The power of voting and corruption cycles

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2022

Authors

Accinelli, E. (Author) Other; Martins, F. (Author) FCUP; Pinto, Alberto Adrego (Author) FCUP; Afsar, A. (Author) Other; Oliveira, B.M.P.M. (Author) FCNAUP

Journal

Title: Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Pages: 1-24

ISSN: 0022-250X

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 5 Citations

Scopus - 3 Citations

Scientific classification

CORDIS: Health sciences

FOS: Medical and Health sciences

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00S-QAW

DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2020.1818077

Abstract (EN): We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 24