DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS
DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
Supplement 2013

Website: www.aimSciences.org

pp. **61–68**

R&D DYNAMICS

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Abstract. We study a Cournot duopoly model using Ferreira-Oliveira-Pinto's R&D investment function. We find the multiple perfect Nash equilibria and we analyse the economical relevant quantities like output levels, prices, consumer surplus, profits and welfare.

1. **Introduction.** In this paper we consider a Cournot duopoly competition model where each of the firms invest in R&D projects to reduce its initial production costs ([4, 8]). This competition is modeled, as usual, by a two stages game (see [1]). In the first subgame, two firms choose, simultaneously, the R&D investment strategies and in the second subgame, the two firms are involved in a Cournot competition with production costs equal to the reduced costs obtained in the previous stage. The R&D investment function considered is the one introduced in [5]. We find the Nash investment equilibria for the two stages game and study the economical impacts resulting from having distinct equilibria ((see [2, 9])). As it is well known from the literature, the second subgame consists of a Cournot competition and has a unique Nash equilibrium. For the first subgame, consisting of an R&D investment program there are at most four distinct Nash investment equilibria: (i) a Nash equilibrium where both firms invest (see [1]); (ii) a Nash equilibrium where firm F_1 invests and firm F_2 does not; (iii) a Nash equilibrium where firm F_2 invests and firm F_1 does not; (iv) a Nash equilibrium where neither of the firms invest. We consider a competitive investment region C where both firms invest, a single investment region S_1 for firm F_1 where just firm F_1 invests, and a single investment region S_2 for firm F_2 where just firm F_2 invests. We observe that these regions can have non-empty intersections, i.e. the strategic optimal investment equilibrium might not be unique.

2. **The Cournot competition model.** The Cournot competition with R&D investment programs consists of two subgames in one period of time (see [1]). We fully characterize the perfect Nash equilibria of the game that is determined by the Nash investment equilibria for the first subgame (non-unique) and the Nash equilibrium output level for the second subgame (see [5]).

The first subgame is an R&D investment program, where both firms have initial production costs and choose, simultaneously, their R&D investment strategies to obtain new production costs. The second subgame is a standard Cournot duopoly

2010 *Mathematics Subject Classification.* 91A10, 91A40.
Key words and phrases. Nash *R&D* investment strategies, duopoly model.

competition with production costs equal to the reduced cost obtained in the previous stage. We consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, F_1 and F_2, each one producing a differentiated good, where q_i denotes the output quantity of the firm F_i. In the region of quantity space where prices are positive, we assume that the inverse demands are linear and the price p_i of the good produced by the firm F_i is given by

$$p_i = \alpha - \beta q_i - \gamma q_j,$$

where $\alpha, \beta > 0$. Furthermore, we assume that the goods are substitutes, i.e. $\gamma > 0$ (see [11]).

The firm F_i invests an amount v_i in an R&D program

$$a_i : [0, +\infty] \times [c_L, \alpha] \to [c_i - \epsilon(c_i - c_L), c_i]$$

that reduces its production cost c_i to a new production cost $a_i = a_i(v_i, c_i)$ given by

$$a_i = c_i - \frac{\epsilon(c_i - c_L)v_i}{\lambda + v_i}. \tag{1}$$

All the results presented hold in an open region of parameters $(\lambda, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ containing the point $(0.2, 10, 0.013, 0.013)$.

The profit $\pi_i(q_i, q_j)$ of firm F_i is given by:

$$\pi_i(q_i, q_j) = \pi_i(q_i, q_j; v_1, v_2, c_1, c_2) = q_i\left(\alpha - \beta q_i - \gamma q_j - a_i\right) - v_i, \tag{2}$$

for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$ and $i \neq j$. Let

$$R_i = \frac{2\beta\alpha - \gamma\alpha - 2\beta a_i + \gamma a_j}{4\beta^2 - \gamma^2},$$

with $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$ and $i \neq j$. As it is well-known (see [5, 7]), the *Nash equilibrium output level* (q_1, q_2) is given by:

$$q_i = q_i(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2) = \begin{cases} 0, \text{ if } R_i \leq 0 \\ R_i, \text{ if } 0 < R_i < \frac{\alpha - a_j}{\gamma} \\ \frac{\alpha - a_i}{2\beta}, \text{ if } R_i \geq \frac{\alpha - a_j}{\gamma} \end{cases}. \tag{3}$$

