Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2010

Authors

Parreiras, SO (Author) Other; Rubinchik, A (Author) Other

Journal

Title: Games and Economic Behavior

Vol. 68

Pages: 703-715

ISSN: 0899-8256

Publisher: Elsevier

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 35 Citations

Scopus - 41 Citations

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-017-3S4

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.007

Abstract (EN): We study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort (bid) where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution. These differences can either cause a player to drop out, that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation, or use "all-or-nothing" strategies with discontinuous effort choice. Neither complete drop-out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex-ante identical players or only two distinct participants. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 13