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Hannah Ginsborg on Kant and perceptual normativity

This paper is the written counterpart of a talk given at the IFILNOVA in the context of the colloquium ‘Kant | atitudes, experiências, valores’. The aim of the talk was to present my first readings of Hannah Ginsborg on Kant’s aesthetics. Ginsborg defends that Kant’s proposals in the *Critique of Judgement* provide an insight to avoid the infinite regress created in any explanation of the grounding of the acquisition of empirical concepts on perceptual experiences. Ginsborg finds this infinite regress to be at the basis of one of the most important problems of contemporary philosophy of perception, that on the nature of perceptual *contents*: are they conceptual or nonconceptual? For Ginsborg, none of the sides of the dispute between conceptualism and nonconceptualism, or at least as they are usually taken, avoids the infinite regress. According to Ginsborg, Kant’s notion of reflection offers a way out of the infinite regress by considering that in reflective judgements a subjective validity – the ‘universal voice’ – is manifest. Such an ingredient is neither a concept or a representation, but rather a norm, that is also present in perception, through what Ginsborg calls ‘perceptual normativity’. The main goal of this paper is to present Ginsborg’s readings of Kant and her solution to the infinite regress of an explanation of the acquisition of empirical concepts as grounded on perceptual experience. But in the end I present a reconsideration of the map of positions within philosophy of perception as a different use to Ginsborg’s perceptual normativity.

Introduction

Philosophy of perception is a philosophical independent area of investigation since the late 20th century (Crane 1992; Brogaard 2014). Before that, perception was indeed a subject of philosophical debate, but it was mostly as part of the

discussions within the philosophy of mind, epistemology or phenomenology. In the last decades of the 20th century, philosophy of language and the cognitive science introduced the notion of content in the philosophical debates on perception (Peacocke 2001; Evans 1982). The nature of perception itself became an important core of philosophical discussion. The first concern of the newly introduced philosophy of perception was whether the contents of perception were conceptual or nonconceptual (McDowell 1996; Peacocke 2001). To put it very crudely, the matter of discussion between conceptualists and nonconceptualists is whether perceiving is or is not determined or influenced by concepts or conceptual capacities. Common to both sides of the dispute is the assumption that perceptual experiences are contentful. This assumption is developed in different ways by different authors (Brogaard 2014; Schellenberg 2014; Bengson, Grube and Korman 2011; Siegel 2010; Brewer 2002; Peacocke 2001; McDowell 1996; Searle 1985; Evans 1982). At the core of the assumption is the basic idea that to perceive objects in the world is to take them as being a certain way. The opposing sides of the dispute between conceptualists and nonconceptualists are thus both representationalist accounts of perception. Both conceptualism and nonconceptualism take it that perception is representational in that it involves accuracy conditions. This general representational view of perception has been called into question (Travis 2013, 2004; Martin 2002). According to Charles Travis (2013, 2004) there is no relevant sense in which something as a *representational content* is part of perception, or has a relevant role in an explanation of what perception is. From Travis's anti-representationalism til now, the main dispute within philosophy of perception is whether it is or is not representational. Some have tried to answer to Travis's objections (McDowell 1996, Schellenberg 2014), but the debate is not settled. Considering the disputes on the nature and existence of content in perception as what contemporary philosophy of perception is, what does it have to do with Kant and, more specifically, with Hannah Ginsborg's proposals to read his *Critique of Judgement*? The connection between aesthetics and perception has been long considered⁽¹⁾.

(1) Consider as an example Urmson (1957), considered to be a founding text on aesthetics within the analytical tradition.

Recently, some have considered how the notions and theoretical frames of the philosophy of perception can influence aesthetic theories (Nanay 2016; Sedivy 2018). Ginsborg's proposal is the inverse situation. Her goal is to display how Kant's considerations on the nature of aesthetic judgements provide an insight on the nature of perception. My goal is to present Ginsborg's proposal and, as an endnote, point to one possible extension of it.

1. The infinite regress

In her 2015 *Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's Critique of Judgement*⁽²⁾, Ginsborg takes the clash between nonconceptualists and conceptualists as a version of the more general problem of considering how empirical concepts are acquired on the basis of experience. This is so for Ginsborg highlights that claiming that the perceptual contents are nonconceptual or conceptual is a response to the problem of knowing how we perceive particular objects as having certain properties. According to Ginsborg, this problem is an inheritance of classical empiricism. In her perspective, Locke, Berkeley and Hume developed compositional theories of perception, in which association of ideas or impressions was the key to solve the problem — unsuccessful. There surely is a lot to say about this but I will not do that here. About classical empiricism, what needs to be stressed here is that Ginsborg endorses contemporary readings of what ideas and impressions, as considered by the empiricists, are. In these contemporary readings, ideas and impressions are equivalents of what is now called sense impressions or sensations.