At the Nash equilibrium output level, the price p_i of firm F_i is given by

$$p_i = p_i(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2) = \alpha - \beta q_i(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2) - \gamma q_j(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2).$$

Furthermore, the profit $\pi_i(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2)$ of firm F_i is given by:

$$\pi_i(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2) = \begin{cases} -v_i, \text{ if } R_i \leq 0 \\ \beta R_i^2 - v_i, \text{ if } 0 < R_i < \frac{\alpha - a_j}{\gamma} \\ \frac{(\alpha - a_i)^2}{4\beta} - v_i, \text{ if } R_i \geq \frac{\alpha - a_j}{\gamma} \end{cases}. \tag{4}$$

Given initial production costs c_1 and c_2, the sets A_i of new production costs for firms F_1 and F_2 are given by:

$$A_i = A_i(c_1, c_2) = [c_i - \epsilon(c_i - c_L), c_i],$$



FIGURE 1. (**A**) Full characterization of the Nash investment regions in terms of the firms' initial production costs $(c_1, c_2) \in [4, 10]^2$. The single investment regions S_1 and S_2 are shown in blue and red, respectively; the competitive investment region C is shown in green; and the Nil Nash investment region N is shown in grey, dark blue and dark red. (**B**) Zoom of Figure (**A**) in the region $(c_1, c_2) \in [9, 10]^2$. The intersection $S_1 \cap S_2$ between the region S_1 and the region S_2 is shown in pink. The intersection $S_1 \cap C$ between the region S_1 (respectively S_2) and the region C is shown in light blue (respectively light red); The intersection $S_1 \cap C \cap S_2$ between the region S_1, the region S_2 and the region C is shown in light grey.

for $i \in \{1, 2\}$. The R&D cost reduction investment programs a_1 and a_2 of the firms determine a bijection between the *investment region* $\mathbb{R}_0^+ \times \mathbb{R}_0^+$ of both firms and the *new production costs region* $A_1 \times A_2$ given by the map

$$\begin{array}{rcccc} \mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2) & : & (\mathbb{R}_0^+)^2 \times [c_L, \alpha]^2 & \longrightarrow & A_1 \times A_2 \\ & & (v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2) & \longmapsto & (a_1(v_1), a_2(v_2)), \end{array}$$

where, due to the non-existence of spillovers

$$a_i(v_i) = a_i(v_i; c_i, c_j) = c_i - \frac{\epsilon(c_i - c_L)v_i}{\lambda + v_i}.$$

The new production costs region can be decomposed, at most, in three disconnected economical regions characterized by the optimal output level of the firms: the *monopoly region* M_i of firm F_i; the *duopoly region* D characterized by the optimal output levels of both firms being non-zero and consequently below their monopoly output levels (see [5]).

The *best investment response (multivalued) function* $V_1 : \mathbb{R}_0^+ \times [c_L, \alpha]^2 \to \mathbb{R}_0^+$ of firm F_1 is given by:

$$V_1(v_2; c_1, c_2) = \arg\max_{v_1} \pi_1(v_1, v_2; c_1, c_2).$$

In [5], an explicit computational algorithm to find the best investment response function $V_i : \mathbb{R}_0^+ \to \mathbb{R}_0^+$ is presented.



FIGURE 2. (**A**) Plot of the Nash investment $v_1 = v_1(c_1, c_2)$ of Firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2); (**B**) Plot of the aggregated investments $v = v_1 + v_2$ of Firms F_1 and F_2 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2); (**C**) Plot of the price $p_1 = p_1(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2); c_1, c_2)$ of Firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$.

The *Nash investment equilibria* are given by the (multivalued) function

$$v : [c_L, \alpha]^2 \to (\mathbb{R}_0^+)^2,$$

where $v(c_1, c_2) = (v_1, v_2)$ are the solutions of the system:

$$\begin{cases} v_1 = V_1(v_2; c_1, c_2) \\ v_2 = V_2(v_1; c_1, c_2) \end{cases}.$$

We find, at most, four distinct types of Nash investment equilibria (v_1, v_2): (i) a *competitive Nash equilibrium* where both firms invest, i.e. $v_1 > 0$ and $v_2 > 0$; (ii) a *single Nash equilibrium of firm* F_1 where firm F_1 invests and firm F_2 does not, i.e. $v_1 > 0$ and $v_2 = 0$; (iii) a *single Nash equilibrium of firm* F_2 where firm F_2 invests and firm F_1 does not, i.e. $v_2 > 0$ and $v_1 = 0$; (iv) a *Nil Nash equilibrium* where neither firm F_1 neither firm F_2 invest, i.e. $v_1 = 0$ and $v_2 = 0$ (see [5]). We define a *competitive investment region* C consisting of Nash investment equilibria where both firms invest, a *single investment region* S_1 for firm F_1, consisting of Nash investment equilibria where just firm F_1 invests, a *single investment region* S_2 for firm F_2, consisting of Nash investment equilibria where just firm F_2 invests and a *nil investment region* N where neither of the firms invest (see [5]).

