ut quod si Petrus esset in tali uel tali loco deambulare, et non sederet. Hanc scientiam conditionatam aliqui uocant mediam inter scientiam uisionis et scientiam simplicis intelligentiae de praedicatis necessariis." (LUIS, [1591 ou 1592], q. 14, art. 13, disp. 67, f. 281v)

because it is prior to the decrees of God's will that make the world exist in such or such a way. In this aspect, Luis is closer to Pedro da Fonseca's taxonomy of divine knowledge¹³ than he is to Molina's. For Molina, it is more important to highlight God's eminent and mysterious capacity to penetrate created free will. Moreover, *scientia media* is in between *scientia naturalis* and *scientia libera*¹⁴.

Through *scientia conditionata*, God knows what would have happened if Adam had not sinned. It is also through *scientia conditionata* that God knows, before creating the actual world we live in, that, given certain circumstances, Adam will sin and that the remedy for sin will be Incarnation. It is important to stress that the circumstances don't determine Adam's will to sin; otherwise, sin would not result from his freedom but from God's choice of circumstances. They determine the horizon of his choice, not the choice in itself. This is why *scientia conditionata* is the science that makes God know the effects effected by free second causes: they choose this or that path not absolutely but given the circumstances in a given moment of their lives in a given order of things. For God to know what they will choose and why they will choose this or that, it is not enough to know every single possibility and the one that will occur effectively, but also the free choice of the free cause in itself. This is why Molina highlights the comprehension of freedom from within freedom. However, if circumstances were not given, there would be no horizon of choice from which God would know how and why a free will chooses this or that. So, the knowledge of freedom from within freedom must be inside *scientia conditionata* as a part of it.

This said, let's see how Pedro Luis's taxonomy of divine knowledge determines his answer to the question of the relationship between the original sin and Incarnation. He answers that it is more likely (*probabilius*) that God would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned. Still, it is impossible to give an absolute answer in all matters concerning the free intention of God's will unless it is undoubtedly affirmed in scripture. Both the authorities and

¹³ "Tertio loco animaduertendum est, hanc quasi mistam scientiam, quam conditionata appellauimus (de hac uerum tota est difficultas) pertinere non solum ad ea quae reuera futura sunt, sed etiam ad ea quae futura essent si Deus alium ordinem dispositionemue in rebus instituisset, ut si alium mundum creasset, in aliisue occasionibus creatas voluntates posuisset, quae tamen nunquam in rerum natura erunt. Vnde nascitur quaedam distinctio huius scientiae conditionatae, ut alia dici possit conditionata futurorum, alia pure conditionata, utpote eorum quae reuera futura non sunt, qualis erat ea qua Christus dominus affirmabat Tyrios et Sidonios poenitentiam acturos, si apud eos ea signa facta essent, quae ipse in Corozaino et Bethsaida fecisset." (FONSECA, 1604, lib. VI, cap. 2, q. 4, sec. 8, cols. 140b-141a) Pedro Luis doesn't make this distinction inside *scientia conditionata*, but he stresses that it is through this knowledge that God knows every hypothetical or conditional proposition. He even gives the same biblical example, which became a cliché.

¹⁴ "Tertiam denique mediam scientiam qua ex altissima et inscrutabili comprehensione cuiusque liberi arbitrii in sua essentia intuitus est, quid pro sua innata libertate, si in hoc vel illo vel etiam infinitis rerum ordinibus collocaretur, acturum esset, cum tamen posset, si vellet, facere re ipsa oppositum, ut ex dictis disp. 49 et 50 manifestum est." (MOLINA, 1953, p. IV, disp. 52, § 9, p. 340)

the rational arguments he presents try to show that although one cannot prove decisively that God wouldn't have become incarnate if man had not sinned, there is proportionality between God's love for humanity and the remedies he gives to save it. He even states that a mother puts more care into treating an ill child than a healthy one (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, f. 106v).

We must wait for section 3 to see the question of foreknowledge being put against the question of predestination. In that section, Pedro Luis struggles once again with Caietan's (and Medina's) reading of Aquinas's affirmation that predestination requires the foreknowledge of the future and that the divine decree that dictates that humankind is saved by Incarnation presupposes God's foreknowledge of sin (AQUINO, 1903, III, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3, p. 14). As we saw in the first redaction, Luis does not accept that the three orders of reality presented by Caietan coincide with any kind of priority of knowledge from the inferior to the posterior order. He tries to find another solution by saying that God had to know through *scientia conditionata* that Adam would sin before the effective volition of Incarnation¹⁵.

Then, in his third conclusion, Pedro Luis asks the *dubium gravissimum*: why did God want to create an order, with his effective volition, where he knew that there would be sin¹⁶? He finds it highly problematic that God would permit sin just to have the occasion to manifest his justice by condemning the reprobates and his glory by saving the predestined through Incarnation. He has three main reasons to find it problematic. The first is that it is ultimately mysterious the reason why God permitted sin. The second and the third are connected, and they are the ones that are of interest to our reading: this would mean that if Adam had not sinned, the primary intention of God wouldn't have been fulfilled. And so, Adam's sin would be a prerequisite for God to manifest his justice and glory. Moreover, it is inadequate (*non videtur decere*) that sin would be a prerequisite for God's direct intentions when creating humankind. According to Pedro Luis, God had a primary direct intention which is occult and impenetrable, when creating humankind. Then, he had a secondary, indirect, conditioned intention of manifesting justice and mercy if sin would occur. Sin is not part of his direct intention, nor Incarnation¹⁷.