The major attack on sense impressions or sensations is that they are not adequate to be perceptual *content*, for they are not the kind of thing that has or can have accuracy conditions (Sellars 1983; McDowell 1996; Tang 2010). So, when trying to explain the acquisition of empirical concepts as grounded on perceptual experiences, considering that what they provide are sense impressions or sensations, one gets short of content. All one gets are sense

(2) Ginsborg, H. (2015) *The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's Critique of Judgement*. Oxford University Press.

impressions or sensations. Therefore, 'mere' sense impressions or sensations cannot provide a plausible explanation of the grounding of the acquisition of empirical concepts on perceptual experiences. This problem is the one John McDowell offers conceptualism as a solution (1996). McDowell's conceptualism is (also) a Kantian solution. Inspired on Kant's alternative to empiricism concerning objective knowledge, McDowell proposes that perception involves the operation of both sensibility ('receptivity') and understanding ('spontaneity'), so that in perceiving an object, conceptual capacities are already in exercise. In this way, perception is conceptual. Thus, although it is a Kantian solution to the broader problem of knowing how perceptual experiences ground empirical concept, McDowell's differs from that of Ginsborg in that it assumes that all perceptual experience involves conceptual capacities. This is, for Ginsborg, the core of the problem, for it provides concepts as a ground for the acquisition of empirical concepts. The result is it leads to an infinite regress in the explanation of how perceptual experiences ground the acquisition of empirical concepts: if the relevant concepts are already contained in perceptual experience, how can an explanation of the perceptual experience be the ground for their acquisition without incurring in a vicious circle?

Ginsborg's proposal aims to use Kant's alternative to empiricism in a different way than that of McDowell. For her, the infinite regress is originated by the joint assumption of the following thesis:

1. If empirical concepts are grounded in perceptual experience, objects are presented in perception as having certain properties, more specifically, properties that correspond to the empirical concepts at stake.
2. An object is perceived as having a certain property only if the correspondent empirical concept figures in the perceptual experience.

Indeed, the joint assumption of these two theses may be found in McDowell's conceptualism. McDowell (1996) defends that, in a perceptual experience, objects are presented as already being in a certain way, so the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual: it is shared with beliefs and judgements

formulated from them.

Ginsborg considers that, like McDowell, conceptualists cannot but hold these joint theses and thus conceptualism cannot but assume that there is no noncircular explanation of the grounding of empirical concepts on perceptual experiences. In her opinion, against conceptualists' accommodation, nonconceptualists try to avoid the infinite regress, and they do so by rejecting 2). to reject 2) is to deny that the empirical concepts that correspond to the perceptual properties figure in experience. This is indeed Gareth Evans's (1982) proposal. Evans proposes that ways of perceiving are not always connected to concepts in the possession of the subject of the experience. In Ginsborg's opinion, the rejection of 2) is the best strategy to avoid circularity. Yet, nonconceptualism, at least as it is usually considered, may not be the best way to follow this strategy. There is at least one version of nonconceptualism that Ginsborg considers to meet some difficulties here: that of Christopher Peacocke's. To fully understand Ginsborg's proposal is thus necessary to consider Peacocke's nonconceptualist proposal.

In "Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?", Peacocke (1992) proposes that perceptual experiences have a certain kind of content that is distinct from either concepts — in that it is finely grained — or mere sensations — in that it represents the properties at stake. According to Ginsborg, with this notion of perceptual content, Peacocke rejects 2), which would avoid the infinite regress. However, Peacocke adds to this rejection the claim that perception involves, in addition to the having of sensations, a capacity to discriminate objects by their represented properties that does not involve the figuration of those properties in its content. How can this be? As Ginsborg remarks, Peacocke's discriminatory capacity aims at being a middle ground between perceptual experiences and empirical concepts, or between experiences and judgements. The exercises of Peacocke's discriminatory capacity are what Ginsborg calls a way of perceiving. So, according to Ginsborg, Peacocke's proposal is that ways of perceiving are to be distinguished both from ways of feeling or sensing and from ways of thinking or judging. In Ginsborg's account, Peacocke's nonconceptual content is the content of ways of perceiving. This is different from the contents of ways of feeling and sensing and from the contents of ways of thinking and judging. Whereas sense impressions and sensations are the contents of ways of feeling and sensing,