We note that in every figure of this paper we use the same colors to identify the different regions. The single investment regions S_1 and S_2 are shown in blue and red, respectively. The competitive investment region C is shown in green. The Nil Nash investment region N is shown in grey, dark blue and dark red. The intersection $S_1 \cap S_2$ between the region S_1 and the region S_2 is shown in pink. The intersection $S_1 \cap C$ between the region S_1 (respectively S_2) and the region C is shown in light blue (respectively light red); The intersection $S_1 \cap C \cap S_2$ between the region S_1, the region S_2 and the region C is shown in light grey (see the right hand figure).

3. **Investment analysis.** We are going to study the Nash investment equilibria $v : [c_L, \alpha]^2 \to (\mathbb{R}_0^+)^2$. Let us denote $v(c_1, c_2)$ by $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$ (see Figure 2).

If the new production costs $(a_1(v_1), a_2(v_2)) \in M_2$, then the Nash investment equilibrium v_1 of firm F_1 is $v_1 = 0$ (see Figure 2).



FIGURE 3. (**A**) Plot of the output level $q_1 = q_1(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2); c_1, c_2)$ of Firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$; (**B**) Plot of the aggregated output levels $Q = q_1 + q_2$ of Firms F_1 and F_2 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$.

Let $\eta_i = \epsilon(c_i - c_L)$, $L_1 = 6\beta\lambda^2 - \lambda\eta_1^2 - \eta_1\lambda(\alpha - c_1)$ and $N_1 = 2\beta\lambda^3 - \eta_1\lambda^2(\alpha - c_1)$. If the new production costs $(a_1(v_1), a_2(v_2)) \in M_1$, then the Nash investment equilibrium v_1 of firm F_1 is a solution of the following polynomial equation (see [5]):

$$2\beta v_1^3 + 6\beta\lambda v_1^2 + L_1 v_1 + N_1 = 0. \tag{5}$$

Let $A_i = 4\beta^2\eta_i\lambda$, $G_i = -2\beta\eta_i\lambda$, $H_i = \gamma\eta_i\lambda$, $C = (4\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2$, $E_i = \alpha - c_i + \eta_i$ and $F_i = 2\beta E_i - \gamma E_j$. Let $I_i = -A_i F_i C^{-1}$, $J_i = -A_i H_i C^{-1}$ and $K_i = -A_i G_i C^{-1}$. If the new production costs $(a_1(v_1), a_2(v_2)) \in D$, then the Nash investment equilibrium v_1 of firm F_1 is a solution of the following polynomial equation (see [5]):

$$J_1^3 v_1^3 + (J_1(I_2 v_1 + J_2) - K_2)(v_1^3 + I_1 v_1 + K_1)^2 = 0. \tag{6}$$

4. **Profit and welfare analysis.** We study the output levels q_1, the prices p_1 and the profits π_1 of Firm F_1 depending upon the initial production costs (c_1, c_2), when both firms choose to invest accordingly with the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$. We find the consumer surplus cs_1 of the consumers of firm F_1 and the consumer surplus $cs = cs_1 + cs_2$ of the consumers of both firms depending upon the initial production costs (c_1, c_2), when both firms choose to invest accordingly with the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$. We analyse the welfare $w_1 = cs_1 + \pi_1$ of the market of firm F_1 and the welfare $w = w_1 + w_2$ of the consumers of both firms depending upon the initial production costs (c_1, c_2), when both firms choose to invest accordingly with the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$.

