EXPLAINING THE DEFINITION OF WHOLESALE ACCESS PRICES IN THE PORTUGUESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2022

Authors

Ribeiro, VM (Author) FEP; Pereira, FL (Author) Other; Goncalves, R (Author) Other

Journal

Title: Journal of Dynamics and Games

Vol. 9

Pages: 33-74

Publisher: American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 0 Citations

Scopus - 0 Citations

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00V-YHS

DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2021024

Abstract (EN): The 2016-2018 triennium was a period marked by a fierce dispute between the European Commission and Autoridade Nacional de Comunicacoes, Portugal, on the need to regulate wholesale access prices. While the European Commission defended the imposition of Fiber-To-The-x regulation in non-competitive areas, the Portuguese sectoral regulator argued in favor of the persistence of Fiber-To-The-x deregulation. Following a Game Theory approach, the present study demonstrates that the transition from Fiber-To-Thex deregulation to Fiber-To-The-x regulation should only occur when a given territorial unit becomes a competitive area since the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium captures a regulatory framework optimally characterized by the imposition of active access price deregulation (regulation) in non-competitive (competitive) areas, that is, local administrative units characterized by a weak (strong) degree of vertical spillover, respectively. Meanwhile, ducts access regulation must be permanently imposed throughout the national territory, despite it can be relaxed in competitive areas if the regulator imposes intra-flexibility to establish a monopolistic bottleneck to ensure social welfare maximization. Previous conclusions require to introduce both facility-based and service-based competition at the entry stage as well as active and passive obligations at the regulation stage in a multi-stage game with complete information. The present analysis legitimizes the emergence of a new optimization theory in the telecommunications literature, whose modus operandi is contrary to (coincident with) the ladder of investment theory in non-competitive (competitive) areas, respectively. Differently from the view sustained by the ladder of investment theory, which defends that a short-term regulatory touch combined with long-term market deregulation is a socially optimal strategy, the new theory confirms that a regulatory intervention is socially desirable only in the long run. The conceptual refinement is meticulously explained and labeled as the theory of creative creation because, differently from the Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction, whose processes of industrial mutation are permanently market-driven by assumption, a period of regulatory holidays followed by successive regulatory interventions dependent on the degree of vertical spillover observed in the telecommunications industry can effectively promote investment realization that continuously revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly destroying the old technology. The theory of creative creation reflects the regulatory framework currently in force in the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 42