NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL

• Type: Article in International Scientific Journal
• Date: 2017

Authors

Zubelli, JP (Author) Other; Alberto A. Pinto (Author) FCUP; Martins, F (Author) Other

Journal

Title: Journal of Dynamics and Games

Vol. 4

Pages: 149-173

Publisher: American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Indexing

ISI Web of Knowledge - 1 Citation

Scopus - 1 Citation

Other information

Authenticus ID: P-00M-W7Y

DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2017009

Abstract (EN): We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quantities. We compare the competitive (Nash) tariffs with the cooperative (social) tariffs and we classify the game type according to the coincidence or not of these equilibria as a social equilibrium, a prisoner's dilemma or a lose-win dilemma.

Language: English

Type (Professor's evaluation): Scientific

No. of pages: 25