concepts and thoughts are the contents of ways of thinking and judging. So, for Ginsborg, Peacocke's proposal takes this nonconceptual content to be what puts the subject of experience in position to acquire empirical concepts, and more specifically, the concepts which correspond to the perceived properties. Therefore, Peacocke's ways of perceiving, that involve nonconceptual content, aim at being able to explain the acquisition of empirical concepts as grounded on perceptual experience, without the infinite regress.

But Ginsborg remarks that Peacocke cannot avoid the infinite regress he tries to escape from. This is so for nonconceptual content, although it is not conceptual, still is *representational*. As we saw before, the very notion of content is connected to that of representation. To propose that perception is contentful is to assume that it represents things to be a certain way. Indeed, a representation is what is at stake in Peacocke's proposal, for he claims that ways of perceiving have content, that is, they represent the world to be a certain – nonconceptual – way to the subject of the perceptual experience. Therefore, nonconceptualism, like that of Peacocke, is still hostage to the infinite regress of explaining the acquisition of empirical concepts with perceptual experience. As Ginsborg could put it: to represent something as being a certain (nonconceptual) way is already to subsume a particular under a universal, that is, it is a conceptual exercise.

For Ginsborg, the problem of Peacocke's nonconceptualism is that it confounds two ways of *thinking* about ways of perceiving. In her opinion, the difference between these two ways of perceiving is phenomenological. Ways of perceiving an object can be distinguished phenomenologically:

- As the way the object is presented to the subject of the experience.
- As the way the subject of the experience takes the object to be.

This distinction is important for Ginsborg for it provides two ways of considering perceptual properties: they can be thought of as ways of being *for the object* or ways of being *for the subject*, in perception. For brevity, I will call the first, objective, and the second, subjective. Distinguishing objective and subjective ways of perceiving is the basis for Ginsborg to propose that

considering objective ways of perceiving provides no escape from the infinite regress. Concerning Peacocke's proposal, Ginsborg considers that when he takes the content of perceptual experiences to be representational but not conceptual, Peacocke is conflating the objective and subjective ways of thinking about ways of perceiving, and in doing so, he reintroduces circularity in empirical conceptualization. For, in perception, an object is always presented to the subject as being a certain way: the objective way of thinking about ways of perceiving is always representational. So, the key to the solution of the problem of the acquisition of empirical concepts in perceptual experiences must be in what I am calling the subjective ways of perceiving.

So far, I showed that and how Ginsborg rejects both conceptualism and nonconceptualism as good alternatives to the empirical circular inheritance of an explanation of the acquisition of empirical concepts as grounded on perceptual experiences. Conceptualism is not suitable for it holds 1) and 2). According to Ginsborg, the infinite regress can be avoided only rejecting 2). However, this rejection is not sufficient. To avoid the infinite regress a certain way of thinking about ways of perceiving must be considered. As I shall show below, Ginsborg claim is that it is not true that an object is perceived as having a certain property only if the correspondent empirical concept figures in the perceptual experience, but it is not enough to take empirical concepts out of what figures in perceptual experiences. For something to figure in a perceptual experience, is for its subject to be aware of it while having the experience. In rejecting Peacocke's nonconceptualism, Ginsborg rejects that, when she perceives an object, not only the subject of a perceptual experience is *not* aware of a concept but also that she is *not* aware of a representation. Yet, if the infinite regress has to be avoided, then the result of this rejection cannot fall prey of the same difficulty of the empiricists. Mere sense impressions or sensations are not the adequate ground for an explanation of the acquisition of empirical concepts on basis of perceptual experience. It is to find an alternative both to empiricism or to conceptualism and nonconceptualism that Ginsborg appeals to Kant and his *Critique of Judgement*.

2. Kant on reflection

What is reflection and how does Kant consider it? In the published Introduction of the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant presents the faculty of judgement as one of the three faculties of knowledge. The other two are understanding and reason, already considered in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason*, respectively. Kant's motivation for writing the third Critique is that he believes that none of the first two critiques is able to tackle one feature of the faculty of judgement: reflection. This is so for judgement differs from understanding in that it involves, not the constitution, but an application of concepts to objects. As Ginsborg explains, for Kant, to judge is to subsume a particular under a universal and there are two ways of doing this. The faculty of judgement can be exercised either by submitting an object to a determinate concept or by finding a concept to a given object. It is in this second way of subsuming a particular under a universal that rests the importance of the faculty of judgement to a critique of knowledge, for it is there that it is exercised reflectively.

