Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2011

Authors

Alonso Meijide, JM (Author) Other; Ferreira, F (Author) Other; Alvarez Mozos, M (Author) Other; Pinto, AA (Author) FCUP

Journal

Title: Journal of Difference Equations and Applications

Vol. 17 No. 7

Pages: 1095-1100

ISSN: 1023-6198

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 5 Citations

Scopus - 8 Citations

Scientific classification

FOS: Natural sciences > Mathematics

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-002-XCC

DOI: 10.1080/10236190903200677

Resumo (PT): Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Abstract (EN): Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 6