Sequential cross-border mergers

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2009

Authors

Eileen Fumagalli (Author) Other; Helder Vasconcelos (Author) FEP

Journal

Title: International Journal of Industrial Organization

Vol. 27

Pages: 175-187

ISSN: 0167-7187

Publisher: Elsevier

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 19 Citations

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 20 Citations

Econlit

Scientific classification

FOS: Social sciences > Economics and Business

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-003-MV3

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.06.002

Abstract (EN): This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between intra-national and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly with a cost structure a la Perry and Porter [Perry, M. and Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger. American Economic Review 75(1), 219-227]. We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs: and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 13