Ginsborg remarks that Kant seems to offer a solution to the problem of the infinite regress when, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he demands that, for objective knowledge to be achieved, sensibility and understanding must be both in operation. This is what influences McDowell's conceptualism. Yet, according to Kant, the joint operation of sensibility and understanding – the synthesis – is due to the intervention of imagination, which provides rules to structure singular representations into general ones – the schemata. But according to Ginsborg, even if they are not *empirical* concepts, schemata are themselves concepts. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the synthesis provided by imagination is, at the end, an application of concepts to sensations, which preserves the infinite regress in an explanation of how perceptual experience grounds the acquisition of empirical concepts. If the acquisition of empirical concepts is explained by making explicit the rules that govern imagination in the synthesis of representation, what one gets is just a displacement from the problem of knowing how empirical concepts are grounded in perceptual experience to the problem of knowing how the synthetic rules of imagination are grounded in

experience: the acquisition of empirical concepts is still being explained with the acquisition of other concepts. Thus, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant merely substitutes empirical concepts by the rules of synthesis of imagination, in an explanation of how the acquisition of empirical concepts is grounded in perceptual experience. I will not question or argue this reading of schemata as concepts. My interest is to show that Ginsborg's assumption that, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, schemata are concepts is her motivation to defend that if Kant has a solution for the infinite regress on the explanation of the acquisition of empirical concepts in perceptual experiences, it is not to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, considering logical judgements, but rather in the *Critique of Judgement*, considering judgements of taste.

According to Kant, judgements of taste are aesthetic and not logic, for they do not – and cannot – attribute properties to an object. In judging that something is beautiful, for instance, one does not attribute beauty to the represented object, but rather attribute one's own feeling of pleasure to all those who represent the same object. Reference to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure cannot be objective, for nothing can be designated for the object from it. Feeling pleasure or displeasure, the subject is aware of herself as she is affected by sensations. Judgements of taste, like Ginsborg remarks, are self-referential in this sense for Kant. In a judgement of taste, the awareness of the representation of an object is not an exercise of the joint activity of sensibility and understanding, with an intervention of imagination, but an exercise of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The feeling of pleasure or displeasure does not contribute to knowledge but rather to preserve or discard the awareness of the representation of the object.

It is this feeling of pleasure or displeasure that grounds the peculiar feature of the faculty of judgement that most interest Kant. To introduce it, consider again judgements of taste. In them, Kant claims, the existence of the object represented is irrelevant. When I judge something to be beautiful, what I aim at is to preserve the feeling of pleasure the representation of which provides me. What then is relevant in a judgement of taste is its subject and what she does with the representation of the object in herself. Thus, Kant claims, beauty is something someone is aware independently both of any interests.

Something that someone is aware of like this cannot be judged otherwise except as something which contains a foundation of universal pleasure. When I find something beautiful, I represent beauty as an object of universal delight. Kant accounts for this attribution of one's own feeling of pleasure or displeasure as a 'universal voice', something that he calls subjective universality. This universality of judgements of taste is not the same kind as the universality of logic judgements. The universality at stake is subjective for it is not founded in concepts nor is it founded on objects. For Kant, judgments of taste do not postulate objects or properties. Instead they postulate this universal voice, that he explains as a demand, not for a universal agreement, but for the confirmation of a rule that is universal.

Kant argues that aesthetic judgments are peculiar to the faculty of judgement in that they do not contribute to objective knowledge but belong to the faculty of knowledge itself by referring it to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure — and this is what makes of them reflexive. Aesthetic judgements make manifest that the faculty of knowledge can indicate a rule, by which nothing is known, according to which reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure takes place. This rule has to be applied where a universal concept of the understanding is not enough to grasp or explain the experience of things as purposive; and its application is relevant both for pure reason, in that it intervenes in the knowledge of 'mundane beings', and to practical reason, for it opens perspectives. The manifestation of the a priori principle of the faculty of judgement is thus possible in aesthetic judgements for they are reflective, rather than determinative. A judgement of taste, Kant says, may not judge according to that idea of purposiveness. However, Kant continues, the one who judges aesthetically *refers* to this idea. The subjective universality of aesthetic judgement is thus different from the objective universality of determinative judgements, for it designates the reference of a representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure for each subject, rather than the reference of a representation to the faculty of knowledge.

