Resumo (PT):
Abstract (EN):
This article starts by defining instrumentalized knowledge (IK) as the practice of selectively
valuing some set of reliable beliefs for the promotion of a more generally false or unreliable worldview.
IK is typically exploited by conspiratorial echo chambers, which display systematic distrust and
opposition towards mainstream epistemic authorities. We argue that IK is problematic in that it
violates core epistemic virtues, and this gives rise to clear and present harms when abused by said
echo chambers. Yet, we contend, mainstream epistemic authorities (MEAs) are also complicit in
practices resembling IK; we refer to these practices as instrumentalized knowledge* (IK*). IK* differs
from IK in that the selective valuing of beliefs corresponds to a ”reliable” worldview, namely, one
independently verified by the relevant epistemic experts. We argue that IK*, despite its apparent
veracity, is also problematic, as it violates the same epistemic virtues as IK despite its aim of promoting
true beliefs. This, we argue, leads it to being counterproductive in its goal of producing knowledge
for the sake of the pursuit of truth, thereby raising the question of what distinguishes virtuous
from nonvirtuous practices of instrumentalized knowledge. In an attempt to avoid this violation
and to distinguish IK* from IK, we investigate whether and how IK* could still be epistemically
virtuous. We conclude that IK* can be virtuous if its goal is to produce understanding as opposed to
mere knowledge.
Language:
English
Type (Professor's evaluation):
Scientific
No. of pages:
14