Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2017

Authors

Carvalho, M (Author) Other; Lodi, A (Author) Other; Joao Pedro Pedroso (Author) FCUP; Viana, A (Author) Other

Journal

The Journal is awaiting validation by the Administrative Services.

Title: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING

Vol. 161

Pages: 389-417

ISSN: 0025-5610

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 20 Citations

Scopus - 22 Citations

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00K-E9S

DOI: 10.1007/s10107-016-1013-7

Abstract (EN): Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national, regional or hospital frameworks, to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted. For the case of hospital programs, it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other, sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals. This claim led to the study of multi-hospital exchange markets. We propose a novel direction in this setting by modeling the exchange market as an integer programming game. The analysis of the strategic behavior of the entities participating in the kidney exchange game allowed us to prove that the most rational game outcome maximizes the social welfare and that it can be computed in polynomial time.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 29