Kant considers that the subjective validity found in judgements of taste is a challenge for the transcendental philosopher, for it cannot be deducted from logic universal validity, since aesthetic judgements do not refer to objects. So,

subjective validity calls for the discovery of its origin revealing a property of our faculty of knowledge, that would be unknown without the quest for the origin of subjective universality. It is here that imagination fulfills a very different role than that concerning objective knowledge. The analysis of reflexive judgements demands a different approach to imagination than that of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for the work of imagination in a judgement of taste seems not to be that of providing the required schemata for the conjoined exercise of sensibility and understanding, but that of *reflecting* the very faculty of judging. To have a pretension for universal agreement is the hidden property of the faculty of knowledge that a critique of the faculty of judgement unveils. In finding one's own feeling of pleasure as a universal delight in judgements of taste, one is able to assume that universal subjectivity is present also in the universal objectivity claimed in determinative judgements. The role of imagination in a judgement of taste is thus to make its subject aware of her feeling of pleasure or displeasure as being universally valid. So, instead of attributing properties to the judged object, a judgement of taste reflects a property of the faculty of judging as universal. What is at stake in an act of reflection is precisely a claim of *subjective* universal validity.

3. Ginsborg's Kantian solution to the infinite regress: perceptual normativity

In the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant affirms that the subjective condition for a judgement of taste is the capacity to communicate a state of the mind [*Gemüt*]. But then there is a problem. According to Kant, only knowledge and representation can be communicated. Since judgements of taste are not objective, that is, they do not involve reference to objects, but to subjects, they can not be about either of objective knowledge or any particular representation of an object. What then is communicated in the expression of a judgement of taste? Kant's answer is that what is communicated in a judgement of taste is not an object of knowledge or representation but the relation of the faculties of knowledge and representation — understanding and imagination — in free play. This relation of free play between understanding and imagination is thus a representation of

knowledge in general. That is, a representation of the faculties through which objects are given, in knowledge and in representation. In Ginsborg's view, Kant is here proposing that judgements of taste make manifest the very possibility of knowledge and representation, and this is what makes them unique in Kant's critical system. This is so for Kant assumes that the pleasure obtained in aesthetic judgements consists in the satisfaction of a condition that is necessary to all empirical cognition. This condition is precisely reflection in itself: mere reflection [*blosse reflexion*]. Mere reflection is the foundation of pleasure in taste and is given exclusively in the free play of the faculties of knowledge provided by judgements of taste. Therefore, to judge that an object is beautiful is a postulation of the very possibility of judging: since a judgement of taste involves universal subjectivity, in it, nothing is postulated except the very own possibility of knowledge. How does this relate to perception – and more specifically to the problem of the grounding of acquisition of empirical concepts in perceptual experiences?

According to Ginsborg, it is common to take Kant's discussion on reflection and reflective judgements in the *Critique of Judgement* as an answer to the problem of the possibility of systematization the multiplicity of natural phenomena in scientific theories. Yet, for her, this is not all Kant has to say. In the *Critique of Judgement*, and specifically, in the First Introduction, reflection appears to Ginsborg primarily as the capacity to bring particulars under universals. For Ginsborg, this is the key to solve the infinite regress of empirical conceptualization, since it makes of reflection the faculty that makes it possible to put particular objects under general concepts. Her central point in Kant's characterization of reflection is that it has an essential role in general empirical cognition. Ginsborg's motivation is that, for it to be possible to systematize the multiplicity of natural phenomena in scientific theories, it has to be assumed that they are organized in classes, according to their similarities and differences. Without the assumption that nature is divided in classes, to which our empirical concepts aim to correspond, the idea that an empirical concept agrees or not with nature cannot make sense. Thus, before it systematizes the multiplicity of natural phenomena in scientific theories, reflection has to subsume particular objects under general concepts.