Let $q_i = q_i(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2); c_1, c_2)$ be the output level of Firm F_i in terms of the production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$ (see Figure 3**A**). The marginal rate of the output level q_i with respect to the



FIGURE 4. (**A**) Plot of the profit $\pi_1 = \pi_1(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2); c_1, c_2)$ of Firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$; (**B**) Plot of the aggregate profit $\pi = \pi_1 + \pi_2$ in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$.

production costs c_i is given by:

$$\frac{dq_i}{dc_i} = \begin{cases} \frac{\eta_i\lambda}{2\beta(\lambda+v_i)^2}\frac{\partial v_i}{\partial c_i}, \text{ if } (a_i(v_i), a_j(v_j)) \in M_i \\ \frac{2\beta\eta_i\lambda}{(4\beta^2-\gamma^2)(\lambda+v_i)^2}\frac{\partial v_i}{\partial c_i} - \frac{\gamma\epsilon(c_i-c_L)\lambda}{(4\beta^2-\gamma^2)(\lambda+v_j)^2}\frac{\partial v_j}{\partial c_i}, \text{ if } (a_i(v_i), a_j(v_j)) \in D \\ 0, \text{ if } (a_i(v_i), a_j(v_j)) \in M_j \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

Let $p_i = p_i(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2); c_1, c_2)$ be the price of Firm F_i in terms of the production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$ (see Figure 3**C**). The marginal rate of the price p_i with respect to the production costs c_i is given by:

$$\frac{dp_i}{dc_i} = \begin{cases} -\frac{\eta_i\lambda}{2(\lambda+v_i)^2}\frac{\partial v_i}{\partial c_i}, \text{ if } (a_i(v_i), a_j(v_j)) \in M_i \\ -\frac{2\beta^2\eta_i\lambda}{(4\beta^2-\gamma^2)(\lambda+v_i)^2}\frac{\partial v_i}{\partial c_i} + \frac{\beta\gamma\epsilon(c_i-c_L)\lambda}{(4\beta^2-\gamma^2)(\lambda+v_j)^2}\frac{\partial v_j}{\partial c_i}, \text{ if } (a_i(v_i), a_j(v_j)) \in D \\ 0, \text{ if } (a_i(v_i), a_j(v_j)) \in M_j \end{cases} . \quad (8)$$

Let $\pi_i = \pi_i(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2); c_1, c_2)$ be the profit of Firm F_i in terms of the production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$ (see Figure 4**A**). The marginal rate of the profit π_i with respect to the production costs c_i is given by:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial c_i} = \frac{q_i \partial p_i}{\partial c_i} + \frac{p_i \partial q_i}{\partial c_i}.$$

The consumer surplus $cs_i = cs_i(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2), c_1, c_2)$ of the consumers of firm F_i (see Figure 5**A**) is given by:

$$cs_i = (\beta_i q_i^2)/2. \quad (9)$$

In Figure 5**C** we present the welfare $w_i = w_i(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2), c_1, c_2)$ of the market of firm F_i .



FIGURE 5. (**A**) Plot of the consumer surplus cs_1 of Firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$; (**B**) Plot of the aggregate consumer surplus $cs = cs_1 + cs_2$ of Firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$; (**C**) Plot of the welfare w_1 of firm F_1 in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$; (**D**) Plot of the aggregate welfare $w = w_1 + w_2$ in terms of the initial production costs (c_1, c_2) using the Nash investment equilibria $(v_1(c_1, c_2), v_2(c_1, c_2))$.

5. **Conclusions.** In this paper we studied the mathematical and economical properties of the multiple perfect Nash equilibria of a Cournot duopoly competition model where each of the firms invest in R&D projects to reduce its initial production costs. We analysed the output levels q_1, the prices p_1 and the profits π_1 of Firm F_1; the consumer surplus cs_1 of the consumers of firm F_1; and the welfare $w_1 = cs_1 + \pi_1$ of the market of firm F_1. Furthermore, we analysed the aggregated output levels $Q = q_1 + q_2$ and the aggregated profits $\pi = \pi_1 + \pi_2$ of both firms; the aggregated consumer surplus $cs = cs_1 + cs_2$ of the consumers of both firms and the aggregated welfare $w = w_1 + w_2$ of the full market.

Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Marta Faias, Edson de Faria, Helena Ferreira, John Franks and Myrna Wooders for helpful discussions. We acknowledge the financial support of LIAAD-INESC TEC through 'Strategic Project

- LA 14 - 2013-2014' with reference PEst-C/EEI/LA0014/2013, USP-UP project, IJUP, Faculty of Sciences, University of Porto, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, FEDER, POCI 2010 and COMPETE Programmes and Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) through Project Dynamics and Applications, with reference PTDC/MAT/121107/2010. Part of this research was done during visits by the authors to IMPA (Brazil), The University of Warwick (United Kingdom), Institut Henri Poincaré (France) and SUNY (USA). We thank them for their hospitality.

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Received for publication September 2012.

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