¹⁵ "Secunda conclusio in ordine est notitia simplicis intelligentiae conditionata de peccato Adami per se praecessit natura volitionem efficacem incarnationis." (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, f. 108r)

¹⁶ "Dubium ergo gravissimum est qua de causa voluerit Deus servare ordinem quem servavit, atque adeo permittere peccata." (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, f. 108v)

¹⁷ "Deus in prima hominum creatione habuit duas intensiones. Prima fuit directa, per quam ex illa creatione intendit finem aliquem cuius assequutio non praerequirebat peccatum. Hic autem finis erat tum salus omnium hominum, quam voluit per veletatem, tum alius finis nobis in hac vita omnino occultus, et impenetrabilis. Et haec fuit primaria intentio. Secunda intentio fuit indirecta, qua intendit manifestare suam iustitiam puniendo et

To finish our reading, it is important to look at Luis's fourth and fifth conclusions concerning abstractive and intuitive knowledge and the order between knowledge and volition. The order is as follows: (1) God needs to know through *scientia conditionata* that Adam will sin in the future; (2) he produces the will to Incarnate; and (3) he sees through intuitive knowledge sin, Incarnation, as all existent things. Intuitive knowledge, or *notitia visionis*, is a knowledge of existents as such, but this knowledge doesn't order them in terms of causality nor in terms of priority and posteriority. So, it would never be through *scientia visionis* that God would know the future contingents perfectly, i.e., in their causes. It must be through *scientia conditionata*¹⁸.

3. Concluding remarks

Finally, some conclusions should be taken from our reading.

First, we can see clearly that we are in the presence of a constellation of questions, not an isolated thesis, and that the doctrines on divine foreknowledge deeply affect some Christological questions. This means that one should not isolate, for instance, some Molina's thesis on foreknowledge or possible worlds without looking at its ramifications and consequences in other contexts, be it predestination and reprobation, be it Incarnation, be it any theological issue where God's knowledge affects the relationship between merit, grace, sin, etc.

Second, it would be vital to study what Molina holds in his Commentary on the *Tertia pars* of the *Summa*. However, this task will be very challenging due to the awful material condition of the only manuscript that contains this commentary, i.e., ms. Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, cod. 2823. As a plausible hypothesis, Molina may have wanted to enhance his theory of divine foreknowledge in a way that would accommodate better some aspects of his Christology. It is a hypothesis that I would like to pursue in the future.

Third, it is clear that the publication of Molina's *Concordia* in between the two redactions of Pedro Luis's commentaries on the *Summa theologiae* influenced the way he discussed divine

misericordiam incarnando si primi parentes peccarent. Et haec intensio fuit secundaria." (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, f. 109r)

¹⁸ "Quarta conclusio. Loquendo de notitia certa abstractiva qua Deus cogit effectum in sua causa prius cognovit peccatum Adami esse futurum quam determinate vellet incarnationem in eius remedium. (...) / Quinta conclusio. Notitia proprie loquendo intuitiva qua Deus intuetur res existentes ut existentes sunt, et quae praesupponit earum existentiae, simul natura videtur attingere omnia quae pro aliqua temporis differentia existunt, atque adeo ipsam permissionem peccati internam et externam, peccatum ipsum, incarnationem, etc. Haec conclusio probatur: nam notitia intuitiva non fertur ad sua obiecta sicut fertur notitia simplicis intelligentiae cognoscendo scilicet unum in alio, verbi causa, effectum in causa, propter dependentiam quam habent inter se, atque adeo prius natura unum quam aliud; sed fertur ad ea propter existentiam quam habent siue habeant inter se colligationem causae cum effectum siue non." (LUIS, [between 1593 and 1595], q. 1, art. 4, disp. 12, ff. 109v-110r)

foreknowledge. However, as I already noticed when studying his commentary on the first part of the *Summa*, Luis adopts a terminology and taxonomy that is more similar to Fonseca's than to Molina's. At the same time, another question remains: he was a student of Molina between 1568 and 1574, many years before the publication of *Concordia*. So, why did he enhance his position and distinguished more clearly a *scientia conditionata* only after the publication of *Concordia*? What if Molina didn't state his position in public? What if he didn't find yet his position? What if Pedro Luis didn't state his position before someone else did? Here we have one more clue to map the origin and development of *scientia media*.

Fourth, as Mário Santiago de Carvalho pointed out in his *conimbricenses.org* article on Pedro da Fonseca's life and works, Pedro Luis may have collaborated in the preparation of the third tome of Fonseca's commentary on the *Metaphysics* that contain the theory of divine foreknowledge as well as in a smaller companion of metaphysics that was never completed (CARVALHO, 2020). This may be, at least partially, the reason why Luis is closer to Fonseca than he is to Molina in what concerns the taxonomy of divine knowledge. It is another clue I would like to pursue in the future.

Finally, there may be other important passages to explore inside Luis's Christology, especially concerning the merit and impeccability of Christ.

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