As the faculty of bringing particulars under universals, Ginsborg assumes that, in the *Critique of Judgement*, reflection is presented either as the operation of *submitting* a particular to a given universal or the operation of *discovering* a universal for one particular. Submitting a particular to a given universal is to submit an object to a determinate concept. For instance, when determining that this is a azure-winged magpie, I observe the bird in front of me and determine that the concept <azure-winged magpie> is appropriate to subsume it. This is for Kant a psychological activity for it requires the application of a concept that is already in the possession of the judging subject. Since it is psychological it is of no interest to a transcendental investigation of knowledge. Kant's purpose with the *Critique of Judgement* is to find the a priori principle, or principles, of the faculty of judgement. Being the result of a psychological activity, determinative judgements, in which an object is subsumed to a concept, are of no use for this purpose. Kant thus turns his attention to those judgements in which, contrary to determinative judgements, a representation of an object is referred, not the object, but to the subject of the judging, and her feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by imagination. These are reflexive judgements, among which judgements of taste have a crucial role.

In Ginsborg's reading of Kant, the first instance of reflection must be the operation of discriminating and classifying objects according to their properties. Such an operation consists, not in submitting an object to a concept, but rather in discovering a concept for an object. But how are concepts for objects discovered? This is another way of putting the question on how perceptual experiences ground the acquisition of concepts. Ginsborg already eschewed a psychological characterization: to discover a concept for an object is not to assess the concepts one possesses and apply one to the object. According to Ginsborg, Kant offers a nonpsychological answer when he claims that the discovery of concepts for objects, in judgements of taste, is, not a matter of fact, but a matter of law. In Ginsborg's reading, reflective judgements are for Kant the actualization of the capacity to take one's own mental states as adequate to a particular experience, and that capacity just is, in a primary instance, reflection. To find beauty in an object, Ginsborg suggests, is the most general and indeterminate exercise of the faculty of judging, that is, the capacity to bring a particular under a

universal – or a perceived object under an empirical concept. Thus, judgements of taste are judgements in which the universal that subsumes the particular has to be discovered. It is precisely this discovery that gives rise to pleasure. The universal rule that governs aesthetic judgments is thus not conceptual in that it is a concept under which all agree to subsume an object. The universal rule is rather a norm to which the object of experience is in accordance with and that the one who judges aesthetically expects all to share. It is this that Ginsborg develops as the core of what she calls *perceptual normativity*.

For Ginsborg, in the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant claims that to exercise the capacity of judgement reflectively is, at a first instance, to take one's mental state as universally valid. This is what Kant calls universal subjectivity. It is universal subjectivity that Ginsborg puts at the core of her notion of perceptual normativity. Ginsborg considers that aesthetic judgements can be used as a model for perceptual judgements. In such a modeling, the reflexive exercise of the capacity of judgement in perception is the taking of one's own (subjective) perceptual experience as universally valid. But Ginsborg remarks that, although judgements of taste can be used to model perceptual judgements, there is an important difference between them. Whereas in perceptual judgements, objects are subsumed to concepts, in judgements of taste there is no such thing. What is the effect of this difference in Ginsborg's perceptual normativity? Ginsborg's aim is to propose that, although they involve the subsumption of an object to a concept, perceptual judgements *also* involve an auto-referential character. Thus, just like judgements of taste, perceptual judgements are reflective in that they demand for a universal voice that provides a norm for perception. Being reflective, perceptual judgements can thus be taken to be exercises of the faculty of judgement in which the subject grasps a rule, not as a concept, but as a normative attitude toward her mental activity. In the case of perception, the mental activity at stake is perceptual experience. In Ginsborg's proposal, perception contains a normative fit that applies simultaneously to both the (subjective) way of perceiving and to the object perceived. A normative fit is the awareness of the object as making the way of perceiving it adequate. Thus, in a perceptual experience, the ways of perceiving involve awareness of their own adequacy to the object perceived to the subject.

