A Note on Type-Symmetries in Finite Games

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2022

Authors

Soeiro, R (Author) FEUP; Alberto A. Pinto (Author) FCUP

Journal

Title: Mathematics

Final page: 4696

Publisher: MDPI

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 0 Citations

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00X-KAA

DOI: 10.3390/math10244696

Abstract (EN): In two-action generalized polymatrix games, Nash equilibria are support-type-symmetric, i.e., determined by supports for each type of player. We show that such a property does not generalize straightforwardly for games with at least three actions or where interaction weights have different signs (neither all positive nor negative). A non-trivial condition on interaction weights must be satisfied, which may go unnoticed as it is trivially satisfied for: (i) two-action games, (ii) conformity games, and (iii) congestion games. We derive this condition and the corresponding simplified analytic equation for mixed strategies.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 13