General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2012

Authors

João Correia-da-Silva (Author) FEP; Carlos Hervés-Beloso (Author) FEP

Journal

Title: Economic Theory

Vol. 51 No. 3

Pages: 729-755

ISSN: 0938-2259

Publisher: Springer Nature

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 13 Citations

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 16 Citations

Econlit

Scientific classification

FOS: Social sciences > Economics and Business

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-002-426

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0647-1

Abstract (EN): We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 27