Now, if Ginsborg wants her Kantian reading to be a solution to the infinite regress she finds in both conceptualist and nonconceptualist proposals, then the awareness she is assuming to be the normative fit has to be elaborated, for it will be hostage to the infinite regress whether if it involves concepts or nonconceptual representations. In a more recent text, Ginsborg (2016) develops her notion of perceptual normativity proposing that Kant's characterization of aesthetic judgements, in the *Critique of Judgement*, allows for their consideration as manifestations of the awareness of the lawfulness or governability-by-rules of the activity of imagination, without there being the previous grasp of a rule. For Ginsborg, the way Kant describes the activity of imagination in the *Critique of Judgement*, suggests that there are no requirements for grasping the rule *before* the operation of imagination, even if the conceptualization of that rule is possible. From here, Ginsborg claims that the proposal that, in an aesthetic judgement, the faculties of knowledge are in free play is an insight on the nature of the kind of normativity at stake in perception. For Ginsborg, this insight is the suggestion that to grasp a rule without concepts is to adopt a normative attitude. Thus, to grasp the normative fit in perceptual experiences can be explained as the awareness of one's own activity of perceiving an object as *agreeing* with normative restrictions. Ginsborg's proposal is then that the (subjective) way of perceiving that needs to be at the ground of the acquisition of empirical concepts in perceptual experiences involves a normative element that consists in the awareness of its adequacy to the perceived object. Such an awareness is neither conceptual nor representational. It is rather an attitude toward one's own mental state: that of perceiving an object in a way that it is as the experience takes it to be and thus fits the normative agreement of a universal subjectivity. With perceptual normativity at hand, the explanation of empirical conceptualization can be that empirical concepts are acquired from perceptual experiences through subjective ways of perceiving, in which the subject of the experience takes the object to be as it *ought* to be perceived. This calls for a rule of perceiving, the normative fit, which explains how empirical concepts are acquired from perceptual experiences. Where the object of perception is perceived as is ought to be, to all perceivers, an objective conceptualization can thus take place. Thus, perceptual normativity is the best candidate to occupy

the middle ground in perception, between sense impressions or sensations and concepts or thoughts, since it provides a non-circular explanation of how perceptual experiences ground the acquisition of empirical concepts.

4. Conceptualism: a new mapping?

To conclude, Ginsborg proposal is that, to avoid the infinite regress, an answer to the question of how perceptual experiences ground the acquisition of empirical concepts must, *first*, reject 2), the thesis that for an object to be perceived as having a certain property the correspondent concept has to figure in its subject's experience. *Second*, to avoid the infinite regress, the rejection of 2) must distinguish two ways of thinking about phenomenological ways of perceiving (that I called the objective and the subjective), and, *third*, toss the objective one and consider just the subjective one. Finally, an answer to the question of how perceptual experiences ground the acquisition of empirical concepts can consider Kant's insight on the nature of aesthetic judgments and, from there, model perceptual judgments on judgments of taste. For Ginsborg, Kant's account of judgements of taste provides a model for perceptual judgements in that it offers a way of thinking on subjective ways of perceiving as being ruled by a universal norm.

Ginsborg's perceptual normativity is thus a proposal from aesthetics, and more precisely, Kant's proposals on aesthetic judgements, that can be called to solve a problem within the philosophy of perception. But, although this is not a path I can take here, Ginsborg's perceptual normativity can do more than this.

Considering the distinction Richard. G. Heck Jr. (2000) establishes, and others (Bengson, Grube and Korean 2011; Tang 2010) endorse as a distinction between state conceptualism and content conceptualism, Ginsborg's perceptual normativity can be used to reconsider the place of conceptualism within the map of positions in contemporary philosophy of perception. This is so for state conceptualism is the view according to which perceptual experiences are conceptual mental states; and content conceptualism is the view according to which the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual. This distinction allows for different combinations. Heck (2000) notices that, with this distinction

at hand, Gareth Evans' proposal can be reconsidered as a version of state conceptualism that rejects content conceptualism.

For some, as for Evans (1982) or Bengson, Grube and Korean (2011), a conceptual mental state is a mental state in which a subject can be only if she has possession of concepts. But there is also the possibility of considering that conceptual mental states are those mental states in which conceptual capacities are in exercise, independently of the possession of concepts. I believe that a proposal in these lines is what is at stake for Michael Dummett when he claims that to see colors is possible only for those who acquired the concepts expressed by color-words (1996). Dummett is clear in stating that the notion of concept at stake in his proposal is one that follows a 'Wittgensteinian grammar'. That is, for Dummett, the acquisition and possession of concepts is, not a psychological internal event, but a normative achievement. So, in Dummett's perspective, the activity of conceptual capacities is not representational, in that it involves content, but linguistic. It is, thus, as Evan's nonconceptualism, a case of state conceptualism.

Although this is a claim that must be investigated, at a first glance, Dummett's conceptualism seems to be compatible with Ginsborg's Kantian perceptual normativity. If it is so, then there is at least one version of conceptualism that can be on the side of anti-representationalism in the map of positions within philosophy of perception. And this is a new way of investigation offered to the philosophy of perception by Ginsborg's perceptual normativity, based on Kant's insights on the nature of aesthetic judgements.

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